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Preface 
In this book I describe problems encountered by British con-
suls and the British legation during the American Civil War 
and attempt to determine their influence on the British For-
eign Office's attitude and policies toward the crisis. My discus-
sion is limited solely to issues within the Union and the Con-
federacy and does not cover such topics as the Trent affair, the 
building of Confederate raiders arid Laird Rams in British 
shipyards, or other issues that at times put the Union and 
Britain on the brink of war. These topics have been thoroughly 
covered in such seminal works as Ephraim Adams's Great 
Britain and the American Civil War, published in 1924, and in 
many fine diplomatic studies and essays since. 
I originally intended to study the consuls only, but investi-
gating their problems made me aware of the vital role played 
by the legation in Washington. The consular and diplomatic 
corps were separate departments within the foreign service, 
but foreign· ministers supervised the work of consuls and the 
two worked closely on issues of common concern. 
My interest in this topic began when I read William Howard 
Russell's diary, published in 1863. As special correspondent for · 
the London Times during the first year of war, Russell traveled 
throughout the United States and remarked on the consuls 
and their problems in each major city he visited. He also made 
numerous references to Lord Lyons, British foreign minister to 
the United States. Investigation on my part revealed that very 
few historical studies had been done on the consuls or Lyons. 
Thomas Newton's two-volume biography of Lyons, written in 
1913, devoted less than one hundred pages to the Civil War 
years and was based on limited sources and documentation. For 
the consuls there was only the work of Milledge Bonham Jr. on 
the British consuls in the Confederacy, written as a doctoral 
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dissertation at Columbia University during the first decade of 
the twentieth century. Bonham's pioneering study was an ex-
cellent introduction but, like Newton's biography, it also was 
based on limited sources. Major collections including Lyons's 
papers, Foreign Office correspondence between the British 
legation and the consuls, as well as diplomatic correspondence 
between the U.S. State Department and the British legation 
was not available to the public before the First World War. His-
torians now have access to these materials and their availabili-
ty opens the way for a more comprehensive investigation of 
British legation and consular problems with the Union and the 
Confederate governments. 
I have broadened Bonham's study by including consuls in 
the North as well as the South, and this has given me oppor-
tunity to compare the similarity and intensity of their prob-
lems. The issues were comparable b~t established diplomatic 
relations between Great Britain and the Union eased their se-
verity in the North and ultimately provided a means for easier 
solution, whereas the lack of any diplomatic channel in the 
South caused increasing resentment and bitterness toward 
Great Britain and its consuls. 
I also attempt to reevaluate past impressions of consular atti-
tudes, espeCially those of Robert Bunch, consul at Charleston. 
Bonham accepted the general belief of South Carolinians and 
the U.S. State Department that Bunch was pro-Confederate. 
However, Bunch's correspondence-found chiefly in Foreign 
Office records and the Lyons papers-indicates the reverse was 
true. His attitude about the war, the South, and its leaders, 
expressed to his superiors at the legation in Washington and at 
the Foreign Office in London, was hardly pro-Southern. 
I have been exceptionally fortunate iri securing assistance 
from many individuals and institutions while undertaking my 
research. Grants from the American Philosophical Society, the 
National Endowment for the Humanities, and Colorado State 
University provided funds for travel to libraries and reposito-
ries in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Li-
brarians at theLibrary of Congress, the National Archives in 
Washington, D.C., and at Duke University were helpful in lo-
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eating materials and answering my many questions. Beverly 
D. Bishop at the Emory University Library; Charles Reeves, 
assistant director at the regional center of the National Ar-
chives at East Point, Georgia; and Michael Meier of the Mili-
tary Records Division at the National Archives permitted me 
to photocopy a significant portion of the information I needed 
from their holdings and to study in leisure away from the ar-
chives. In England, Mrs. H.E. Jones, assistant keeper of the 
records in the Public Record Office at K.ew, and Mrs. Patricia 
Gill, county archivist at the West Sussex Record Office, an-
swered my many letters and aided me in numerous ways dur-
ing my research trips to London and Chichester. The staffs at 
K.ew and Chichester did much to help an uninitiated American 
become familiar with the English library system. Without the 
assistance of all of these individuals this book might never 
have been written. Extracts from the Lyons papers are repro-
duced with the permission of the Trustees of the Arundel Cas-
tle Archives, and with acknowledgment of the County Archi-
vist, West Sussex Record Office. 
Colleagues and friends also aided me by reading portions of 
the manuscript and offering suggestions for improvement. Pro-
fessors Robert W. Johannsen of the University of Illinois, Ur-
bana, and Mark T. Gilderhus at Colorado State University read 
an early draft of the entire manuscript and saved me from a 
number of mishaps. Carolyn Duff, a professional editor, made 
suggestions for organizational refinement that improved the 
book throughout. Interpretations found herein, however, are 
solely mine and I take full responsibility for them. John C. 
Inscoe, editor of the Georgia Historical Quarterly, granted per-
mission to incorporate into chapter 6 portions of "The Case of 
Stirrup and Edwards, 1861-1870," which appeared in the spring 
1992 issue of the Quarterly. Finally, my thanks to Betsy, Anne, 
and Tad for encouraging my research trips to England even 
though they had to remain at home. Staying home was partic-
ularly difficult for Anne because her appreciation for British 
culture is inexhaustible. To my family especially and to col-
leagues I express my deepest appreciation. 
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1 
The Foreign Service 
on the Eve of the War 
The British foreign service in the nineteenth century consisted 
of the diplomatic corps and the consular corps. The diplomatic 
corps represented the British government in foreign capitals, 
acting as ·diplomate agent and transmitting correspondence. 
The chief diplomatic agent was either an ambassador, a minis-
ter, or an envoy, the title determined by the military and politi-
cal importance that London placed on the foreign country. The 
head of the British legation in Washington was a minister; he 
was supported by a secretary of legation, who served as charge 
d'affaires in the absence orillness of the minister, and a number 
of attaches, unpaid young men who assisted with daily business 
or worked as secretaries. To reduce expenses, the British gov-
ernment did not maintain a permanent diplomatic compound 
in Washington, and the minister rented a private house to serve 
as both legation and residence for the staff.1 
The consular corps was larger but in many ways the step-
child of the foreign service. Sons of the aristocracy and landed 
gentry received diplomatic appointments, while members of 
the merchant class and retired military officers were assigned 
to the consulates. Moreover, consuls were never promoted to 
the diplomatic corps because the Foreign Office considered 
such advances inappropriate and unfair to attaches working 
toward promotion. Only once, at the beginning ·of the nine-
teenth century, was a consul elevated to the diplomatic corps.2 
The first British consulate in the United States was estab-
lished at Boston in 1790, one year before the two countries 
established formal diplomatic relations; by 1860 the number 
had grown to fourteen. Because a consul's peacetime duties 
focused on enhancing his country's trade and protecting indi-
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viduals employed in trading ventures, most of the consulates 
were located in seaport cities: Portland, Maine; Boston; New 
York City; Philadelphia; Baltimore; Charleston; Savannah; 
Mobile; New Orleans; Galveston; and San Francisco. The only 
consulates in the interior of the country were in Richmond, 
Chicago, and Buffalo. a 
In contrast to the British service, other European nations 
maintained much smaller consular systems. France had four 
consulates and Spain had three, all located in major port cit-
ies. Other European and most Latin American nations sup-
ported at least two consulates, usually at New York and New 
·Orleans, but often one person acted as consul for several coun-
tries or consular agents (a rank below consul) represented one 
or more governments. 4 
The major distinction between the British and American 
foreign services was the professionalism of the former and the 
political nature of the latter. Presidents usually appointed in-
dividuals to diplomatic posts as a reward for party loyalty, 
whereas British diplomatic personnel began their careers as 
unpaid attaches. American consulates, too, were awarded as 
political favors or at the request of politicians seeking appoi:p.t-
ments for friends and supporters. Some Americans assigned to 
minor consulates retained their posts despite changing admin-
istrations at home and a few even passed them on to members 
of their own family, but more lucrative consular posts, such as 
London, Paris, and Liverpool, changed hands with the inau-
guration of every new president. In contrast, most British con-
suls began their careers as unpaid secretaries or vice-consuls 
before being assigned a consulate of their own. s 
Diplomats and consuls were accorded different kinds of re-
ception upon arrival at their new posts. In the United States, 
ministers presented their credentials at the State Department 
before undertaking their duties, and the secretary of state then 
accompanied them to the White House for an audience with the 
president. ·The length of the meeting depended upon the ad-
ministration's opinion of the county's importance. William 
Howard Russell, correspondent for the London Times visiting 
the United States in 1861 and 1862, was introduced to Presi-
dent Lincoln following the audience at which the Italian min-
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ister had been formally presented. Russell noted that Lincoln's 
remarks to the minister were perfunctory, whereas his conver-
sation with Russell was more lively and lasted much longer.s 
Consuls did not receive personal acknowledgement from the 
State Department. It merely granted them an exequatur, a for-
mal statement authorizing them to exercise their powers. Exe-
quaturs varied, some stipulating the exact geographical limits 
of the consul's authority, others being less specific. The consul 
at Richmond, for example, could only perform his consular du-
ties within Virginia, whereas the exequatur for the consul at 
Chicago placed no restrictions on the geographical area of his 
authority. Unlike ministers, consuls were not granted extra-
territc;>riality and were subject to punishment for infringe-
ments of national and local laws. 7 
In addition to consuls, there were numerous British vice-
consuls in the United States. Some worked at consular offices, 
others managed separate vice-consulates. Until1843 the For-
eign Office named vice-consuls, and they received exequaturs 
from the United States government. This procedure became . 
less formal after that date; the Foreign Office continued to 
name the vice-consul at New York City but permitted other 
consuls to choose their own subordinates. Exequaturs were no 
longer required for vice-consuls. In most cases. the British 
legation in Washington approved vice-consular appointments, 
but as the wartime predicament involving the vice-consulate 
at Fredericksburg, Virginia, indicates, consuls did not always 
seek the legation's approval. Whereas consuls received their 
appointments from the Foreign Office and were British citi-
zens, vice-consuls were selected from the local population and 
tended to be naturalized American citizens of British birth. 
Usually men with commercial interests, they received no com-
pensation but accepted the vice-consulship to further their 
own business concerns. s 
Copies of exequaturs, now on file in the National Archives, 
provide accurate information on the locations of British consul-
ates in the United States and the individuals who staffed them. 
Data on vice-consulates is less accurate because exequaturs 
were not required. During the Civil War both the Lincoln and 
the Davis administrations requested the names of consuls and 
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vice-consuls functioning within their borders. Information sup-
plied byBritish authoritiesindicates only a vague knowledge 
about vice-consular personnel. The legationin Washington sub-
mitted a list of all vice-consuls in the nation, and the consul at 
Richmond responded to the Confederate request. There are nu-
merous discrepancies between the two lists regarding the spell-
ing of names, the location of vice~consulates, and the individu-
als who held posts. But they do indicate the existence of eleven 
separate British vice-consulates in. the United States, mostly 
located in smaller port cities such as Key West and Pensacola, 
Florida, and New Haven, Connecticut.9 
While the duties of the legation staff were confined to dip-
lomatic matters, the responsibilities of a consul were wide-
ranging. Asked about the various tasks he encountered in his 
job, one consul replied: ''With the exception of the administra-
tion of the Sacrament of baptism and exercising the business 
of executioner, it would be difficult to say what duties I can not 
be called on to perform." Because a consul's chief obligation 
was to oversee and enhance his country's commercial inter-
ests, his duties assumed a mercantile character. He kept close 
contact with British vessels in his port, offering vital informa-
tion about shipping possibilities and complaining to local au-
thorities when infractions of trade treaties occurred. He warned 
ship's captains of possible shipping dangers, inspected ships, 
and estimated the value of imported goods for United States 
customs officials. Consuls acted as advocates for sailors and 
civilians in trouble with the law and provided legal assistance 
if it wa.s needed. They also made sure that British ships pa.id 
their bills before leaving port· and arranged transportation on 
British ships for penniless or stranded sailors and civilians. 
Occasionally consuls in the American South were called upon 
to trace and secure the release of black British nationals kid-
napped or sold into slavery by unscrupulous authorities or in-
dividuals. They ·notarized documents, issued passports and 
certificates of nationality to British citizens, and recorded the 
births and deaths of British· nationals in their district.Io 
At the more personal level, consuls were expected to estab-
lish friendships with local commercial and. political leaders 
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and even to become members of social organizations to further 
their country's interests. They were also expected to entertain 
(usually at their own expense) prominent visiting Englishmen 
and to introduce them to social and political leaders within the 
district: The consulate at New York City virtually closed its 
doors to all other business in the fall of 1860 as the consul 
devoted his entire attention to arrangements involved with the 
visit of Edward, prince of Wales. When journalist William 
Howard Russell traveled throughout the United States at the 
outbreak of the Civil War, consuls from New York to New Or-
leans gave elaborate dinners that provided Russell with intro-
ductions to individuals knowledgeable about current affairs.n 
During the Civil War the Union blockade relieved the South-
ern consuls of their commercial responsibilities. Instead, their 
major concern centered on protecting British nationals, some 
from mistreatment by local authorities because of their race, 
others from being conscripted into the Confederate army or 
the Southern militia. Northern consuls encountered many of 
the same problems. These were, however, in addition to their 
commercial duties, which expanded because of an upsurge in 
United States foreign trade and the increasing use of British 
merchant ships by American exporters in order to avoid Con-
federate raiders. 
Considering the responsibilities of foreign service person-
nel-diplomats and consuls-their salaries were minimal and 
seldom covered the expenses of office. Both were expected to 
provide money from their own or their family's re8ources if 
expenses exceeded salary. Occasionally the British minister in 
Washington recommended small supplements to cover infla-
tion or as reimbursements for exceptional expenses, but gener-
ally he rejected pleas for increased salary because he thought 
the consuls "received sufficient compensation." 12 
Paid members of the legation staff received their salaries 
from the Civil List, a parliamentary appropriation authorizing 
wages for political and foreign service employees. Unfortu-
nately payment was often as much as three years in arrears. 
Consuls were paid in part from the Civil List and in part from 
fees they collected for their various services. There was no stan-
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dard salary scale, and the government made different arrange-
ments with each consul. As will b~ noted later, some received 
higher salaries, but the average compensation for most British 
consuls in the United States was between four hundred and five 
hundred pounds a year.1a This amount included rental for office 
space, fuel, all supplies, salaries for vice-consuls and clerks, if 
any were employed, and the consuls' own living expenses.14 
To save money, consuls sometimes sent their families to live 
with relatives in England and almost always rented office 
space in the least desirable districts. The consulate in New 
York City, the busiest in the country, consisted of two rooms 
that could be reached only by going through a back alley and 
climbing three flights of stairs. Even the Times of London 
thought that such quarters were ''beyond what ... republican 
plainness ought to demand." 15 
To compensate for their low salaries, the Foreign Office per-
mitted all but two British consuls in the United States to 
trade; that is, to engage in private commercial venture of their 
own. Some in the Southern states served as cottonfactors; oth-
ers operated import-export businesses. Several Northern con-
suls were agents for Lloyd's of London or for English compan-
ies wishing to expand their business activities to America. In 
consenting to these arrangements, the Foreign Office stipu-
lated that consuls so employed could never discuss political is-
sues in corresponclfmce with their employers back home. Con-
suls almost never mentioned their trading activities to the 
legation or the Foreign Office, but the one who did, the consul 
at Savannah, proudly announced that his investments in busi-
ness and activities in land speculation netted him over twenty 
thousand pounds a year.16 
The legation in Washington supervised consular activities 
in the United States; still, the system of communication be-
tween the consulates, the legation, and the Foreign Office was 
not firmly established. Consuls sought advice from the For-
eign Office as often as they did from the legation. If the issue 
seemed pressing or one in which the Foreign Office had a vital 
interest, they sent copies of their letters to both places at the 
same time. During the Civil War, consuls in the North re-
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tained a close association with the legation and sought direc-
tion for pressing problems. Those in the South turned more 
often to the Foreign Office because they were encouraged to 
give the impression of acting without direction from the lega-
tion. The Confederate government considered the British min-
ister in Washington accredited to a foreign government and 
lacking authority to direct consular affairs within its borders. 
But the slowness of communication with either the legation or 
the Foreign Office forced consuls in the South to cope without 
direction and to assume duties of a more diplomatic character, 
especially those connected with protecting British nationals 
from military service. 
The British foreign service in the United States was under-
going a· transformation on the eve of the Civil War. The State 
Department, in 1855, had revoked the exequaturs of the consuls 
in New York City, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati and requested 
the recall of the foreign minister for attempting to recruit 
Americans during the Crimean War. The new foreign minister, 
Lord Francis Napier, while highly respected in Washington so-
cial and po~itical circles, remained only two years, and his re-
placement lacked the same professional stature and personal 
charisma. The consuls at New York City and Philadelphia were 
quickly replaced, but the Foreign Office closed the Cincinnati 
consulate in retaliation for an American effort. to charge the 
consul with violating United States neutrality laws. The clo-
sure of the Cincinnati office would prove a seriou~ disadvantage 
to British nationals attempting to avoid service in the Union 
army during the warP 
American reaction to British recruiting efforts during the 
Crimean War (which would be in sharp contrast to the British 
reaction to a similar issue some years .later) created a certain 
tension between the.Foreign Office and the State Department 
on the eve of the Civil War. Southerners hoped that these mu-
tual British-American suspicions would capture Britain's sym-
pathy for their cause. In the beginning the South appeared suc-
cessful, but among the factors that determined Britain's final 
decision were consular problems and the Confederate response 
to them. 
2 
The Consuls 
The Foreign Office considered the consulates at New York 
City and Charleston, South Carolina, the most important in 
the United States. Not only was New York City the nation's 
major import-export center, but the consulate there served as 
a filter for virtually all news about America sent to Great 
Britain. Both the British legation and the consulates for-
warded their mail to New York City for transshipment across 
the Atlantic on fast mail packets. It was important that the 
New York consulate be headed by a man of competence, and 
the individual chosen to hold that post during the Civil War 
had proven his ability in his former career. 
The consulate at Charleston, to the contrary, required a 
man with the personality and ability to secure the confidence 
of the local population. The British government kept a close 
watch on sectional difficulties in the United States and was 
aware that they would undoubtedly break out in South Caroli-
na if a crisis erupted. Since Charleston, the state's major city, 
was also the center of states' rights thinking, the consul was in 
a strategic location for evaluating local response to sectional 
issues. 
The preeminence of New York City and Charleston was evi-
dent by the different stipulations and duties placed on the con-
suls inthose cities. Unlike other British consuls in the United 
States, the consuls at New York City and Charleston were for-
bidden to trade-that is, to engage in business activities in 
·addition to their consular obligations.l To compensate them for 
this restriction, their salaries were substantially higher than 
those of the other consuls. The consul at New York City re-
ceived twelve hundred pounds a year, from which he paid his 
own wages, all office expenses, and the salary of a vice-consul 
selected by the Foreign Office. 2 According to correspondence 
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between the foreign minister in Washington and the consul at 
Charleston, he was paid-for "special considerations" -£950 
annually, a sum which was to cover all of his expenses. Neither 
consul received any of the fees they charged for services. a 
The two consuls were almost regarded as consul-generals, 
although they did not hold the rank. The Foreign Office ele-
vated the New York City office to a consulate-generalship in 
1863, after its wartime duties had increased tremendously and 
it assumed supervision over the vice-consulates at Key West 
and Pensacola, Florida, cities the Union held during the entire 
war. The consulate at Charleston never achieved any upgrade 
in status. Lord Lyons, British foreign minister to the United 
States, often consulted the two consuls about appointments 
and other personnel matters. He also informed them about 
problems other consuls were encountering and asked for their 
advice concerning them. Foreign ministers normally solicited 
such guidance from consul-generals, not from mere consuls.4 
Finally, the men appointed to the consulates at New York 
City and Charleston attested to the importance of these cities 
in British opinion. The Foreign Office named Edward Morti-
mer Archibald as consul at New York City in 1857. Archibald 
had little consular experience but was well-known and well-
regarded in both England and Canada as a public administra-
tor and jurist. At the age of twenty-two, in 1832, he had been 
appointed chief clerk of the Newfoundland Supreme Court, an 
office he resigned in 1838 to become the colony's attorney gen-
eral. Serving in that position for almost a decade, Archibald, 
in 1847, became advocate general for Newfoundland. He also 
served on the commission that drew up the Marcy-Elgin reci-
procity treaty of 1854, which expanded American and Cana-
dian fishing rights along the Atlantic coast and granted free 
navigation of the St. Lawrence River and Lake Michigan to 
citizens of both nations. 5 Given his efficiency and experience, 
Archibald could be expected to restore confidence in his office, 
recently lost by the expulsion of his predecessor for recruiting 
American youths to fight in the Crimea. The selection of Archi-
bald was an excellent choice; he was so well-admired that he 
retained his consulship until his death in 1883. 
10 British Foreign Service and the Civil War 
Robert Bunch was consul at Charleston when the Civil War 
began. Not as distinguished as Archibald, still Bunch had a 
long and commendable career in the ·consular service.· From 
1840 until 1848 he served in various consular posts in South 
America, then in 1848 he was appointed vice-consul at New 
York City. In 1851 he advanced to a full consulship at Phila-
delphia and was transferred to Charleston in 1853, following a 
number of calls for secession from Robert Barnwell Rhett and 
the passage by a state convention of a resolution declaring that 
"South Carolina has good cause to secede from the Union." 6 
Bunch was the most outgoing of the British consuls in the 
United States. His correspondence to Lyons and Lord John 
Russell, foreign secretary in London, indicates a keen sense of 
humor, astute observation of events around him, and the abili-
ty to win the confidence of others. 7 But Bunch's success as con-
sul may have been his downfall. It was his personal friendships 
as much as his actions that caused his problems with the Lin-
coln administration during the war. 
Archibald and Bunch were to be the consuls most involved 
in wartime activities, but the others played roles. John Ed-
ward Wilkins, consul at Chicago, dealt with problems arising 
out of military activities in the western theater. Like Archi-
bald, he had no previous consular experience, but he held the 
distinction of being a fellow in the Royal Geographic Society. 
hi November 1861, as fighting intensified between Union and 
secession forces in Missouri, the Foreign Office sent Wilkins to 
St. Louis, where he could more easily "protect British citizens 
and their property"; at least, that was the reason given for the 
transfer. He remained there until after the war, when he re-
turned to Chicago.s · 
The major problems faced by consuls in the Northern states 
involved keeping British nationals from being drafted into the 
Union army. Charles Kortwright at Philadelphia, Denis Don-
ohoe at Buffalo, and John Henry Murray at Portland, Maine, 
contended with such problems, though Murray's wartime re-
sponsibilities differed little from those he carried on in peace-
time, except during the 'fully hearings of 1864. 
Francis Lousada, consul at Boston, found his workload in-
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creased in 1861 and 1862 when many British sailors were in-
carcerated at Fort Warren in Boston harbor for attempting to 
run the blockade. Still, his additional duties never became as 
onerous as those of Archibald, who had to contend with the 
much larger number of British citizens sent to Fort Lafayette 
in New York City. 
On the Pacific coast, in San Francisco, Consul William 
Booker carried on his normal peacetime duties. Separated 
from the fighting front by thousands of miles of mountains 
and plains, he only occasionally reported on pro-Union senti-
ment in California. He did send several letters detailing activ-
ities of five Russian warships in San Francisco Bay in 1863; 
otherwise, his correspondence to the Foreign Office said very 
little about American national events.9 
Frederick Bernel's position as consul at Baltimore was over-
shadowed by the nearness of the legation in Washington, 
thirty-five miles away. He reported fully on the riot between 
local civilians and Union troops on April19, 1861, but during 
most of the war his time was taken up with securing supplies 
for British warships sent to observe American naval activities 
along the Atlantic coast. They used Baltimore as a source for 
fresh food and other nonmilitary provisions.lo 
The war had greater impact on consuls in the Confederacy, 
especially those at Charleston, Richmond, and Savannah. In-
deed, the additional responsibilities and difficulties eventually 
brought an end to all unofficial communication between the 
South and the British government. Bunch was the most com-
petent consul, but his lack of discretion would be his downfall. 
George Moore at Richmond proved ineffectual but his vice-
consul, Frederick Cridland, a British citizen hoping to advance 
in the consular service, more than compensated for Moore's 
incapacity. Moore suffered from his inability to adjust to Rich-
mond after twenty years as consul in Ancona, Italy. Inflation 
and hardships in the Confederate capital only aggravated his 
dislike for the city and the officials he had to deal with.11 
The consul at Savannah proved as ineffectual as Moore. Ed-
mund Molyneux certainly found Savannah congenial, having 
lived there since his appointment as consul in 1832. But he also 
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wished to escape wartime hardships. Independently wealthy 
and reaching retirement age when the war began, Molyneux 
spent the first months of the conflict at his mountain retreat in 
North Carolina. Upon returning to Savannah he requested sick 
leave and returned to England, where he died within a year. 
Unable to send a consul from England, the Foreign Office ac-
cepted Allan Fullarton, a local banker, as acting consul. Con-
sidering his lack of experience and the problems he faced, Full-
arton coped as best he could but his efforts went unappreciated 
by the Foreign Office. 
The consul at Mobile also encountered the disfavor of the 
Foreign Office. Lord Russell dismissed the regular consul just 
as the war broke out and, anxious to avoid a confrontation 
with the Confederacy over the granting of an exequatur, he 
quickly appointed as acting consul James Magee, a retired 
businessman of British citizenship. Besides lacking in experi-
ence, Magee had strong pro-Southern bias because of his twen-
ty years' residence in Alabama. It was merely a matter of time 
before Magee embarrassed the British government and fled to 
England under a cloud of disapprobation. 
The consul at New Orleans at the beginning of the war, 
William Mure, served only until the fall of 1861, when he 
turned his office over to George Coppell and returned to Eng-
land because of ill health. After a brief confrontation with 
General Benjamin Butler following the captlire of. New Or-
leans, Coppell's responsibilities reverted to a peacetime pat-
tern. Occasionally British citizens crossed the military lines 
from the Confederacy and reported the suffering of other Eng-
lishmen, but Coppell could do little but pass this information 
on to the legation. 
Consul Arthur T. Lynn at Galveston never dealt directly 
with the Confederate government; it seemed unaware of his 
presence. Lynn at times had to confront sta.te authorities, espe-
cially with regard to the induction of British nationals into the 
Texas militia, but his reports to the legation and the Foreign 
Office imply only mild protests. His lack of forcefulness in pro-
tecting his fellow citizens may have. been due to his isolation, 
or it may be that Union Admiral David Farragut's assertion 
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that Lynn, although a British citizen, was "openly avowed as a 
notorious rebel" had some basis in fact.12 
The major question confronting the Southern consuls at the 
beginning of the war was its possible impact on their occupa-
tions. On the eve of SOuth Carolina's secession, Bunch asked 
Lyons: "What is my position?" Did his exequatur from the 
president of the United States give him the right to remain in 
the state once it seceded? If war broke out and he withdrew, to 
whom could British citizens appeal if their rights were vio-
lated or their property destroyed? Caught up in the wartime 
fervor being exhibited· by Charlestonians themselves, Bunch 
even suggested stationing a British warship in the harbor to 
evacuate British nationals if such action became necessary.ta 
In grappling with these . issues, both the legation and the 
Foreign Office recommended caution and rejected the sugges-
tion about warships in Charleston harbor. If hostilities broke 
out and the ships were fired upon, the results could be disas-
trous. Still, as Lyons pointed out, "I think the English [govern-
ment] will find it necessary to ... hold unofficial communica-
tions with the Southern Government on matters concerning 
the interests of their subjects .... It· is a preposterous preten-
sion to exclude Foreign Governments from intercourse with 
the authorities however illegitimate [when] their Subjects 
must in fact look for protection." In London the question was 
important enough to be referred to the prime minister, and he 
advised the consuls to remain and await action on the part of 
the Southerners themselves.t4 
In the end Jefferson Davis, newly elected president of the 
Confederacy, solved the problem by not making it an issue; he 
permitted foreign consuls to remain. The Confederate State 
Department did not question the exequaturs issued by the 
United States government before 1861, nor did it insist upon 
issuing its own. Davis's decision did not please a large segment 
of the Southern public, but Lyons found it acceptable. He even 
recommended the Southern consuls be instructed to communi-
cate only with the Foreign Office and to give the impression 
that the legation had no authority over them.15 
Davis's decision was influenced by the necessity of having a 
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British Consuls and Consulates during the Civil War 
Individual Title Consulate 
Edward Archibald Consul New York City 
Frederick Bernal Consul Baltimore 
William Booker Consul San Francisco 
Robert Bunch Consul (1860-61) Charleston 
George Coppell Acting Consul (1861-65) New Orleans 
Frederick Cridland Vice-Consul (1860-63) Richmond 
Acting Consul Mobile 
(May-June 1863) 
Denis Donohoe Consul Buffalo 
Pierrepont Edwards Vice-Consul New York City 
Allan FullartOn Acting Consul (1862-63) Savannah 
Charles Kortwright Consul Philadelphia 
Charles Labuzan Acting Consul (1860-61) Mobile 
Francis Lousada Consul Boston 
Arthur Lynn Consul Galveston 
James Magee Acting Consul (1861-63) Mobile 
Edmund Molyneux Consul (1860-62) Savannah 
George Moore Consul (1860~63) Richmond 
William Mure Consul (1860-61) New Orleans 
John Murray Consul Portland, Maine 
Wm. Tasker Smith Consul (1865) Savannah 
Charles Tulin Acting Consul (1860) Mobile 
H. Pinckney Walker Acting Consul (1861-63) Charleston 
John E. Wilkins Consul Chicago 
(St. Louis after 
1861) 
* Dates given if tenure was less than entire war period 
communication link with the foreign powers. Until diplomatic 
recognition was achieved, the consuls were the only source of 
information on England's attitude, and they might even influ-
ence opinion in the Foreign Office. Indeed, secessionists had 
attempted to gauge British sentiment through the consuls 
even before the Confederate government became a reality. The 
first such effort occurred as early as 1856. On the eve of that 
year's presidential election, several Southern congressmen in-
dicated to George James, then consul for Virginia, that a Re-
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publican victory might well precipitate a Southern indepen-
dence movement, and they stressed the advantages such a 
move could have for England. The conversation seems to have 
gone no further. James reported it to the Foreign Office, but 
there is no record ofits reaction.16 
The second approach came on the eve of the 1860 presidential 
contest when Consul Archibald in New York City received a 
letter from "Benjamin'' requesting his cooperation in a plan to 
separate the slave states from the Union upon Lincoln's elec-
tion, "which is almost certain." "Benjamin'' requested an intro-
duction to "Her Majesty's Ministers at Washington City, with a 
view to the accomplishment of this great end." Britain's reward 
for supporting the South, wrote "Benjamin," would be a "return 
to our allegiance with Great Britain, our mother country!!!" 
"Benjamin'' sent the letter by courier because, as he explained, 
he was a native Southerner and a former congressman andre-
vealing his true identity might be dangerous. Because of this 
statement and the signature on the letter, Judah P. Benjamin, 
senator from Louisiana at the time, was accused of being its 
author, but he vigorously denied the accusation. The true au-
thor never revealed himself, but it probably was not Benjamin. 
Why would a United States senator seek an introduction to the 
British minister through a consul in New York City when he 
could make it as easily, and less obtrusively, at a Washington 
social gathering? 
Given the circumstances of its delivery and the author's de-
sire to remain anonymous, Archibald thought the letter might 
be a prank, but he decided to respond, telling "Benjamin'' that 
he had no interest in the scheme and would report him to Fed-
eral authorities if he knew his identity. Archibald then in-
formed his own government of the affair.17 
Two more attempts to gauge British opinion through the con-
suls were made following Lincoln's election in 1860. Consul 
Mure at New Orleans wrote of being approached by "several 
gentlemen'' who promised reduced tariffs and a monopoly over 
the entire coastal trade from Virginia to Texas if Britain re-
vealed "sympathy" for the Southern move toward indepen-
dence.ls But the Foreign Office took more seriously the over-
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tures made by Robert Barnwell Rhett, editor of the Charleston 
Mercury and leading fire-eater in South Carolina. Through 
Bunch's previous correspondence, Russell was aware that Rhett 
spoke for the leaders of the secession movement. The fire-eater 
asked Bunch directly what Britain's attitude toward a Southern 
confederacy might be. Not only did Southern hopes center on 
England, declared Rhett, but a separate Southern nation had 
much to offer: free trade, minimal or no import duties, and a 
market for English manufactured goods and shipping. In re-
porting the ''pow-wow," as he called it, Bunch claimed he "de-
clined giving any opinions beyond the vaguest generalities," 
but he certainly was not as firm as Archibald had been with 
''Benjamin." According to his own report, Bunch told Rhett that 
the only "stumbling block would be the reopening of the [Afri-
can] slave trade," an idea then being pushed by more fanatical 
Southerners. Bunch thought slavery itself would not preclude 
British support, but "I spoke for myself not the· Government." 
Taken aback by Bunch's remarks about the slave trade, .Rhett 
threatened to seek out the opinion of the French consul, where-
upon Bunch reminded him that all European nations were in-
tent on suppressing the slave trade. Still, Bunch's equivocal 
statements about slavery left Rhett with ''the distinct impres-
sion that Great Britain could be persuaded to recognize the in-
dependence of the Confederacy, if it were offered attractive in-
ducements." Some historians have concluded, moreover, that 
Bunch's remarks about the slave trade influenced the Confed-
erate government to outlaw the practice in its constitution, 
written two months later.ts 
Britain's reasons for wanting to keep the consuls in the Con-
federacy were just as strong as Davis's for allowing them to 
remain: the consuls served as the major source of information 
about local events and attitudes. While the Foreign Office de-
sired information about the entire country, its chief concern 
lay with the South. "You should address an instruction to all 
H.M.'s Consuls at the Southern ports pointing out the impor-
tance of accurate and complete information being furnished by 
them," Prime Minister Henry Palmerston instructed Lyons 
following the first battle of Bull Run. 2o · 
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The best source of information about Southern events was 
Robert Bunch at Charleston. Even Lyons deferred to Bunch's 
ability in this respect: "Mr. Bunch is in a better situation than 
I am for obtaining accurate intelligence respecting these de-
tails. He is also in a better position for estimating their effect 
in the South, which is the principal point of importance with· 
regard to them." By April1861, Lyons exhorted Bunch "not to 
scrimp in getting the news to me" and to use the telegraph or 
private messenger if necessary.21 
Bunch's assessments were both accurate and penetrating .. 
Even before secession occurred, he predicted that South Caro-
lina had no other choice but to leave the Union: "'t is difficult 
to see how any truce is to be expected. The time for compro-
mise or intervention would seem to have gone by, and it would 
appear certain that South Carolina must either secede at all 
hazards ... or be content to exhibit herself to the ridicule of 
the world."22 
Bunch's reports became more pessimistic as the war contin-
ued. Though he saw potential victory for the South in 1861, he 
began to realize by mid-1862 that the Confederacy had overex-
tended itself and lacked the resources to carry the war to a 
victorious conclusion. He was especially concerned about the 
anti-British attitudes expressed in Southern newspapers and 
by the general population and warned the Foreign Office not 
to accept at face value pro-British expressions made by South-
ern advocates in England. His opinions on Southern leader-
ship also changed as the war went on. In the beginning he 
wrote almost in jest: ''they have an uncommonly good opinion 
of themselves," but he was soon referring to Confederate lead-
ers as "dead level mediocrity" incapable of understanding any 
point view except their own.23 
Other consuls in the South supported Bunch's assessments. 
Molyneux in Savannah and Murein New Orleans both re-
ported that conservative elements felt secession was too r~sh 
an act but were being silenced because "excitement is so great, 
passions so bitter." Like Bunch they regarded Southern lead-
ers as lacking in tact and ability. Molyneux, although some-
what sympathetic to the South because of his long residence in 
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Georgia, confided to Russell that Robert Toombs, Davis's first 
secretary of state, "talks too much" for the sensitive position he 
held. Regarding Davis himself, Mure classified him as "an ul-
tra ... of the South Carolina School, and most of the thinking 
people would have preferred to see Mr. [Alexander] Stephens in 
his place." 24 
Northern consuls, too, kept the Foreign Office informed of 
significant events in the Union. Generally pro-Union in their 
attitude, they emphasized the material advantages of the 
North, its population growth and industrial advance even un-
der the stress of war. Charles Kortright, consul at Philadel-
phia, predicted one major consequence of the war would be the 
emergence of the North as an industrial power and wondered 
why the South "entered into this struggle in which it has so 
much to lose and so little to gain." 
Pro-Union attitudes of Northern consuls made it possible 
for them to reach easier solutions to problems encountered 
with Northern authorities. In 1862 Lyons informed Russell 
that Consul Wilkins, now stationed in St. Louis, had little dif-
ficulty keeping British citizens from being drafted into the 
Union army or in gaining the return of their property. United 
States military authorities in the western theater were well 
aware of his pro-Union attitude and seldom questioned the 
cases he brought before them.25 
With the secession of South Carolina, the Foreign Office be-
came concerned about the outbreak of war, and it was consuls 
Bunch and Archibald who kept London apprised of events that 
led to the surrender of Fort Sumter and the start of the strug-
gle. Writing at the turn of the new year in 1861, Bunch in-
formed his superiors about Major Robert Anderson's decision 
to transfer his troops from Fort Moultrie to Sumter. The move 
was totally unexpected, but it encouraged South Carolinians 
to seize Moultrie and the customs house. Not only that, Bunch 
concluded, but "publick excitement" was being kept alive by 
continual talk of bloodshed "and reasonable consels [sic] are 
entirely disregarded." 26 
Archibald kept the Foreign Office aware of preparations for 
the Sumter expedition at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and he even 
sent a ''confidential agent" to get more information from mili-
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tary personnel and workers stationed there. 27 Once Fort Sumter 
surrendered, Archibald sent a full report to London. Normally 
the foreign minister would have supplied this information, but 
Lyons was unable to get any correspondence out of Washington 
because Maryland secessionists had cut all communications 
between the capital and cities to the north. 
Archibald was aware that he was usurping a legation func-
tion, and he even held the mail packet an extra day, hoping 
Lyons's report would arrive. But finally he decided that the 
news of Sumter's surrender was too important to delay. Thus it 
was through a consul that the Foreign Office learned about 
the surrender of Sumter even before official word arrived from 
the United States.2s 
Consuls also kept the Foreign Office apprised of the South's 
voluntary cotton embargo at the beginning of the war. Many 
Southerners believed that Europe's need for cotton, particu-
larly England's, would force the powers to recognize the Confed-
eracy and break the Union blockade to obtain the fiber. As early 
as December 1860, Bunch wrote from Charleston: the Confeder-
acy's "great aim is to be recognized by Great Britain. They try to 
bluster about England wanting cotton and being obliged to get 
it from them .... It actually amounts to the belief ... that to 
withdraw the supply of cotton for one year, would alter the 
whole condition of[England's] existence." Echoing Bunch's con-
cern, Russell the journalist commented during his visit to 
Charleston: "The doctrine of 'cotton is king,' to them is a lively 
all powerful faith. . . . Here were these Southern gentlemen 
exulting in their power to control the policy of Great Britain, 
and it was small consolation to me to assure them they were 
mistaken." 29 
Given this Southern confidence in the power of cotton to sway 
English opinion in their favor, local and state politicians en-
couraged a self-imposed embargo in 1861, perhaps under the 
belief that England would blametheir inability to get cotton on 
the Union blockade. Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the 
consuls kept the Foreign Office aware that the Union blockade 
in 1861 was having little impact on cottop. exports. They agreed 
it was too ineffective to prevent some trade. Only at the mouth 
ofthe Mississippi River, wrote Consul Mure, was the blockade 
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being rigidly enforced; other ports were relatively open. Even 
as late as July 1861, three months after the blockade had been 
proclaimed, the consul at Mobile noted that Union warships 
appeared only occasionally off Mobile Bay, and merchant and 
passenger ships freely left the bay to use the intracoastal water-
way between Mobile and New Orleans. Reports elsewhere were 
similar. From Bunch at Charleston and Fullarton at Savannah 
came word that coastal shipping continued unabated and that 
the blockade of major ports was sporadic. Informing Foreign 
Secretary Russell of the Union occupation of Cape Hatteras in 
August 1861, Bunch assumed it might enable the Federals to· 
make the blockade more effective.so 
Europe failed to receive cotton, the consuls maintained, be-
cause of the self-imposed embargo and not the blockade. Ships 
could get through, Bunch informed Russell, but Southerners 
were . not permitting the shipment of cotton. Charlestonians 
were pressuring shippers to keep it at home, and a "Committee 
of Safety" in Wilmington, North Carolina, was tising force to 
prevent the loading of cotton on vessels. ''The action of these 
citizens is suicidal," Bunch concluded, and "an inglorious re-
treat from [Southern] promises of free and unencumbered 
intercourse." at 
Bunch was unsure where the blame for the embargo lay, but 
he assumed that Judah P. Benjamin, then Confederate attor-
ney general, had devised the scheme and implemented it de-
spite the opposition of other presidential advisers. Vice-Consul· 
Cridland at Richmond also suspected Benjamin. At least, Ben-
jamin had cheerfully told him about the burning of one million· 
bales of cotton in the Mississippi Valley. It is doubtful that the 
Foreign Office placed blame solely on Benjamin; all the con-
suls in the South, including Arthur Lynn in Texas~ reported 
massive destruction of cotton. Still, the consuls' comments 
about Benjamin indicated a critical att:itude toward him that 
intensified as the war continued.a2 
If Southerners hoped Britain would interfere in the war to 
obtain cotton, some members of the British cabinet feared it 
might be forced to interfere if a slave insurrection broke out. 
Indeed, influential newspaper editors in England and even 
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the charge d'affaires in Washington insisted that Lincoln's 
purpose in issuing the Emancipation Proclamation was to en-
courage a slave insurrection: he hoped to achieve through a 
slave uprising what his armies were incapable of accomplish-
ing in the field. Again, consular reports assured officials that 
an insurrection was unlikely. "No one [in South Carolina]," 
Bunch reported, "seems to contemplate that the Proclamation 
of Mr. Lincoln will produce any effect upon the Negro popula-
tion .... The Document has been fully published, and doubt-
less circulated among the slaves, who are fully alive to all that 
is going on." Vice-Consul Cridland in Richmond, closer to the 
Union army than the other consuls, made the most perceptive 
comment. The slave insurrection had started almost as soon as 
the war began, he declared, and consisted of fleeing to Union 
troops. Most slaves had little interest in seeking vengeanCe on 
their masters when freedom was so near. ''I don't think there 
will be insurrection among blacks," he concluded.aa 
Consul Archibald's office became the chief civilian source of 
information on military events. Great Britain and other Euro-
pean powers sent military personnel to observe technical as-
pects of the warfare, but Archibald regularly forwarded copies 
of New York newspapers, which contained detailed descrip-
tions of battles. Occasionally other consuls sent newspaper ac-
counts, but only Henry Pinckney Walker, Bunch's replacement 
in Charleston after 1863, described his personal impressions. 
As an eyewitness to the shelling of Charleston and its later 
capture by Union troops, Walker was in an excellent position 
to relay details of the devastation of war. 34 
In sum, the consuls fulfilled many different functions for 
the British government during the war. In addition to carrying 
on the normal consular duties, they took on extra burdens pro-
duced by the wartime situation. Throughout the war they·pro-
vided valuable information about the Confederacy and the 
Union, keeping their home government informed of domestic 
and military events across the ocean. 
3 
The Foreign Minister 
Lord Lyons-Richard Bickerton Pernell, second Baron Lyons 
and first Viscount and Earl Lyons-served as British minister 
to the United States during the Civil War. His father, Ed-
mund, first Baron Lyons, had been elevated to the peerage as a 
reward for long service in the Royal Navy and at various diplo-
matic posts in Europe. Like many British aristocrats in the 
nineteenth century, the first Lord Lyons arranged celebrated 
marriages for his daughters and prepared his sons for service 
to their country. The elder daughter married a German baron 
and the younger, Minna, the Duke of Norfolk.· The younger 
son, Edmund, entered the Royal Naval College and rose to the 
rank of captain in the Royal Navy before he met his death be-
fore Sevastopol in 1855. The father also planned a naval career 
for Richard; but the young man found military service unsuit-
able. After serving as midshipman on his father's ship, Rich-
ard entered Oxford where he earned an M.A. before joining the 
diplomatic corps.l 
Lyons began his diplomatic career in 1839 as unpaid at-
tache under his father's tutelage in the legation at Athens, a 
post he held for thirteen years. After his father became minis-
ter to Switzerland, Lyons served as attache at various posts in 
the Germanies and in Florence, Italy. He moved into higher 
echelons of the service in 1856 with his appointment as envoy 
to the Duchy of Tuscany. Two years later, at the age of forty-
two, he succeeded to the peerage upon his father's death and 
soon after was named minister to the United States.2 
Naturally reticent, Lyons's reserve caused him to be re-
garded as arrogant by some Americans, taciturn by others. 
Perhaps because he had served in his father's shadow for so 
many years, he was more inclined to listen than to speak. Even 
during the Civil War, Edward Bates, Lincoln's attorney gener-
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al, continued to refer to Lyons as the '~dmiral's son." Lyons 
expressed himself freely to John Russell, foreign secretary in 
London, on matters involving diplomacy and to his sister Min-
na on social affairs, but even then he seldom elaborated. He 
was a compulsive worker, fastidious about his health, and a 
worrywart. Often Russell found it necessary to caution Lyons 
about hypothetical situations he raised. After Lincoln issued 
his blockade proclamation in April 1861, for example, Lyons . 
fretted the fate of British merchant ships that might be un-
aware of the proclamation and sail into Southern ports. He 
seemed mollified only when Russell assured him the Foreign 
Office would handle such matters when they occurred. a 
Perhaps Lyons's reserve was due, in part, to his reluctant 
acceptance by the Buchanan administration and the fact that 
he never grew to appreciate Washington during his six years 
there. President James Buchanan considered Lyons's appoint-
ment something of an affront because of the new minister's lack 
of experience. As former American minister to the Court of St. 
James, Buchanan was aware of Lyons's low ranking as a diplo-
matic officer, and he felt that Britain should send a more expe-
rienced and distinguished individual to represent its interests. 
The British mission in the United States, he wrote, "ought al-
ways to be filled by a first rate man whose character is known in 
this country and whose acts and opinions will command respect 
and influence in England."4 If Buchanan did not regard Lyons 
as "first rate," the feeling was reciprocal. Writing to Minna 
upon the departure of the Buchanan administration from .the 
capital, Lyons could only comment, ''I shall miss Miss [Harriet] 
Lane, [Buchanan's niece and hostess] very much. [She] did 
wonders towards making that House pleasant." 5 
Regarding Washington itself, Lyons found the city "hot and 
dull," and he made continual references to ''the heat of the 
place." Given his tendency to put work before pleasure in addi-
tion to the fact that he and every staff member at the legation 
was a bachelor, Lyons seldom entertained on a large scale. 
Unlike his immediate predecessor, Lyons did not admire the 
. Southern-oriented society of Buchanan's Washington and pre-
ferred small dinner parties with only the legation staff and sev-
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eral guests present. Charles Sumner, a leading abolitionist and 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during 
the war, was a frequent dinner guest at the legation. Comment-
ing on the social scene in the capital, Lyons wrote: ''This is the 
gay season here; the consequence to me is that I have sometimes 
to dine out. The dinners are interminable in length, miserable 
in quality and not often amusing in the way of society. I have a 
large one at home tomorrow, but here at least the eating and 
drinking parts are excellent." 6 
Following the Union defeat at Bull Run in 1861, when 
rumor of a possible Confederate invasion of Washington ran 
rampant, he informed Minna, ''It is not likely to make much 
difference to me whether the Southerners get here or not. I 
should have to go if they did, but that might be rather agree-
able." When Prince Albert died in December 1861, Lyons con-
fided that he was refusing all invitations to dinners or parties 
out of respect for the Prince Regent, and ''this has been no 
sacrifice as you may suppose." 7 
William Stuart was Lyons's secretary of legation. Although 
somewhat excitable and more sympathetic toward the South 
than Lyons, Stuart had the ability to assume sole respon-
sibility for the legation and to serve as charge d'affaires in 
Lyons's absence. Stuart had previously been secretary of lega-
tion in Brazil, Sicily, and Greece, and had a complete famil-
iarity with diplomatic procedure. He arrived in Washington 
just as the war broke out in 1861 and would remain until 
mid-1864, when he was transferred to Constantinople.s 
Lyons and Stuart were assisted by a small number of at-
taches, who served as secretaries or as copiers of documents. 
That their work became overwhelming is seen in Lyons's con-
stant pleas for additional personnel and a description of their 
work day: 
During the Civil War we had to be in the Chancery at nine-there was 
no time for luncheon, a few sandwiches ~ere brought to us on a tray, 
which we mopped down with lemonade. At a quarter past seven we ran 
to Willard's Hotel and swallowed a cocktail, harking back just in time 
for dinner at eight. This was the regular routine, and it constantly 
happened that, in addition, we had to go back to the Chancery at night 
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and work till twelve or one in the morning. Any quantity of letters 
arrived daily asking every imaginable question, and often making un-
tenable complaints. They were all opened by Lord Lyons, who made a 
pencil note upon them indicating the tenor of the answer to be sent, 
and returned them to the Chancery. Draft answers were then written, 
which were again sent up to Lord Lyons with the letters. He would 
nearly always alter the wording. Then he put an "L'' at the bottom, and 
returned them to be written out for signature. In this way not a letter 
issued from the Legation which had not been approved by the chief. It 
was a most valuable safeguard, for you can never be sure what a young 
man may say when he gets a pen into his hand.9 
There is no record of correspondence to and from the lega-
tion for the entire the war period, but in 1864 alone Lyons 
received 6,490 pieces of correspondence and sent out · 8,326 
communications-or 14,816 total. Half of these dispatches, 
7,143 pieces, consisted of correspondence to or from the U.S. 
State Department or the British consuls.1o 
Lyons's responsibilities included supervising the consuls, 
and he was painstakingly precise. His communiques were de-
tailed and left no doubt about the action he wished taken. In-
deed, at war's end Consul Archibald criticized Lyons's replace-
ment: his instructions were little more than informal notes 
and left many questions unanswered.11 
In return, the consuls' relationship with their chief was cor-
rect and formal. Among the Southern consuls, only Robert 
Bunch seemed to break through the barrier of formality. On 
February 14, 1861, Bunch began a letter, "I do not write this 
for the purpose of requesting your Lordship to accept me as 
your Valentine .... " A month later he relayed the boast of a 
Charleston doctor regarding Anthony Copeland, a black man 
executed for participating in John Brown's raid on Harpers 
Ferry. The doctor claimed that he had severed the dead man's 
penis and sent it to a Northern abolitionist. Given Lyons's re- · 
serve and sense of propriety, Bunch must have felt confident in 
his association with his lordship to repeat the story.12 
Lyons's attitude toward Bunch, in turn, was almost pater-
nal. When Bunch remained in Charleston during the summer 
of 1861 to gain Southern consent to the Declaration of Paris, 
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Lyons insisted the consul should receive extra compensation. 
After he learned that Bunch's stay would cost the consul his 
life insurance policy, which required him to leave Charleston 
during the summer months, Lyons requested from the insur-
ance agent a temporary suspension of the policy and its reac-
tivation in the fall. No other Southern consul received such 
personal attention.· Informed that Molyneux had managed a 
number of affairs in Savannah satisfactorily, Lyons attributed 
the consul's success to "his large fortune and his established 
position in Georgia."ta 
Among the Northern consuls, Lyons found Archibald at 
New York City to be "a valuable public servant" yet issued 
occasional "mild reproofs" to him for suggesting policy. Archi-
bald made no secret of his pro~Union leanings, and frequently 
offered unsolicited advice to both Russell and Lyons. For ex-
ample, in May 1861, Archibald wrote: ''The Southern insurrec-
tion, is regarded purely as a rebellion, and it is considered an 
unfriendly act on the part of the Governments of the nations 
not to regard it in the same light." He continued, saying the 
war was not "one of vengeance on the South .... the mainte-
nance of the Union and of the National Constitution is, I truly 
believe, the predominant motive which influences the course 
of action." Reacting to calls in Parliament to debate the issue 
of recognition, Archibald cautioned the Foreign Office in 1862 
to retain its policy of strict neutrality. Neither recognition of 
the Confederacy nor an offer of mediation between the bellig-
erents would be well-regarded by the North and "might em-
broil this country in a war with England." While the letter 
made some impression on Russell, Lyons did not appreciate 
such comments. In response to one of them, he wrote: "You 
usually end your letters with suggestions about what I should 
do. Since I cannot always follow your suggestions or don't 
agree with them, please stop doing this." t4 
Lyons's most trying time with the Northern consuls came at 
the beginning of the war. Shortly after the surrender of Fort 
Sumter, Governor John Andrew of Massachusetts requested 
from Consul Lousada at Boston the names of arms merchants 
in Canada. Lousada referred him to Sir Edmund Head, gover-
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nor general of the provinces, who began to receive inquiries 
about the purchase of arms from other Northern governors as 
well. Head turned the requests over to Lyons because, in addi-
tion to its other duties, the legation in Washington was also 
responsible for British North America's relations with foreign 
nations. Immediately Lyons informed the consuls to discour-
age the idea of arms purchases and to maintain an attitude of 
strict neutrality. To Lousada he wrote a special plea: "I beg you 
to bear constantly in mind that Her Majesty's Government 
have not authorized ... Diplomatic or Consular Servants in 
this country to take part in the unhappy dissension. You will 
conform to these views & language unless you receive contrary 
instructions." When Consul Donohoe at Buffalo failed to re-
spond to Lyons's instructions over the matter, the minister in-
quired about his leanings in the conflict and his trustworthi-
ness.15 
Lyons demanded that public statements by the consuls and 
the legation staff about the sectional conflict be totally impar-
tial, and he adopted the same objective stance for himself. As 
early as December 1860, on the eve the South Carolina seces-
sion convention, Lyons cautioned Lord Russell: "We should if 
[at] all possible give every impression of not wanting to be-
come involved in this quarrel." Even after the fighting be-
tween North and South began, Lyons reported: "I have not ex-
pressed any opinion on the current crisis [and] have attempted 
to remain on easy terms with government officials." 16 
Lyons's insistence on impartiality was dictated by his fear 
that Britain might be dragged into war if too much favoritism 
was indicated toward either the North or the South. To Foreign 
Secretary Russell, he wrote: "My own opinion is that any inter-
ference in the quarrel ... would only bring upon the hatred of 
both," When the British Cabinet was considering Napoleon Til's 
proposal of mediation in November 1862-a step the British 
had considered earlier-Lyons responded: "I certainly desire 
that the settlement of the contest be made without the inter-
vention of England ... the less conspicuous the part she plays, 
the more quickly will [Northern] irritation [with us] subside." 
Strengthening his point, he then referred to increasing British 
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fears about American interest in Canada: "it must be remem-
bered, too, that if the war with the South last any considerable 
time, the United States may find themselves at the close of it 
with a numerous, and probably not inefficient, army, ready and 
eager for an invasion of British North America." 17 
His public expressions of impartiality aside, Lyons's private 
sympathy lay with the Union. This was so evident to Russell the 
journalist that he wrote: "There is no minister of the European 
Powers ... who feels as much sympathy perhaps in the Federal 
Government." And Lyons wrote to Minna, "I am really grieved 
to see these people bent upon cutting each other's throats;" 
Lyons's pro-Union attitude was apparent even before secession 
occurred. The Southern states, he surmised, were merely using 
Lincoln's election as an excuse to leave the Union, an idea: that 
the more radical element had advocated for "the avowed princi-
ple of perpetuating, if not extending, Slavery." 1s 
Lyons's intense dislike of slavery made it difficult for him to 
conceive of supporting the Southern cause. ''The taint of Slav-
ery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilized 
world," he declared. Responding to Consul Bunch's report of his 
interview with Robert Barnwell Rhett in December 1860, Lyons 
wrote: ''The domestic Slavery of the South is a bitter pill which 
it will be hard enough to get the English to swallow. But if the 
[international] Slave Trade is to be added to the dose, the least 
squeamish British stomach will reject it." Nor did he criticize 
the South alone on the slavery issue. "The Northern· States 
[were as much to blame] for the turn of events, for [they] are 
quite.ready to yield on everything except the extension of Slav-
ery." Still, he concluded, ''the sympathies of an Englishman are 
naturally inclined toward the North .... If I had the least hope 
of their being able to reconstruct the Union, my feeling against 
Slavery might lead me to desire to co-operate with them." 19 
Given Lyons's disdain for slavery, the high point of his diplo-
matic career, for him, came with British-American cooperation 
in suppressing the international slave trade. Since the end of 
• the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Great Britain had signed treat-
ies with European nations giving it the right to search ships 
along the African coast if it suspected.they were engaging in 
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slave traffic. The United States, however, refused to sign such 
a treaty. Although Americans patrolled the coast of Africa on 
their own, the issue remained a sore point because slave trad-
ers used American flags to elude visit and search by British 
officials. With the outbreak of the Civil War and the departure 
of the Southern states from Congress, the Senate approved a 
convention with Britain giving the right of mutual search and 
establishing courts for the punishment of offenders. Seward 
and Lyons signed the treaty on April 7, 1862, and it was rat-
ified in London several months later. In transmitting the docu7 
ment to the Foreign Office, Lyons indicated his pride in the 
achievement by writing: "Yesterday was the anniversary of my 
arrival three years ago at Washington. Weary years they have 
been in many respects. But if I am as fortunate in obtaining 
your approbation for this last proceeding as I have on former 
occasions, I should be very ungenious [ungenerous?] and un-
grateful to grumble about the arrogance and disagreeableness 
of the post." 20 
Lyons's antislavery attitude and his private inclination to 
side with the Union influenced his relationShip and coopera-
tion with Henri Mercier, the French foreign minister. Personal 
acquaintances ever since they had served at their respective 
legations in Saxony in the 1850s, Lyons and Mercier presented 
a united front at the State Department in the early months of 
the war. Mainly they defended their nations' positions of neu-
trality and their right to communicate with the Confederate 
government through the consuls. But Mercier's sympathy for 
the South was stronger than Lyons perhaps realized, and he 
soon found himself acting as a brake on his French colleague. 
In March 1861, soon after Lincoln's inauguration, Mercier 
asked Lyons to sign a letter to their respective governments 
suggesting diplomatic recognition of the South. His argument 
focused on France's need for cotton, but he added that recogni-
tion before hostilities broke out might ease the severity of the 
fighting or cause the Union to accept Confederate indepen-
dence. Ever cautious, Lyons refused because he considered rec-
ognition at this time to be premature and beyond the scope of a 
minister's duty to recommend. Two months later, in May, Mer-
30 British Foreign Service and the Civil War 
cier suggested another joint statement, declaring that Eng-
land and France would not observe the blockade after Septem-
ber 1861. Such a statement, Lyons responded, was inconsistent 
with the policy of neutrality and "not within the province of 
ministers to discuss." 21 
Mercier continued to press, however. In April of 1862, as 
General McClellan was beginning the peninsular campaign, 
Mercier requested permission to visit Richmond. In the hope 
that he would "see now that the insurrection is shrinking and 
shrivelling," Seward encouraged Lincoln to grant permission. 
But events on the peninsula and his ·talks with Confederate 
officials, many of whom had been friends during the Buchanan 
administration, convinced Mercier of the South's invincibility, 
and he returned to Washington persuaded that only mediation 
would end the conflict. Lyons took leave for health reasons 
shortly after Mercier returned; he sailed to England where he 
remained from June until November 1862. By the time he ar-
rived back in Waahington, Napoleon III was making overtures 
to England and Russia about joint mediation, and Mercier 
again urged the idea on Lyons. Based on his previous conversa-
tions with Seward, Lyons became convinced that the United 
States would never accept mediation and opposed any inter-
ference by Britain. After the British cabinet rejected Napoloon 
ill's proposal, Lyons began to distance himself from his·French 
colleague.22 
While Lyons sympathized privately with the Union cause, 
he found much to criticize about American society and leader-
ship. Like most upper class Englishmen, he thought Ameri-
cans were too materialistic and placed too much confidence in 
their government.23 And the reason for the nation's problems, 
he concluded, were the politicians' failure to respond to South-
ern secession. Lyons squarely placed the blaine on Buchanan: 
his statements were equivocal, his actions to stem the tide of 
secession ineffective, and he shunned all responsibility by 
turning the matter over to a Congress that was incapable of 
dealing with the situation.24 
But if Buchanan failed to measure up to Lyons's standard, 
"President Lincoln looming in the distance [was] a still greater 
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peril." Lyons regarded him as a rude political unknown who 
"has not hitherto given proof of possessing any natural talents 
to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois vil-
lage politics." The incoming president might ''be well-meaning 
& conscientious ... but not much more." Lyons characterized 
Lincoln's inaugural address as disappointing because it lacked 
a clear statement of his intentions. At least, he added, Lincoln 
"does not declare as Mr. Buchanan did that the Government 
has absolutely no right to use force to bring a state back into 
the Union." In the month between the inauguration and the 
firing on Fort Sumter, Lyons surmised that "the President and 
his cabinet have determined no policy toward the South. The 
jJolicy, if there is one, seems to be of inaction."25 
On the president personally, Lyons, in 1861, made only one 
comment: "I dined in company with him the day before yester-
day. He is a little uncouth but mild and quiet. I don't perceive 
the shades of difference in American manners as they do them-
selves." Whether the minister's opinion of Lincoln improved in 
succeeding years remains unknown. He almost never men-
tioned the president in official or personal correspondence, nor 
did he mention any personal contact other than state dinners or 
formal receptions. Following Lincoln's assassination, Senator 
Charles Sumner told John Bright, the English reformer, that 
Lincoln seldom spoke of personal antagonisms, but on one occa-
sion did express an extreme dislike for Lord John Russell. If the 
statement is correct, Lincoln may well have avoided contact 
with Lyons, Russell's agent in the United States.26 
Lincoln's major failure as president, according to Lyons, was 
his lack of experience in foreign affairs and his appointment of 
William H. Seward as secretary of state. Seward would eventu-
ally gain Lyons's confidence, but in the. early months of the 
war, Lyons considered Seward too aggressive in his dealings 
with foreign representatives and too confident in his own abili-
ty to find a solution to the national crisis. Seward's tendency to 
''bluster and bluff'' caused Lyons to write: "It is a great incon-
venience to have him as the organ of communication from the 
Un.[sic] S. Government." In addition to directing the nation's 
foreign policy, Seward believed he was going to establish all 
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the policies of the Lincoln administration. And, concluded 
Lyons, in his "unbounded confidence in his own skill in man-
aging the American people [Seward] is apt to announce as the 
fixed intentions of his Government what is in reality no more 
than a measure which he himself supports." 27 
Mainly, Lyons feared Seward's intentions toward Canada-
that he might purposely engage in war to acquire the provinces. 
Although Lyons could at times write: "I do not think Mr. Seward 
would contemplate actually going to war with us ... ," he was 
alarmed by Seward's boast of using a foreign war to reunite the 
country. He also recalled Seward's statements, made during the 
presidential campaign of 1860, about seizing British North 
America to compensate the nation for its losses should the slave 
states secede. Then, in June 1861, shortly after Britain declared 
neutrality in the crisis and Seward appeared most belligerent, 
Lyons received a disturbing communique that seemed to· con-
firm his suspicions. Archibald had heard of a plot, supposedly 
formulated by Seward, to purchase a number of newspapers in 
Canada East (present-day Quebec Province) for the purpose of 
agitating a union with the United States. Informing the For~ 
eign Office and the governor general of Canada about Archi-
bald's letter, Lyons declared such a scheme "improbable"; still, 
he urged improving Canadian defenses to discourage the Amer-
icans.28 
Lyons also was concerned that Seward might seek war to 
reunite the nation and to bolster his own declining popularity. 
He was probably unaware of Seward's ''Thought for the Presi-
dent's Consideration," written to Lincoln on April 1, 1861, 
which suggested a foreign conflict as a means of encouraging 
the seceded states to return to the Union.29 Still, Seward's 
bellicose statements, his seeming unconcern about the gravity 
of the secession crisis, his misstatements about widespread 
unionism in the South, and his lack of consistency had lost 
him the confidence of his party, claimed Lyons, and he was not 
above using foreign policy to rebuild his political popularity. 
''This," Lyons concluded, "is no new course of policy with Mr; 
Seward. He has ever regarded the Foreign Relations of the 
country .as safe material from which to make, to use his own 
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phrase: political capital at home." That Seward's actions and 
·statements were often intended to appeal to public opinion, 
Lyons was well aware; still, he wrote, it was "a mode of reason-
ing, which I confess [surpasses] my diplomacy to understand." 
Undoubtedly, Lyons's alarmist correspondence distressed 
his superiors at home. Prime Minister Palmerston assured 
Lyons of Britain's firmness in any crisis, but he did not believe 
the American would pick a foreign quarrel. Lending his sup-
port to Palmerston's statement, Russell added· that "Seward 
[would not] indulge the insolence of his nature and nation."ao 
Seward's behaVior toward the British foreign minister be-
came more conciliatory following the Peerless affair. Summon-
ing Lyons to the State Department, Seward informed him that 
the Peerless, a ship with British registry but believed to have 
been recently purchased by Confederates, was about to leave 
its Canadian port and become a privateer on the high seas, 
and he demanded that Lyons order British authorities in Can-
ada to impound the ship. Lyons refused. The ship's papers were 
in order, he declared, and there was no proof that she was 
about to engage in unlawful actiVities. Seward thereupon 
threatened to seize the ship once it reached the high seas, no 
matter what flag it was flying and no matter what its papers 
indicated. Bluster may have helped in this case, for. the Peer-
less did not leave port, but Lyons was still "grieved at the arro-
gant spirit and disregard of the rights and feelings to Foreign 
Nations with which the American Government seemed to be 
disposed to conduct the Civil War in which they were about to 
engage." But the final humiliation fell to Seward when he 
learned that Federal agents, not Confederates, had purchased 
the ship. In his embarrassment he soon began to make a spe-
cial effort to gain Lyons's friendship. Aware of the foreign min-
ister's dislike for large social gatherings, Seward often invited 
him to dinners where the only other people present were mem-
bers of the secretary's family. at 
Lyons's anxiety about Seward remained strong during 1861, 
and perhaps he continued to be wary of him for the rest the war. 
Even as late as 1863, when rumor again surfaced about possible 
British recognition of the Confederacy, Lyons wrote of Seward's 
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strong language. This time Russell assured the minister: "I 
don't think Seward means to quarrel with us, but perhaps he 
will bluster rather more when he has lost the support of Con-
gress .... We have no thought of recognizing at present."32 
Lyons began to note a change in Seward's behavior during 
June 1861. Reporting a conversation on June 17 between him-
self, Mercier, and Seward about the British and French neu-
trality proclamations, Lyons concluded: "Mr. Seward's lan-
guage and demeanour throughout the interview were calm, 
friendly, and good-humoured~" One month later, on July 20, 
Seward requested that. Lyons pay a visit to the State Depart-
ment for a "private" talk concerning the closing of Southern 
ports. "No bluster, no bossing," Lyons reported. "He just wanted 
to know my opinion." Then again on August 1, Seward called 
Lyons to the department to discuss the closing of the ports, and 
this time he seemed almost apologetic that the action had been 
taken.33 
Not only did Seward's relations with Lyons become more 
agreeable, but the secretary may have been engaging in a de-
liberate policy of separating the British and French foreign 
ministers. Lyons's correspondence intimates that he and Mer-
cier had always confronted Seward together before the solo vis-
it in July. In late July and early August 1861 Mercier was 
escorting the Emperor's cousin, Prince Napoleon, on his trav-
els throughout the country. If Lyons placed any significance in 
Mercier's absence, he failed to mention it in his accounts to the 
Foreign Office. 
After Seward adopted a more conciliatory tone, Lyons began 
to find their relationship easier, and by war's end the two men 
would show genuine appreciation for each other. Following the 
settlement of the Trent affair in late 1861, Seward gave permis-
sion for British troops, unable to reach their Canadian destina-
tion because of ice on the St. Lawrence River, to cross through 
Maine. Later in the year, when Seward and Lyons worked out 
the treaty on the slave trade, Lyons reciprocated. He drew up 
the draft but, to avoid the impression that America was submit-
ting to Britain, he agreed to let it appear as if Seward had initi-
ated the agreement. The terms Seward presented were the same 
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as Lyons's. Then in 1863 Lyons warned Seward of a rumored 
Confederate plot to release prisoners of war from Johnson's Is-
land in Lake Erie, a warning that may have caused the per-
petrators to abandon the scheme.34 According to Lyons's own 
statement, it was not unusual for him, while taking his daily 
walk, to encounter Seward "accidentally," and the secretary of-
ten invited Lyons into his carriage to discuss pressing problems. 
So friendly did the two men become that Secretary of the Navy 
Gideon Welles characterized Lyons as "cool and sagacious" and 
claimed he "shapes and directs" American foreign policy. "This 
is humiliating but true," he wrote. Indeed, Seward's behavior 
changed so much from his early aggressive attitude that Lyons 
found "his friendliness has become actually embarrassing."35 
Some historians mark this change in Seward's attitude as 
emerging from the Trent affair, which made it clear "that there 
were other roads to gaining diplomatic aims than being bel-
licose."36 Yet it began earlier and occurred for several reasons. 
For one thing, Seward must have become aware that his aggres-
sive tone was having a negative impact on Britain's foreign 
minister, if not the entire diplomatic corps in the capital. More-
over, individuals outside Washington's diplomatic circle were 
beginning to complain about Seward's irascibility. Charles 
Sumner, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and a fellow Republican, publicly referred to Seward as a war-
monger. Thurlow Weed, Seward's long-time friend and political 
ally, cautioned the secretary to be less aggressive. Criticism 
about Seward's undiplomatic demeanor even came from abroad. 
Edouard Thouvenel, France's foreign secretary, communicated 
his displeasure with Seward's tone and language to Mercier, 
and the French minister showed the letter to Seward. For his 
part, Lyons avoided any personal confrontation with Seward 
and took pains to hide his disapproval of Seward's manner. 
Evidently this made an impact, for Seward informed Charles 
Francis Adams, United States minister to England, that "Lord 
Lyons, who, although a man of prudent reserve, is, at the same 
time, entirely truthful." 37 
In addition, the president was taking steps to quiet his sec-
retary. When Seward brought Lincoln a ''bold and decisive" 
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response to the British and French proclamations recognizing 
Southern belligerency in May 1861, Lincoln toned down the 
communique and permitted it to be sent only on the condition 
that Adams use the message as a guide to lodge his own pro-
test. Lyons reported the incident with a note of satisfaction 
that Seward was "getting his coineuppance."ss 
Lord Lyons's appointment as foreign minister was fortunate 
for both the Union and British governments. His dislike of slav-
ery and his reluctance to see Britain become involved in war 
encouraged him to recommend caution, and delay proved the 
wisest policy for Britain in the end. Lyons's refusal to be intimi-
dated by Seward earned the secretary's respect. Along with 
adopting a less aggressive tone, Seward sought a personal rap-
port with the British diplomat. But other issues would interfere 
and the rapport Seward hoped for would not be achieved until 
the settlement of the Bunch affair. 
4 
The .Unwelcome Consul 
Abraham Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand troops to 
put down the rebellion in the Southern states on April 15, 
1861. Two days later Jefferson Davis responded with a procla-
mation offering letters of marque and reprisal to persons who 
wished to engage in privateering against Northern shipping. 
Some individuals became privateers, but their activities were 
an inconsequential aspect of the warfare. England and France 
refused to allow privateers access to their ports early on, and 
by 1862 the Union blockade and profits to be realized by block-
ade running put an end to privateering. Confederate raiders, 
which plied the high seas from 1862 to 1865, were more de-
structive to Northern merchant shipping.t 
Still, Davis's proclamation and fear that Lincoln might also 
authorize privateering caused consternation in London and 
Paris.2 Greedy privateers seldom distinguished between goods 
belonging to belligerents and neutrals; as a result; British and 
French shippers faced the possibility of substantial losses. The 
only solution, Russell informed Lyons, was to gain Union and 
Confederate consent to the terms of the Declaration of Paris. 3 
That agreement, signed by European nations at the end of the 
Crimean War in 1856, contained four major provisions: it out-
lawed privateering; declared nonmilitary goods belonging to 
belligerents exempt from seizure.ifbeing transported in ships 
of neutral nations; declared that nonmilitary property of neu-
trals was not liable to seizure; and finally stated that block-
ades were binding only if effectively enforced.4 
The United States had refused to sign the declaration in 
1856, but Seward expressed his willingness to become a sig-
natory in 1861. He was probably only too eager to have the 
international community recognize Confederate privateers as 
pirates. The administration considered Southern privateers 
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outlaws and threatened to bang them, but Lincoln backed 
down after Davis declared he would execute prisoners of war in 
retaliation.s Seward's one stipulation about signing the declar-
ation involved the process of negotiation: he refused to discuss 
the issue with Lyons and Mercier and insisted that it be nego-
tiated between the American ministers to England and France 
and the foreign secret~ies of those countries. Discussion on 
the matter went smoothly in England until September 1861, 
when Russell incorporated a statement into the convention 
stipulating that American consent to the declaration would 
have no "bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal difficulties 
now prevailing in the United States." In recognizing Confeder-
ate belligerence the previous May, Russell declared, Britain 
had accepted the right of the Southern government to commis-
sion privateers, and it could not now treat them as pirates. 
Seward rejected the British qualification, and negotiations 
broke down. Still, the refusal to become a signatory made little 
practical difference. The United States had championed the 
rights ofneutrals on the high seas in wartime since 1776, and 
it observed them during the Civil War. a 
The European powers sought Confederate consent to the de-
claration at the same time as they negotiated the issue with 
the United States. Here, however, they faced several problems. 
Because of Davis's proclamation authorizing privateering, the 
best England and France could hope for was the acceptance of 
articles two, three, and four-those dealing with the shipment 
of nonmilitary goods and blockades. Since the objective was to 
protect their own international trade, they considered the lim-
itation a slight matter. More complicated was the issue of how 
to gain approval from the Davis government without making 
it appear as if any negotiations had taken place. From the be-
ginning of the war, Seward had warned England and France 
against communicating with the Confederate government; he 
considered any diplomatic contact as tantamount to recogni-
tion. The seceded states were in rebellion, he maintained; they 
were not a separate independent government, and diplomatic 
matters concerning them had to be handled through the U.S. 
State Department. Therefore, he made it clear he would refuse 
any request to send negotiators to the South. 
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Under the circumstances, the Foreign Office in London and 
the Quai d'Orsay, the French diplomatic bureau, each decided 
to entrust one of their consuls in the Confederacy with the re-
sponsibility of gaining Southern consent to the declaration. 
Their presence already in the region eliminated the need to 
seek any required permissions from the State Department, 
and if the consuls dealt with local officials only, the powers 
could not be accused of engaging in diplomatic maneuvering 
with the Confederate government. Thus, Confederate concur-
rence to the declaration might be obtained without any appar-
ent involvement of the powers. 
The immediate question was who should be chosen to un-
dertake this delicate task. Russell's original choice was Consul 
William Mure at New Orleans, but Lyons championed Bunch. 
Mure had been on leave during the early months of 1861, 
Lyons contended, and was not fully aware of events in the 
South. This was not the case with Bunch. His reports indicated 
his understanding of the situation and, declared Lyons, he had 
greater influence and popularity with important political and 
social leaders. Not only was Bunch president of St. George's 
Society, a fraternal organization devoted to maintaining Brit-
ish cultural heritage, but he had already shown his political 
acumen in 1859 when he persuaded South Carolina legislators 
to defeat a reenactment of the 1822 "Coloured Seamen Law." 7 
The clincher in Lyons's argument was that Bunch could carry 
out the mission without bringing attention to himself or his 
actions. M. de Belligny Ste. Croix, French acting consul at 
Charleston, was in Washington and about to return to the 
Southern city. He could take to Bunch the guidelines, recently 
received from London, for the consul to follow in his negotia-
tions. Any meeting between the two consuls would raise no 
suspicions, and the two men could contact influential persons 
and persuade them to seek Richmond's consent to the declara-
tion. As Lyons reported to Russell when the plan had been 
finalized: "The French consul in Charleston and Mr. Bunch 
will do the deed." s 
In transmitting the guidelines, Lyons cautioned Bunch to 
be "very careful in what you are about to do." He instructed 
Bunch to "act identically" with de Belligny and to involve him-
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self as little as possible; he was not to travel to Richmond or to 
confer with Confederate officials. In· addition, he was to say 
nothing about Lyons's role in the affair. The two consuls were 
advised to approach Governor Francis Pickens of South Caroli-
na and to encourage him to persuade Confederate authorities 
to signify their consent to articles two, three, and four of the 
declaration. Bunch was free to say that Southern acceptance of 
the declaration was the "sine qua non'' of friendship between 
Britain and the Confederacy, but he was to "give no hint of 
[diplomatic] recognition ... the southern government would 
take great advantage of giving the impression that they are 
discussing great issues with Britain and France and [are] on 
the eve of recognition."9 
Bunch ignored the suggestion that he contact Governor 
Pickens and may have disregarded the warning about recogni-
tion as well. Instead of Pickens, he and de Belligny approached 
William Henry Trescot, former secretary of the American 
legation in London and undersecretary of· state during the 
Buchanan administration. Bunch justified the choice, stress-
ing Trescot's ability and Pickens's incompetence. In his official 
report, Bunch stated that Pickens was at his plantation in the 
upcountry when the instructions arrived, and he feared a trip 
outside Charleston might cause too much notice. Privately he 
wrote that Pickens was "quite demented [and] I regret to say, a 
very helpless sort"; certainly not an individual to be entrusted 
with such a sensitive mission. Trescot, to the contrary, was "a 
man of talent. and an agreeable companion." Bunch also de-
scribed him as "a particular friend of mine," and that may have 
been the deciding influence in selecting the South Carolinian.1o 
Bunch and de Belligny met with Trescot on July.19, 1861. 
Cautious about the nature of their request, Trescot insisted on 
copies of the consuls' instructions from their governments to 
show authorities in Richmond. More important, Trescot's rec-
ollection of the conference implies that Bunch ignored Lyons's 
instructions about recognition. ''The consuls," he wrote "were 
free to say that they could only look upon this step as the ini-
tiative towards a recognition .... They said they could make 
no pledges about the results of the Confederacy agreeing to the 
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Declaration of Paris, but certainly the consequences would be 
agreeable and beneficial." IfTrescot remembered the conversa-
tion correctly, Lyons's estimation of Bunch would have un-
doubtedly fallen. Certainly he never would have told Russell, 
as he later did, that Bunch managed the negotiations "with 
great tact and good judgement." u 
On July 20, Trescot left Charleston for Richmond to meet 
with Davis and his cabinet. The group agreed to accede to the 
British and French request. On August 14, 1861, the Confed-
erate Congress gave its consent to articles two, three, and four. 
The consuls' role did not surface during the cabinet or congres-
sional discussions, but unfortunately Bunch's indiscretion 
caused the entire issue to become a matter of controversy al-
most immediately.12 
Even before Southern consent became public knowledge, 
Seward began receiving reports about Bunch's pro-Confederate 
sympathies. Specifically, they concerned Robert Mure (some-
times spelled Muir), a Charleston merchant who had left the 
Southern city in early August and was making his way to New 
York City by way of Louisville and Cincinnati. In Louisville 
Mure was overheard telling a friend that he was acting as couri-
er for the consul at Charleston. From Cincinnati, Seward re-
ceived word that the letters Mure carried were from officials in 
Richmond to Confederate sympathizers and commissioners in 
Europe. Bunch had permitted them to be placed in his consular 
pouch to Russell, who would in turn send them to the address-
ees. The pouch also contained other voluminous papers, includ-
ing several pamphlets defending secession and pro-Southern 
accounts of the first Battle of Bull Run. Moreover, the report 
concluded, Mure was reputed to be a colonel in the South Caroli-
na militia and was traveling on a passport issued by Bunch even 
though he was a naturalized American citizen. Seward had re-
cently circulated a regulation requiring all passports issued to 
persons leaving the country to be countersigned by him.13 
Seward could hardly ignore such blatant accusations of 
Mure's questionable activities and ordered his arrest. When 
New York City police apprehended the South Carolinian they 
found two suspicious items: a passport on Mure's person and a 
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diplomatic pouch in his luggage. The passport, signed by Bunch, 
described Mure as a "British Merchant" acting as courier for the 
Charleston consulate and requested that he be allowed to pro-
.ceed without delay. The pouch contained pamphlets, a large 
number of personal letters addressed to various individuals in 
Europe, and two dispatch envelopes bearing the seal of the 
Charleston consulate. Seward wisely sent the envelopes on to 
London, where Russell openedthem and reported that they con-
tained no controversial material. The police confiscated and ex-
amined the publications and other letters in the pouch.14 
As reported by the New York Tribune, most of the letters 
were personal and of little . importance: discussions of crops, 
banking, and personal and everyday affairs. However, there 
was one unsealed, undated, and unsigned statement that re-
counted the consul's recent diplomatic efforts. It concluded: 
Mr. B., on oath of secrecy, communicated to me also that the first step 
to recognition was taken. He and Mr. Belligny together sent Mr. '!'res-
cot to Richmond yesterday, to ask Jeff. Davis, president, to (accept) 
the treaty of (commerce) , to (accept) the neutral flag covering 
neutral goods to be respected. This is the first step of direct treating 
with our government, so prepare for active business by January 1.15 
Immediately upon Mure's arrest, charges were made and ex-
planations sought. To squelch a rumor that the affair was a 
conspiracy among the Southern British consuls because Robert 
Mure was reputed to be Consul William Mure's brother~some 
reports said cousin-Lyons requested a clarification of the 
men's relationship. Undoubtedly he was relieved when Will-
iam Mure reported, ''he is no relation, but merely bears the 
same name because his family comes from the same part of 
Scotland as mine." To distance itself from Robert Mure, now 
imprisoned at Fort Lafayette in New York City, the Foreign 
Office refused to intercede on his behalf or to seek his release. 
When Mure appealed for assistance from Archibald because of 
his British birth, Lyons instructed the consul not to interfere. 
The Foreign Office told Lyons, "Lord Russell ... does not 
mean to say anything about the interception of Bunch's mes-
senger." Finally, two months after Mure's arrest, Seward re-
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leased him on the condition that he contact no one in the Con-
federacy for the duration of the war.16 
The Foreign Office also sought an explanation from Bunch. 
At first, he attempted to pass off the "intercepted letter re-
specting my communication to the supposed writer" as a fabri-
cation. There had been no discussion about a treaty of com-
merce during the conversation with Trescot, and the writer's 
reference to one indicated the falsehood of his statement. 
Bunch referred to the passport as merely a "certificate," which 
he had felt authorized to issue because Mure had only become 
an American citizen in order to purchase land from the Feder-
al government. As Bunch explained the situation, Mure made 
a business trip to England every summer, and because the two 
men were friends Mure offered to convey the consular pouch to 
England. It was difficult, Bunch continued, to turn down "a 
good honest Scotchman, talking the grandest Doric .... a pres-
ident too of St. Andrew's Society-educating his children in 
Scotland and he intending to go & live there so soon as he shall 
be rich enough." Defending his decision to allow individuals to 
put private letters in the dispatch pouch, Bunch replied they 
were principally personal letters or letters that contained 
money from servants and laborers-all British subjects-who 
were helping to support relatives back home, and these people 
had no other way of getting the letters to Europe. Both Lyons 
and Russell found the explanation unsatisfactory. Russell de-
manded further clarification, and told Lyons to notify Seward 
that a British gunboat would be sent to Charleston to pick up 
the consul's statementP 
Bunch became more submissive the second time around. He 
still maintained that the anonymous statement was a fraud, 
"the work of a spy." He had only informed three individuals of 
his activities, and none of them would have placed such a letter 
in the pouch. He apologized for allowing Britons living in 
Charleston to send personal letters through diplomatic chan-
nels. He should have insisted that they use the one private mail 
service still operating but worried it might shut down at any 
time. Finally, Bunch admitted being wrong about the passport, 
particularly in describing Mure as a "British Merchant," and 
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promised not to issue passports to American citizens in the fu-
ture. This time Lyons accepted the explanation, but Russell re-
mained unconvinced. He resented the forwarding of personal 
mail in the diplomatic pouch, contrary to instructions. Further-
more, Bunch never denied making the statement about South-
ern consent to the declaration being "a first step in the recogni-
tion of the so-called Confederate States." Russell was at least 
more charitable than Undersecretary Edmund Hammond, who 
confided to Lyons that Bunch was "a very perverse or stupid 
man ... and not fitfor his post." ts 
Despite his misgivings, Russell defended his consul against 
Seward's charges of inappropriate behavior and violations of 
United States law. First, Bunch had issued a passport, which 
Seward considered a diplomatic and not a consular function. 
Besides, Mure should have had the passport countersigned by 
Seward. His roundabout route of travel between Charleston 
and New York to avoid getting the secretary's signature only 
added to his guilt. Second, Bunch again engaged in a diplo-
matic function by negotiating with the Confederates and in 
doing so breached the terms of his exequatur. These limited 
his activities solely to consular functions in Northand South 
Carolina. Finally, by his action Bunch had violated the Logan 
Act of 1799, which made it a crime for any citizen or resident 
of the United States to correspond with foreign governments 
about American foreign policy. Seward pointed out that Bunch 
was liable to punishment under the ·act because Britain and 
the United States did not concede extraterritoriality to resi-
dent consuls. Considering Bunch's impropriety, Seward de-
manded his recall. 
Russell refused, declaring that Bunch's action to gain Con-
federate consent to the Declaration of Paris was taken at the 
direction of the Foreign Office. While what he did was not 
strictly a consular function, it was necessary to protect British 
trading interests. Since Bunch did not act on his own initiative, 
Russell questioned Seward's contention that he had violated 
the Logan Act. Moreover, in charging that Bunch had ne~ti­
ated with a foreign nation, Seward was acknowledging greater 
recognition to the Confederacy as an independent state than 
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Britain herself conceded. Privately, Russell told Lyons that he 
was unconcerned about Seward's threat to charge Bunch under 
the Logan Act because the consul was free from punishment as 
long as Confederates held Charleston. If Russell was inclined to 
carry his argument further, he was dissuaded by the law offi-
cers of the Crown. They considered Mure's arrest and American 
complaints justified and recommended against a formal de-
mand for restitution or apology.19 
Given Russell's inflexibility, Seward took an extreme ac-
tion: he revoked Bunch's exequatur, but in an almost casual 
manner. Calling Lyons to the State Department on October 28, 
1861, Seward read his response to Russell's communique. u· 
repeated previous assertions about Bunch's conduct, and the 
last paragraph stated that Bunch's exequatur ''has been with-
drawn." When Lyons inquired if the revocation had already 
been signed, Seward informed him that he was in no hurry; 
Lincoln would probably sign the order that evening.2o 
There is no evidence indicating that Lincoln ever signed. a 
revocation order; even so, he was certainly aware of Seward's 
action. The two men conferred often, sometimes several times a 
day. During the late summer and fall of 1861, Lincoln stopped at 
the Seward residence almost every evening to discuss current 
issues. Charles Francis Adams, American minster to Great Bri-
tain, commented that Lincoln seemed to ''have no idea about 
foreign affairs" and gave Seward a free reign. More likely, Lin-
coln was willing to entrust foreign policy to the secretary be-
cause ofhis confidence in Seward and his own concern about the 
military situation. As former chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Seward was more aware than Lincoln of 
foreign policy procedures and practices. He often informed the 
president about attire to be worn at receptions when the diplo-
matic corps was to be present and whether or not Lincoln was 
expected to speak or merely to offer a greeting of welcome. 
Seward's continual references to Lincoln's views in his instruc-
tions to American diplomats, especially to Adams, indicates 
that he kept Lincoln informed about foreign policy issues and 
regarded his input as important.21 
After his conversation with Lyons, Seward dropped the mat-
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ter of Bunch's exequatur and never mentioned it again. This is 
indicated in a letter from Lyons to Bunch, telling him that re-
vocation of his exequatur was a possibility but as of yet not a 
certainty: "Do not be surprised or annoyed if the U.S. Govt. re-
voke your exequatur .... Should it so happen I shall send you 
instructions as soon as I think it is desirable to give official no-
tice to you of the fact." Lyons's correspondence indicates further 
that he did not raise the matter again with Seward until Decem-
ber 1861. The secretary then responded somewhat offhandedly 
that Bunch's exequatur had beeri withdrawn some time ago.22 
Even though Seward announced the revocation of Bunch's 
exequatur in conversation, he never sent a formal statement to 
the Foreign Office or to the legation. Taking note of the fact, 
Russell remarked, ''I hardly know how to deal with such a man." 
Nor did Seward take the usual steps within the United States: 
publishing letters patent revoking Bunch's authority and not-
ing the revocation on Bunch's exequatur itself. In 1856 when the 
State Department withdrew the exequaturs of three British 
consuls for recruiting Americans to fight in the Crimea, it pub-
lished letters patent in newspapers throughout the consuls' dis-
tricts and in New York City. In addition-and Lyons would not 
have known this-no notification was made on Bunch's exe-
quatur, then filed in the State Department but now housed in 
the National Archives. For the three consuls in 1856 there is a 
notation to the effect that their exequaturs had been with-
drawn; there is no such statement on Bunch's exequatur. Be-
cause Seward failed to take any formal action, Lyons wrote as 
late as December 7, 1861, that he had still no reason to believe 
an official revocation had ever been signed. 2a 
Despite the lack of these last formal steps, both the Foreign 
Office and Lyons accepted revocation as an accomplished fact. 
While on leave in the summer of 1862, Lyons wrote back to his 
charge, William Stuart, that Bunch "is not Consul at Charles-
ton either in the eyes of the British or the U.S. Govt." 24 
Seward also overlooked Bunch's failure to leave Charleston, 
and the consul remained in the city until February 1863, six-
teen months after his exequatur was supposedly withdrawn. On 
advice from Lyons, Bunch no longer signed formal documents; 
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he turned that portion of the work over to his vice-consul, 
Henry Pinckney Walker. But he corresponded with Confederate 
authorities, chiefly over their attempts to conscript British na-
tionals, and he continued to send detailed reports on conditions 
and events in the South. Lyons was undoubtedly relieved that 
Seward did not insist on Bunch's removal. Remarking on the 
possibility of Bunch's departure from Charleston, Lyons wrote: 
"I confess that I should greatly regret being deprived of the very 
valuable information which he furnishes on the state of affairs 
in the South." 25 
Possibly Seward temporarily forgot Bunch's presence in the 
Southern city, but he must have been reminded of it during the 
summer of 1862, when the New York Herald published an arti-
cle about the consul. If Seward did not see the piece itself, sure-
ly someone would have brought it to his attention. The jour-
nalist noted that Bunch had left Charleston on H.M.S. Racer 
for a visit to Savannah, and along the way he stopped at Fort 
Pulaski, which· had been captured by Federal forces the previ-
ous April. The writer wondered just how much information 
Bunch might have relayed to Confederates in Georgia, and he 
asked why Bunch was permitted to remain in the South.26 
More mystifying than not demanding Bunch's removal was 
an order Seward signed in February 1862 permitting communi-
cations between foreign legations in Washington and their con-
suls in the South. It specifically stated that all correspondence 
had to be carried on national warships and taken only into those 
ports at which consuls were not permitted to trade. Bunch was 
the only British consul in the South who fell into this category, 
and thus his office became responsible for transmitting all cor-
respondence between the Southern consuls and the British 
legation or the Foreign Office. Because these British ships co~­
veyed messages frequently, it would have been easy for Bunch 
to leave the city if Seward so demanded. Bunch's departure from 
Charleston came at the insistence of Lyons, who feared a Feder-
al attack upon the city. When Bunch departed, he left on the 
same British warship that brought his orders. to leave and in-
structions for his replacement.27 
Other events and actions imply that Seward used Bunch's 
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indiscretion to make a point without pressing it. He was aware 
that England and France were attempting to gain Southern 
consent to the Declaration of Paris despite his refusal to sanc-
tion an official visit by negotiators! Reviewing the entire chain 
of events for Russell, Lyons recalled a meeting he and Mercier 
had with Seward on May 18-two months before Bunch and de 
Belligny met with Trescot. Mercier showed Seward a letter 
from the French foreign secretary, Edouard Thouvenel, which 
"expressly stated that a communication with the Southern 
Govt. was to take place." Seward refused to receive it officially, 
so Mercier laid the document on his desk and, according to 
Lyons, the secretary "had the original for some time in his 
possession." 2s While Seward may not have been aware of the 
particulars, Bunch's activities could not have come as a com-
plete surprise. 
Other incidents indicate that Bunch may have been the ob-
ject of special attention and punishment. For example, in 1864 
when the Union naval commander in Florida was about to ar-
rest Edward Rich, a Confederate sympathizer of British birth, 
Rich obtained a passport from the British vice-consul at Key 
West and fled the country. The State Department informed the 
British legation of Rich's escape but declared it had no wish to 
pursue the matter or punish the vice-consul in any way.29 
More perplexing, Seward did not mention de Belligny dur-
ing the entire Bunch affair. "Not the smallest allusion, that I 
recollect," Lyons wrote of his conversations with Seward, "was 
made anywhere to the share taken by the French Consul at 
Charleston in the communications with the so-called Confed-
erate Government." ao Russell was curious enough about this to 
make inquiries at Paris. Thouvenel informed the British am-
bassador to France that nothing had been said but, anyway, de 
Belligny was recalled shortly after the negotiations were com-
pleted. Thouvenel doubted that the negotiations over the De-
claration of Paris had caused Bunch's problems; rather, it was 
the unsigned letter stating that ''this was the first step to rec-
ognition."31 Despite French involvement from the beginning, 
Britain was left to bear the entire responsibility on!!e the mat-
ter became public. One wonders what effect France's lack of 
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support in 1861 may have had on Britain's refusal to join a 
French-proposed mediation effort in 1862. 
Thouvenel's assertion about the unsigned letter was proba-
bly correct, but Lyons believed that Seward singled out Bunch 
because it was easier and safer to attack him than to make 
extreme charges against the British government for its role in 
securing Southern consent to the Declaration of Paris. Lyons 
also saw Seward's actions as a "sop to public opinion." Recalling 
his initial meeting about Bunch's activities with Seward on the 
day ofMure's arrest, Lyons noted that the secretary emphasized 
that ''he was not seeking a quarrel .... a month ago he would 
have taken away [Bunch's] exequatur." But Mure's arrest had 
received so much notoriety that as time went on Seward was 
forced to placate ''the violent party here." He was taxing his 
ingenuity, wrote Lyons, to avoid a disagreement with Britain 
while, at the same time, trying to respond to the public call for 
retribution. Thus, he built an argument that enabled him to 
withdraw Bunch's exequatur, and, having achieved that, Sew-
ard demanded no further action against the consul. 32 
Seward's action was also prompted by anti-British senti-
ment within the country and by the belief that Bunch was far 
too sympathetic to the Southern cause. 33 His residence in the 
South for almost a decade and his friendships there undoubt-
edly swayed his early impressions of the South's ability to suc-
ceed. Shortly after Fort Sumter surrendered, Bunch predicted 
the Confederacy would eventually consist of all fifteen slave 
states, and even a year later he believed that the South was 
"determined to prosecute the war to the utmost extremity." 
Yet, Bunch doubted ifthe Confederacy would ever "rise to emi:-
nence among the great powers of the earth." Its reliance on 
cotton created an unbalanced and false economy, and ''from the 
day cotton comes into competition or is replaced, so this repub-
lic will diminish." The Confederate desire to preserve and ex-
tend Negro slavery was another factor. In the present age, 
Bunch wrote, slavery deprived the South of "the sympathy and 
encouragement which are as necessary to Nations as to Indi-
viduals." Further, Southern filibustering and expansionist 
tendencies would have to be repressed by European nations. 
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Summing up his opinion of the Confederacy, Bunch concluded: 
"I believe the New Republic will be ostracized by public opin-
ion of the world and only be regarded as growers of cotton and 
rice."34 
No'r was Bunch's opinion of Southern leaders more compli-
mentary. Reporting on the men who headed the new govern-
ment, Bunch characterized Davis as a Southern extremist, a 
"manifest destiny supporter" elected only because of his mili-
tary background. Bunch regarded the Southern cabinet as a 
"dead level of mediocrity," and he held a· special antipathy for 
Judah P. Benjamin. While Benjamin served as attorney gener-
al and secretary of war, Bunch could only blame him for the 
cotton embargo. When Benjamin succeeded to the State De-
partment in 1862, Bunch lamented the change as unfortunate, 
and he predicted difficulty with Benjamin in the future. Ben-
jamin's British birth, Bunch believed, inclined him to expect 
too much from the English; indeed, Bunch predicted Benjamin 
might even expel the consuls if the South failed to gain sup-
port from Great Britain.a5 
Nor did Bunch have a high opinion of Confederate commis-
sioners in Europe: William L. Yancey, Dudley Mann, and Pierre 
Rost. When the Confederate government sent them to gain dip-
lomatic recognition and material support, Bunch wrote: "I am 
particularly anxious that the new commissioners, if received at 
all, should not be too warmly. welcomed." Their belief in their 
"confounded cotton'' and the idea that "we will do anything to 
get it," was not a "flattering estimate of us." Beneath the show 
of friendship and harmony expressed by Southern leaders, 
Bunch warned, was an intense dislike for Britain-"we have 
nothing to expect from the good will of the South." as Even 
though the U.S. State Department firmly believed that Bunch's 
sympathies lay with the South, Lyons and the Foreign Office 
were aware of his true feelings. Throughout the Bunch affair, 
Lyons found himself in a difficult position: he could not openly 
refute American charges regarding Bunch's pro-Confederate 
.leanings despite his knowledge to the contrary.a7 
If Bunch indicated a distrust of Southerners, he was ambi~ 
tious enough to become indiscrete. Intoxicated by his role in 
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gaining Southern consent to the Declaration of Paris, Bunch 
began to hope for the impossible: advancing from the consular 
corps to the diplomatic. As stated earlier, British political 
leaders viewed the two services as separate and never trans-
ferred men from one to the other; yet, in reporting Confederate 
acceptance of the Declaration of Paris, Bunch asked Lyons to 
nominate him as foreign minister should Britain recognize the 
Confederacy. If that office was "too high," Bunch was willing 
to settle for;secretary oflegation at Richmond "with a salary 
not much above my present one." Somewhat taken aback by 
the request, Lyons replied: "I did not !forward your letter for 
promotion. You have just had a great diplomatic success, but it 
is not good to ask for a reward at the same time that you send 
notification of your success." 38 
Bunch's exhilaration turned to depression in the months 
that followed, and he presumed his great achievement was be-
ing ignored only because he disobeyed the regulation about 
sending private mail. Lyons again came to the rescue, advising 
Bunch that the Foreign Office considered his conduct praise-
worthy. "Don't," he warned, "assume the air of having been 
disapproved or harshly treated." 39 As he had in the past, Lyons 
championed Bunch's cause with the Foreign Office, and Bunch 
would be rewarded for his service. Perhaps to Bunch's regret, 
his promotion would be within the consular corps, and it would 
not be within in the United States. 
Examined with historical hindsight, the Bunch affair points 
out several facets of Seward's diplomacy. He realized the limits 
of his power and did not press an issue he could not force to con-
clusion. As Russell contended, Seward lacked power to demand 
Bunch's removal, so he did not demand it. The Bunch affair fur-
ther indicates that Seward's aggressive stand had moderated 
earlier than historians suggest. They date the change from the 
Trent affair, but Lyons's statements imply a more complacent 
attitude several months earlier. Whatever prompted the change 
in Seward's demeanor, it helped to foster a friendlier relation-
ship with Lyons, who in turn presented a picture of a firm but 
not unreasonable secretary of state to the Foreign Office. 
5 
Arbitrary Arrests 
and Property Rights 
During the Bunch affair Secretary of State Seward asserted the 
right to revoke the exequatur of a consul who had exceeded the 
limits of his authority. Having made the assertion, he did not 
press for Bunch's removal from Charleston and thus avoided 
heightening tension between the British and American govern-
ments. Seward followed the same policy in regard to British 
nationals arrested for blockade running or aiding the Confeder-
acy in any way: he exercised his authority to incarcerate such 
individuals but readily released them from prison. 
From the beginning of the war in April1861 until February 
1862, Lincoln charged the State Department with ferreting 
out and punishing anti-Union activities. These months were 
also the period of most intense activity on the part of Confeder-
ate sympathizers, especially . in the border states. The large 
number of arrests in addition to the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus in parts of the border slave-states and the lower 
North caused Seward's contemporaries and historians alike to 
blame him for a harsh enforcement of the policy. One historian 
wrote that Seward expanded his authority until he was order-
ing all the arrests in the free states.1 Such a conclusion should 
be reconsidered, for it does not take into account that Seward 
was often unaware of individual arrests until after they had 
occurred. While he supervised the program, the majority of ar-
rests were made by local authorities outside the State Depart-
ment. In addition, incarceration of civilians for pro-Confederate 
activity was longer and more frequent after Lincoln transferred 
the duty of stamping out dissent to the War Department.2 
A review of Seward's response to the jailing of foreign nation-
als bears out the leniency ofhis policy. Indeed, the quick rel~ase 
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offoreign nationals caused one American, when informed about 
the arrival of a new prisoner in Fort Lafayette, to note in his 
diary: "I suppose as he is a 'British subject' he will be released as 
soon as the British Consul hears of his imprisonment; lucky 
thing now-a-days to have been born in England, or anywhere 
outside the 'Land of the Free and Home of the Brave!"' 3 
Seward not only discharged foreign nationals relatively 
soon after their arrest, but the State Department devised spe-
cial oaths for them to sign in order to facilitate their release. 
American citizens had to swear an oath of allegiance to the 
United States but, depending upon the charges against them, 
British and other foreign nationals had to promise not to run 
the blockade again, not to travel to the South, or not to at-
tempt to contact anyone there for the duration of the war.4 
Arrests of foreigners accounted for 11.2 percent of the total 
ofthose engaged in anti-Union activities up to February 1862, 
and of these, 76.8 percent were British.5 Most were caught at-
tempting to get ships through the blockade or purchasing war 
materials for the South. Individuals arrested were sent to Fort 
Warren in Boston harbor or to Fort LaFayette in New York 
City; the majority ended up at Fort LaFayette. As a result, 
Consul Archibald received the majority of the pleas for help 
and soon found the work burdensome and time-consuming. Be-
fore he could visit a prisoner, Archibald had to obtain permis-
sion from authorities; then it took five and a half hours to trav-
el to Fort Lafayette. There he had to ascertain the prisoner's 
citizenship, consider the reason for his arrest, and determine 
the probability of his guilt. Upon arriving back at the consul-
ate, he would write a report to Lyons, who would then take the 
case before Seward. 
Perhaps what disturbed Archibald most about his visits to 
Fort Lafayette were the conditions he encountered: "Prisoners 
are never allowed to go out of their cells, and from want of air 
and exercise are suffering extremely," he wrote in 1861. "The 
feeding of them is jobbed out at 43 cents a head per day, but not 
more than 10 cents worth, I am afraid, reaches the prisoners. 
The common men are barbarously dealt with." Nor did condi-
tions improve as the war continued. Describing a prison cell to 
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Lyons in 1864, Archibald declared that "the place is not fitted 
to be a jail." Approximately twelve men were confined to cells 
that measured fifteen by eleven feet. Each cell contained only 
a small table, one wash basin and a bucket that served as toi-
let facilities for all the prisoners. The men hung hammocks 
from nails to sleep at night, and they were locked in their cells 
from sun:set until seven o'clock the next morning.s 
Once he obtained permission to visit a prisoner, Archibald 
had easy access to the fort because he was on friendly terms 
with the officers and because of his pro-Union attitude. He in-
formed Lyons that he never wavered from his opinion that the 
North would subdue the South and reunite the Republic. Be-
cause Archibald was "northern in his leanings," as he phrased 
it, he did not sympathize with men who were obviously guilty . 
. When two Britons, William McDonald and Alfred Phillips, ad-
mitted trying to discourage men from enlisting in the United 
States Army, Archibald refused to support their request for 
release. Nor was he particularly enthusiastic when he heard 
they were set free just two weeks later. He also refused to in-
terfere when four British sailors on the captured privateer Sa-
vannah were charged with piracy. He believed them guilty and 
believed a jail sentence was justifiable punishment. 7 
Lyons was as judicious in his approach as Archibald. When 
Russell accused Lyons of being "too tame about the arrest of 
British Subjects," Lyons explained his policy. He sought re-
lease on a case by case basis rather than by following broad 
principles, because he believed this was the most effective ap-
proach with Seward. In addition, Lyons wrote, he never used 
"strong language" and never raised his voice; he merely stated 
the facts in each case and appealed for justice. As if to empha-
size the success of his approach, Lyons added: ''To judge from 
Mr. Seward's conversation, he is anxious, in practice, to avoid 
arresting British Subjects except by regular legal process. I 
dined with him the day before yesterday, nobody else except 
his own family being present."S 
How successful were Archibald and Lyons at securing the 
release of British subjects? A check of the public record for indi-
viduals whose citizenship can be determined indicates that im-
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prisonment of British citizens varied from three days to five 
months after their arrival at Fort Warren or Fort Lafayette.9 
For example, on October 4, 1861, military authorities caught 
Samuel Sharp attempting to cross army lines from the South, 
where he had engaged in commercial activities; he was released 
on October 7. Purcell M. Quillen came north from Charleston to 
purchase military equipment for the Confederacy and was ar-
rested in Washington in late June 1861 and sent to Fort Lafay-
ette on July 22. Even though he admitted to participating in the 
bombardment of Fort Sumter and his interrogators considered 
him a spy, Seward ordered him "quietly released" on August 7. 
Other cases include: William Patrick, arrested August 28, 1861, 
for trading With the enemy and released on September 13; Wil-
liam Williams and William Sims, who arrived at Fort Lafayette 
on August 21 aftet.: being caught attempting to run the blockade, 
were released on September 23.10 
Individuals incarcerated for longer periods faced more seri-
ous charges or delayed their own release. Authorities in De-
troit arrested John Shaver, a Canadian,. on October 19, 1861, 
and charged him With using his position as a travel agent for 
the Grand Trunk Railroad to carry contraband letters and 
small arms to the Confederacy. Seward offered to release Shav-
er on October 28 if he would take an oath of allegiance to the 
United States, an offer he declined. Shaver finally gained his 
freedom on January 7, 1862, after he signed an oath not to 
travel into the South or communicate with anyone there for 
the duration.n 
The charges against John C. Brain were more serious. Al-
though a British citizen, he admitted being an officer in the 
Confederate army and a member of the Knights of the Golden 
Circle, a secret organization that encouraged Southern inde-
pendence. In Michigan City, Indiana, where he was arrested in 
early September 1861, Brain distributed handbills encourag-
ing men to enlist in the Southern cause and attempted to per-
suade Mary Fraley, a local resident, to transport small arms 
into Kentucky for transshipment to the Confederacy. Despite 
Lyons's pleas, Seward refused to release Brain as long as the 
loyalty of Kentucky was in doubt. Seward finally relented and 
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discharged Brain in February 1862, a week before the fall of 
Fort Donelson.12 
The Official Records imply that only one British subject re-
mained in prison long enough to be transferred to the custody 
of the War Department in February 1862. Military authorities 
in St. Louis arrested Joseph Nolen, a minor, in October 1861 
for engaging in "criminal acts." Consul Wilkins thought him 
guilty but appealed for Nolen's release on grounds of his youth. 
The local commander agreed to release Nolen if he would sign 
a statement promising to refrain from further "criminal acts." 
Because Nolen refused and demanded release as a ''matter of 
right," he remained in prison and later was turned over to the 
War Department.1a 
If Lyons was inclined to deal with Seward on a case by case 
basis and to be cautious in his argumentation, Foreign Secre-
tary Russell was not. It was the arrest of William Patrick and 
J.C. Rahming that prompted Russell to question Lincoln's au~ 
thority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and continue mili-
tary arrests. Police apprehended Patrick on August 28, 1861, 
and charged him with carrying on commercial business with 
Southerners. Rahming was arrested after he tried to persuade 
a ship's captain to take cannon to Wilmington, North Caroli-
na. Both men were freed within a month; however, Russell 
continued to complain about the illegality of Lincoln's and 
Seward's actions and pressed the argument even after Patrick 
and Rahming were released.l4 
Russell.found support from a number of sources for his con-
tention that the administration's actions were illegal: critics of 
Lincoln's policy within the United States itself, lawyers for the 
CroWn, and the consuls. J~st after Patrick and Rahming were 
arrested, Charles K.ortwright, consul at Philadelphia, sent 
Russell a number of newspaper editorials that complained 
about Lincoln's arbitrary policies. "The mere suspicion of be-
ing engaged in treasonable intercourse with the South," K.ort-
wright wrote, ''renders a person liable to arrest ... and he is 
carried off to prison, or to some neighboring Fort." Insisting 
that only Congress had authority to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus, K.ortwright declared the arrests of Patrick and Rahm-
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ing a contravention of the Constitution. Shortly thereafter Ar-
chibald also sent editorials that presented much the same ar-
gument. Calling Patrick's arrest an outrage, Archibald con-
tended that the government had no basis for holding him in 
prison.ts 
Russell's concern caused him to turn to Crown lawyers for 
support. The argument they devised stressed two points: first, 
that the suspension of the writ and arbitrary arrests "directly 
opposed the maxim of the Constitution of the United States, 
. 'that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law'"; and, second, that the conduct of 
the executive department had not been authorized by Con-
gress and, therefore, violated the Constitution and treaties of 
amity between Great Britain and the United States. Privately, 
Russell added that Seward does "as he pleases depriving Brit-
ish Subjects of their liberty." Russell then instructed Lyons to 
remonstrate against the administration's actions using the 
lawyers' argument as the basis for the protest.t6 
Seward's response came in a series of notes to Lyons but 
meant for Russell. The secretary began by writing, "The British 
government will hardly expect that the President will accept 
their explanation of the Constitution of the United States."17 
Shortly after he carried the argument further: 
The duty of the President is to save the Government from being over-
thrown, and were the writ of habeas corpus to remain in full force till 
Congress could act, he might be rendered utterly powerless .... It 
may seem hard to imprison an individual, but it is harder for a nation 
to be destroyed. If foreigners come among us, they must share not 
only in our good fortune, but in the calamities which the rebellion has 
caused; and if they are found tampering with or encouraging it, they 
must be prepared to· pay the penalty due to the gravest offenses 
against society.18 
As Russell pressed further, Seward continued. When the 
foreign secretary again protested Patrick's arrest two months 
after the man had been released, Seward wrote: 
I cheerfully consent to leave Earl Russell's protest on the record 
where it will lie side by side with the decisions of this government, 
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which show that during a civil war, now of nine months' duration, no 
complaint of any kind has been denied a hearing, not one person has 
been pressed into the land or naval service, not one disloyal citizen or 
resident, however guilty of treason or conspiracy, has forfeited his life 
except in battle, not one had been detained a day in confinement who 
could not and would give reliable pledges of his forbearance from evil 
designs, nor indeed had one person who could or would give no such 
pledges been detained a day beyond the period when the danger 
which he was engaged in producing had safely passed away.19 
Whether Russell was aware of Patrick's release when he 
sent his second protest is unknown, but he soon conceded that 
Seward's policy was not onerous. When Lord Carnarvon, in the 
House of Lords, protested the illegality of Lincoln's suspension 
of the writ and arbitrary arrests, Russell replied: ·~ innocent 
person being arrested and confined for several days in prison 
was undoubtedly a great grievance, and one for which he is 
entitled to compensation, but beyond the right to complain and 
beyond the constant remonstrances of Lord Lyons, the British 
minister, in every case, I do not hold that the circumstances 
warrant further interference."20 This statement admitted the 
American right to jail subversives, but the words "confined for 
several days" acknowledged the leniency of Seward's enforce-
ment policy. 
Once the War Department was put in charge of ferreting 
out disloyal activities, arrests "outstripped anything Seward 
and the State Department ever managed to produce." Whereas 
864 civilians were arrested during the ten months that Seward 
controlled the policy, Stanton apprehended 354 persons in Au-
gust 1862 alone.21 The case of J.M. Vernon shows that investi-
gations also became more thorough. Picked up from a burning 
ship thirty miles from Charleston in February 1863, Vernon 
was imprisoned in Fort Lafayette. He demanded his freedom 
on the grounds of his British citizenship and claimed merely to 
be on a business trip to Havana. A four-month inquiry by the 
War Department indicated that Vernon had been selling arms 
to the Confederates. Stanton refused to release him until the 
end of the war or until he was exchanged as a prisoner of war. 
Both Archibald and Lyons.blamed the new harshness on Stan-
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ton, and Lyons would now admit that Seward "is not at all a 
cruel or vindictive man."22 
Lyons accepted the validity of War Department investiga-
tions and seldom challenged them regarding the arrest of Brit-
ish subjects. But the controversy between General Benjamin 
Butler and George Coppell, acting consul in New Orleans, 
proves he could be quite firm in cases of a truly diplomatic 
nature. Coppell replaced William Mure, who retired for health 
reasons in September 1861. After the Federal army captured 
New Orleans in Aprill862 and Butler assumed command of 
the area, difficulties broke out between the commander and 
the foreign consuls. Butler presumed that because many of the 
consuls had lived in the South for years they were sympathetic 
to the Confederate cause, and he confiscated money and other 
property from the consulates. 
Butler's conflict with Coppell began with the general's treat~ 
ment of the "British Guard." This military unit had been organ-
ized at the beginning of the war for local defense and to quell any 
attempted slave insurrection; it was not established to fight 
Federal forces. Consequently, when Union troops entered the 
city, some members of the guard put away their weapons. Others 
gave their arms and equipment to Confederate troops abandon-
ing the city. When Butler learned of their action, he ordered all 
members of the guard to bring their arms to military headquar-
ters; those who did not comply were to be confined at Fort Jack-
son, near the mouth of the Mississippi River. 
When Coppell complained, the general responded in what 
Lyons termed "gross and insulting language." After defending 
his policy, Butler told the consul: "I intend this order to be 
strictly enforced." In closing he added: "I note you sign yourself 
'Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul,' but I have received no 
word of your right to act, and sir, your acts ... have not been of 
such a character as to induce the belief on my part that you do 
rightfully represent that noble Government." 23 Offended by the 
tone of Butler's letter, Coppell threatened to stop carrying out 
his consular duties until he received assurance that his position 
would be respected and until Butler apologized. Lyons's protest 
and Seward's complaints to the War Department as well as an 
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official statement from Lyons confirming Coppell as acting con-
sul brought Butler around. He accepted Coppell's right to act as 
consul but gave him only a half-hearted apology: "If there was a 
misunderstanding in the past, remember, that all I have to go on 
were your two letters signed 'acting consul."'24 
Aside from arbitrary arrests, the most pressing complaint 
brought before the consuls and the legation by British nation-
als dealt with the destruction of American-owned property and 
with possible conscription into the Union or Confederate arm-
ies. These issues became so burdensome by early 1862 that 
Lyons remarked: "It seems to me that everybody North and 
South who gets into trouble discovers that he or ·she is a non-
naturalized British subject."25 Conscription became in time 
the dominant issue; but, before that, consuls dealt with many 
complaints about the destruction of real or personal property. 
The number of complaints were moderated by a several fac-
tors. For one, Britons·residing in the Northern states did not 
incur destruction of property unless they lived in the path of 
Confederate raiding parties or in the way of Lee's army when 
it invaded Maryland and Pennsylvania. Secondly, Lyons drew 
up a list of circumstances under which cases should not be 
pressed, and it was fairly comprehensive. He saw little reason 
for British citizens to seek consular or legation help when 
Southerners had inflicted the damage. Since Great Britain 
lacked established . diplomatic relations with the Confederate 
government, it had no means ·to negotiate these problems. 
Thus, when J. Hinton of Georgia protested that local officials 
forcibly closed his business and imprisoned him for refusing to 
serve in the Confederate army, his complaint went no further 
than the consulate in Savannah. In New York, William Argill, 
an alien resident of the state, wrote to Consul Archibald asking 
how to seek compensation for property he owned in Tennessee 
that Southerners had destroyed. The consul could only respond, 
''I see no means of securing redress for Argill and others owing 
to lack of communication with the Confederate States." 26 
Lyons was also adamant about not protesting the destruc-
tion of property belonging to Britons. who had become natu-
ralized American citizens or of those who sought to reclaim 
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fugitive slaves. Responding to Consul Wilkins about an appeal 
for British protection from a man, named Smith, Lyons called 
his argument "groundless." Smith had become an American 
citizen, and the legation would not complain about property 
damaged by· his adopted country. In another instance, slaves 
belonging to an Englishman named Whelan fled to Union 
lines, and Whelan was unable to recover them. When Wilkins 
asked Lyons for guidance, the minister told him to put the 
matter aside: ''I shall certainly give no countenance, support 
or protection to a British Subject who deals in Slaves. Is there 
not a statute making it penal for a British Subject to hold 
Slaves anywhere[?]" 27 
Lyons's list also prohibited consuls from assisting those who 
incurred damage during military action or damage done by un-
known persons and those seeking relief because of extra taxa-
tion. In November 1861, Arthur Lynn, consul at Galveston, 
denounced a naval shelling of the city because the Union com-
mander had given no prior warning. Noting damage inflicted 
on property owned by foreigners, Lynn published a complaint 
in the local newspaper against the Federal officers involved 
and sent a copy to Lyons. He duly forwarded the article to 
Russell but added: "It is quite true that a town may be bom-
barded ... that British subjects may have their throats cut by 
the negroes in· a servile insurrection, or be tarred and feath-
ered by a Vigilance Committee. But we cannot keep a squad-
ron at every port to protect them, and I do not know what 
points are particularly threatened."28 
After General Benjamin Butler became the commander of 
Federalforces at New Orleans in 1862, rumor spread that he 
planned to impose a 10 percent tax on the people in the city. 
Apparently the rumor caused some British citizens to question 
Consul Coppell about the legality of such a tax, and he made 
inquiries to the legation. In response, the legation wrote that 
people opposed to the tax could question its legality because 
Congress or the state legislature had not levied it, while those 
in favor could contend that it was a tax placed on a conquered 
city. But it ended by suggesting compliance in order to ayoid 
· trouble.29 
62 British Foreign Service and the Civil War 
Finally, Lyons would not support exaggerated claims for . 
compensation. In the late spring of 1861 army officials im-
prisoned John Stovin, a Briton living in Maryland, for threat-
ening to poison a well from which Union soldiers took their 
water. After his release in the fall Stovin filed a claim for 
$150,000, basing the demand on loss of income because of his 
inability to plant crops. The State Department rejected the 
claim, and Stovin appealed to the legation. When Lyons learned 
that Stovin's farm was really the property of his recently de-
ceased father-in-law and that Stovin had never worked it, he 
decided not to support the claim. He thought Stovin was enti-' 
tied to some remuneration, but the amount he was requesting 
far exceeded any loss of income. ao 
Compensation from the United States government for dam-
aged property, even when the British Foreign Office backed the 
claim, was difficult to obtain. At least this was true in regard to 
claims made on behalf of the estate of Edmund Molyneux. Con-
sul at Savannah from 1832 to 1862, Molyneux, for all practical 
purposes, stopped functioning as consul when the war started. 
In the spring of 1861-the beginning of the warm season in 
Savannah-he traveled to his mountain retreat in North Caro-
lina, where he stayed until December. Upon his return to Sa-
vannah, he requested and received an extended leave of absence 
for health reasons and returned to England, where he died 
within a year. During his absences Molyneux turned his office 
over to acting consul Allen Fullarton, who was also his personal 
banker. In the prewar years Molyneux had conducted consular 
business from his home, and upon his departure he permitted 
Fullarton to live in and use the residence for the same purpose. 
In October 1863 Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin or-
dered Fullarton to leave Savannah. Before departing, however, 
he secured the house, boxed and sealed all consular records, and 
hung a British flag over the main doorway to inform invading 
troops that the propertywas under British protection.a1 
Following the capture of Savannah in late 1864, neighbors in 
the city informed Mrs. Molyneux, living in England, that Fed-
eral troops were using the house as a headquarters and doing 
extensive damage. Shortly afterward she received similar news 
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about damage to her mountain retreat in North Carolina. She 
complained to the Foreign Office and made pleas for compen-
sation, but the response was cool. Given the heavy military ac-
tivity around Savannah, Russell was reluctant to press Mrs. 
Molyneux's claim. He finally agreed to request compensation if 
she could provide proof that the house had been used as the 
consulate, supply a list of missing or damaged property, and 
present an estimate of damage. Through Fullarton and other 
individuals she was able to comply. According to her claim, Con-
sul Molyneux's ten-thousand-dollar wine collection was stolen 
or consumed; most of the furniture, clothing, jewels, china, 
glassware, and packed trunks were missing or destroyed be-
yond repair; physical damage to the structure itself was almost 
irreparable; and what was left of the consular archives had been 
scattered throughout the house. On the basis of the information 
she received, Mrs. Molyneux filed a claim for twelve thousand 
dollars. Following an investigation by the U.S. War Depart-
ment, the government refused to accept responsibility for the 
damage. Mrs. Molyneux continued to demand compensation in 
a series of highly emotional letters until 1871, when the For-
eign Office informed her that it could do nothing if the Ameri-
can government refused to recognize her claim.32 
Arbitrary arrests and mistreatment of civilians in the Con-
federacy were in sharp contrast to those in the North. Few 
cases were appealed to the Confederate State Department be-
cause there was no channel of communication between it and 
the British government. Few involved activities that threat-
ened Confederate security. If the complaint of John Sullivan, a 
British resident in the Confederacy, is valid, foreigners in the 
South faced greater danger from local authorities than from 
the government at Richmond.33 Records dealing with the ar-
rests or harassment of British citizens indicate that most cir-
cumstances involved the issue of slavery or the confinement of 
free blacks. And if the cases of Tom Winnesfield, a West Indian 
black, and Captain Vaughn are any indication, justice was of-
ten frustrated. 
Local authorities in Wilmington, North Carolina, accused 
Winnesfield of attempting to help a slave escape and arrested 
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him in 1859. They never brought Winnesfield to trial but held 
him in jail for two years. He might have remained there longer 
except he became ill enough in April1861 for his jailers to call in 
Edward Anderson, a local physician. When Anderson learned 
the circumstances of Winnesfield's arrest and imprisonment 
and his status as a foreign national, he informed Donald McRae, 
vice-consul at Wilmington. With Consul Bunch offering moral 
and financial support, McRae persuaded local authorities to 
free Winnesfield; he threatened to embarrass them by demand-
ing a trial that would expose Winnesfield's confinement and the 
shaky evidence against him. Winnesfield's release came early 
enough in the war to enable McRae to send him back to the West 
Indies before the blockade became effective.34 
The Vaughn case also took place just before the outbreak of 
war, and occurred because Vaughn socialized with blacks. Cap-
tain of a British merchant ship, Kalos, docked in Savannah, 
Vaughn invited several black stevedores to dine in his cabin. 
Hearing about Vaughn's invitation, members of the Rattle-
snake Club, a local secret society, seized the captain and took 
him to the edge of the city; there they shaved his head, tarred 
and feathered him, flogged him, and forced him to walk back 
to his ship. The incident created a great deal of local indigna~ 
tion. The mayor of Savannah offered a five-hundred-dollar re-
ward for evidence leading to the arrest of the perpetrators, and 
Consul Molyneux added one thousand dollars to tha~ ·amount. 
In retaliation the criminals threatened to repeat the punish-
ment, and Vaughn, apparently frightened, weighed anchor 
and fled. Eventually the guilty parties were caught, charged 
with riot, and released on bail. None of them showed up at 
their trial. When Molyneux complained to Georgia's governor, 
Joseph E. Brown, the governor expressed regret but stated 
that the men were now in the army and could not be brought 
back. The law had done all that was required in this case, ancl 
he considered the matter closed.35 
The outbreak of war caused authorities in New Orleans to 
undertake a policy of incarcerating free blacks who were not 
local residents. The Foreign Office condemned the action on 
several grounds: it violated commercial treaties between Great 
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Britain and the United States, and it interfered with the men's 
freedom of movement. Louisiana authorities ignored British 
objections. Journalist William Howard Russell noted the large 
number of free blacks on his visit to .the New Orleans city jail 
in June 1861; he especially pitied those from the Northern 
states, for they could appeal to no one. Russell was unaware 
that jailers seldom permitted imprisoned free blacks, Ameri-
can or foreign, to appeal to any authority. During a visit to the 
parish prison, Consul Mure found a West Indian who had been 
held for five weeks and refused permission to contact the con-
sul. He also discovered that unscrupulous captains of cargo 
ships were encouraging the imprisonment of their black crew 
members when they docked at New Orleans to avoid paying 
their salaries. When Lord Russell suggested that Mure seek 
legal redress in such cases, Mure decided against it: "I am re-
luctant to follow Russell's instructions," he told Lyons. "The 
local courts certainly would not side with [the blacks] and, un-
der the present state of things the [state] Supreme Court 
might not either."36 
In July 1861, three West Indian sailol's taken from a Union 
merchant ship by a Confederate privateer were brought to 
New Orleans and imprisoned. After local authorities ignored 
Mure's appeals for their discharge, he hired a lawyer to confer 
with Governor Thomas Moore. The governor seemed sympa-
thetic but the conditions he stipulated for release "amount[ed] 
to a refusal." Since the men could not get through the block-
ade, he would free them only if Jefferson Davis gave permis-
sion for them to travel North by land. So outrjlged was Lyons 
by this stipulation that he suggested demanding indemnity 
"either from the Government of the so-called Confederate 
States, or from the State of Louisiana." Negotiations between 
Mure, and later Coppell, and Louisiana authorities finally led 
to the sailors' release in January 1862. New Orleans police put 
them on a small craft and sent them into the Gulf of Mexico, 
where they were picked up by a United States warship.37 
Cases involving the arrest of British civilians were most nu-
merous during the first year of war. Although a larger number 
of individuals were apprehended in the North, their cases were 
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settled with relative ease. The established diplomatic struc-
ture and Seward's willingness to cooperate with British au-
thorities made this possible. Lyons found Seward more than 
willing to avoid difficulties over mundane matters. Arrests in 
the South were fewer but they caused greater frustration; most 
of the individuals detained were not guilty of a crime in Brit-
ish eyes. Yet the settlement of these difficulties arising during 
the first year of war indicated which of the two governments-
the Union or the Confederacy-would be the more obliging in 
future controversies. 
6 
Searching for 
Stirrup and Edwards 
John Stirrup and Samuel Edwards were abducted from their 
home in Nassau and sold as slaves in Georgia on the eve of the 
Civil War. They were sixteen or ·seventeen years old at the 
time.l Stirrup and Edwards were not the only West Indians to 
be forced into human bondage in the United States before the 
Civil War. In March 1860, authorities in Brunswick, Georgia, 
seized William Brodie, a West Indian sailor, for attempting to 
help a slave escape and sold him into slavery. Consul Molyn-
eux spent eight months trying to locate Brodie only to discover 
that he was an American citizen who had merely lived in the 
West Indies and that he was not eligible for protection. Several 
months before Stirrup and Edwards were seized, Lyons in-
formed Lord Russell that a black named Martin Chartton had 
been abducted from Jamaica and was believed held in Virgin-
ia, and he requested permission to purchase Chartton if he 
could be found. Undoubtedly the outbreak of the Civil War im-
peded any progress in locating Chartton. At least there is no 
mention of him in subsequent correspondence between the 
legation and the Foreign Office.2 
Free blacks in the slave states and in theN orth faced a great-
er possibility of being abducted and illegally sold into slavery.3 
Kidnappings of free blacks were reported as early as the 1790s, 
and they continued well into the antebellum period.4 While the 
kidnapping of adults caused little public indignation, the ab-
duction of minors did create noticeable oompassion for the vic-
tims. In Belleville, Illinois, approximately fifteen miles south-
east of St. Louis, for example, local townspeople took up a 
collection in 1823 to send Rachel, a black resident, to a more 
Northern city after all but one of her teenage children (unfor-
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tunately the report does not say how many) had been abducted, 
and kidnappers attempted to seize her youngest son. In a simi-
lar case involving the abduction of a minor the court ruled that 
''when one takes ... a free negro boy of eight, with the criminal 
intent to appropriate him, the consent of such a boy does not 
excuse or lessen the offense," and the judge imposed a two year 
prison term on the kidnapper.5 
And so it was with Stirrup and Edwards. Possibly because 
their youth created strong feelings of sympathy among those 
individuals who heard of their plight, efforts to free them con-
tinued throughout the war. The attempts seem somewhat hap-
hazard, but considering the chaos in the wartime South they 
were perhaps the best that could be made at the time. Involved 
in this "quest for freedom" were the U.S. State Department, the 
British legation, and the British consul at Savannah as well as 
the U.S. War and Navy departments. Stirrup would escape from 
slavery after one year; Edwards remained in bondage during 
the entire war. Once he secured his freedom, United States offi-
cials, urged on by the British consul at Savannah, sought to 
bring his kidnappers to justice. Following is an account of the 
kidnapping, the search by British and American officials to 
find the adolescents, and the subsequent trial of the kidnapper. 
It is important because it is further evidence of Union coopera-
tion with British authorities at the same time the two countries 
were encountering difficulties arising from the war. 
Until evening of that spring day in 1861 when Stirrup and 
Edwards went fishing off the Bahama Banks, they certainly 
thought fortune must be smiling on them. Clouds were slowly 
gathering, but Stirrup and Edwards did not need to hurry to 
avoid a storm. The catch had been good; indeed, the youths had 
caught more fish than they needed. As they were returning to 
shore a gentleman called out from the Hebe, a schooner lying at 
anchor, asking the boys if they wanted to sell some of their fish. 
''We had seen the schooner for two or three days," recalled Ed-
wards, and so they felt little concern as they climbed aboard. 
Besides the crew, two other black youths, Sampson and Keinp, 
had been brought on board by their employer, the captain of the 
British Lazer. The group seemed to be having a very cordial 
time, talking, laughing and imbibing heavily in liquor.6 
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According to his later testimony, Edwards's suspicions be-
came aroused when one the crew members insisted that he take 
a drink, which he firmly refused. Then, suddenly, the white 
men who had accompanied Sampson and Kemp climbed into 
their boat, leaving their charges behind. Almost immediately 
the captain of the Hebe ordered the crew to weigh anchor, ex-
plaining to his youthful guests the necessity of taking the ship 
closer to shore to avoid possible damage from the coming storm. 
Edwards now insisted on leaving, but as he went aft he noticed 
that his boat had been set adrift. He shouted this news to the 
other three youths who instantly became alarmed. During the 
confusion that followed, Sampson and Kemp jumped overboard. 
A later report noted that Sampson drowned; however, he may 
have been shot. Edwards recalled that a crew member fired at 
least two shots after the fleeing youths as they swam away from 
the ship. "I was going to jump overboard [too] when a man 
caught me," Edwards told a jury many years later, "put a pistol 
at my head, saying, 'if you go any further, I'll blow your brains 
out; you are mine."' Then "he put me [and Stirrup] down in the 
forecastle in the schooner." No sooner were the boys confined 
then they heard the ship heaving ahead, heading out to the open 
sea and not toward land as the captain had claimed. 7 
Two days later the Hebe arrived off the coast of Florida and 
spent the next week on the Indian River, an intracoastal wa-
terway running from present-day Stuart to Titusville, Over-
coming their initial confusion, Stirrup and Edwards began to 
become more aware of their surroundings, even though they 
were forced to spend many hours below deck. The captain also 
gave them strict instructions to go below if any strangers ap-
proached by either land or water. Stirrup and Edwards also 
noticed that Frederick Clark, whom they had been told was a 
passenger, had a great deal of influence with the captain; he 
conferred with Clark before making decisions or giving orders, 
and Clark began to take control of the boys.8 When they asked 
Clark what he planned to do with them, he ignored the ques-
tion. On the one occasion when they were permitted to go 
ashore, Stirrup told Edwards that the name of the schooner 
had been changed from the Hebe to the Lavinia.9 Undoubtedly 
this step was taken to avoid detection. 
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Once the Lavinia arrived at Fernandina, Florida, Clark's 
role as master of the situation became evident. Taking Stirrup 
and Edwards with him, he immediately set out for Georgia. 
During the trip Clark instructed the youths to say they were 
from Florida, should anyone ask questions about their back-
ground. About twenty miles northwest of St. Mary's, he left the 
boys, telling them to wait until he returned. Stirrup attempted 
to return to St. Mary's but was apprehended as a fugitive by 
Henry Floyd, who then took both adolescents to his plantation, 
Bellevue. Three days later Clark arrived with an individual who 
interrogated Stirrup and Edwards about their backgrounds and 
skills. To the question of whether they wished to go with him, 
both Stirrup and Edwards answered "no." Despite their re-
sponse, they were put into a wagon and taken away.1o 
Meanwhile British authorities in the Bahamas took action 
to recover the youths. Upon hearing of the kidnapping, W.C.J. 
Bayley, governor of the Bahamas, immediately notified the 
Foreign Office and Lyons. Giving Lyons all the particulars he 
knew about the case, Bayley concluded, "it is our belief that 
[the] Hebe was outfitted to capture defenseless Negroes. The 
captain knew the Islands well and gave different names to dif-
ferent people." n 
Given his dislike of slavery, Lyons took a special interest in 
the case from the beginning. He reported the incident to Seward 
immediately but remained pessimistic about locating Stirrup 
and Edwards and bringing the kidnappers to justice. Apprising 
consuls in the South of the situation and asking them to use 
their influence with local authorities to apprehend the crimi-
nals, Lyons acknowledged the limited ability of the United 
States government to help because of the wartime situation. 
Also, given the current crisis, he did not expect the State De-
partment to concentrate on finding the youths. His conclusion 
was correct. For the United States government, the outbreak of 
war overshadowed the abduction of Stirrup and Edwards. The 
State Department had more important issues to be concerned 
with, and Lyons realized that any demands on behalf of the 
kidnapped minors would be futile; consequently, no efforts to 
trace Stirrup and Edwards were undertaken in 1861.12 
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Stirrup's actions renewed the investigation. Hearing of the 
capture of Fernandina by United States naval forces in March 
1862, Stirrup escaped from his master and made his way to 
Union lines. There he earned his living by working for the 
United States military, first the navy, then the army. Perhaps 
unhappy or simply just homesick, he wrote to his uncle in Nas-
sau .after several months. Briefly, he recounted his abduction~ 
including the name of his kidnapper-his sale into slavery, and 
his escape. Stirrup also informed his uncle that, although he 
was working for the United States Navy, "I would like to come 
back home again if I can. I send my love to all." 13 
Unfortunately Bahamian officials forwarded the letter to 
the Colonial Office in London, and, by the time it arrived 
through channels at the State Department in Washington, Stir-
rup had left Fernandina and was now employed in the Sea Is-
lands. Unaware of Stirrup's move, Seward requested a Navy 
Department investigation, which began to provide some con-
crete information. Checking with longtime residents in north-
ern Florida, Admiral Samuel Dupont, commander of the South 
Atlantic squadron, was able to supply relatively accurate data 
about Stirrup and Edwards. Though S.L. Burritt, a Unionist 
living in Jacksonville, Dupont learned that Frederick Clark 
had lived in Fernandina but had fled the city at the approach of 
Union forces. He was well k;nown and regarded as an unsavory 
individual. Burritt verified that Clark had kidnapped two mi-
nors from Nassau at the beginning of the war and had taken 
them to Georgia, where he had sold them in Camden County to 
a man named Malcolm Crawford for eight hundred dollars each. 
Burritt also noted that kidnapping was a crime in both Florida 
and Georgia but, since blacks could not testify in court against 
whites, convicting Clark would be very difficult. Probably the 
only way to bring the kidnapper to justice, Burritt assumed, 
would be to extradite him to Nassau. From subordinates within 
his own command Dupont learned that Stirrup, but not Ed-
wards, had been employed on the CSS Darlington after it fell 
into Union hands. However, the army later took control of the 
ship and discharged all the civilian employees. Concluding his 
report, Dupont surmised that, in all likelihood, Stirrup was cur-
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rently employed within the command of General Rufus Saxon, 
stationed around Beaufort, South Carolina.14 
Seward now turned to the War Department, and the search 
for Stirrup began anew. At first the response was disappoint-
ing. Saxon reported his failure to locate Stirrup within his 
command but, thinking ahead, he asked what he should do 
with the young man if he were found. Instructions were for-
warded to Saxon, but no correspondence regarding Stirrup 
took place for the next several months.15 
Although he had been forewarned, Consul Archibald at 
New York City must have been somewhat surprised when in 
mid-April1863, officers from the USS Argo arrived at the con-
sulate with Stirrup in tow. As instructed, Archibald arranged 
to return the lad to Nassau, but he questioned the youth close-
ly before his departure. Archibald was not aware of Burritt's 
memo, but Stirrup's answers verified the fact that he had been 
held as a slave on the plantation ofW. Malcolm Crawford. Stir-
rup also told Archibald that he had escaped on March 3, 1862, 
and that at the time Edwards was still being held in slavery. 
Questioned about the location of Crawford's plantation, Stir-
rup replied that it was in Jefferson County, Georgia.1s 
Stirrup's information was only partly accurate. His unfamil-
iarity with American place-names sidetracked the next phase of 
the investigation. Malcolm Crawford's plantation was located 
near Jefferston, a village twenty miles northwest of St. Mary's; 
Jefferson County was located in the northeastern part of the 
state. Consequently, when Lyons instructed Allan Fullarton, 
vice-consul at Savannah, to locate Edwards and purchase him if 
necessary, Fullarton ran into a dead end corresponding with of-
ficials and residents of Jefferson County. Unable to find Craw-
ford's name in recent tax books, the clerk in charge suggested 
that Fullarton contact George W. Crawford in Richmond City, 
head of the Crawford clan in Georgia. The response was nega-
tive there also. George Crawford advised Fullarton to search in 
another state as "Jefferson is a universal county name in the 
South." Fullarton even encouraged a friend to travel throughout 
several northern counties and question older residents, hoping 
that someone might remember Malcolm Crawford.17 
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By July 1863 any attempt to trace Edwards ceased. Fullar-
ton became embroiled with Governor Joseph Brown of Georgia 
and the Confederate State Department. in his efforts to keep 
British subjects from being conscripted into the Confederate 
army, and Seeretary Benjamin took the drastic step of expel-
ling him. No further efforts were made to find Edwards during 
the remainder of the· war.1s 
The final search for Edwards began in 1865 when Edward 
Long of Lowndes County, Georgia, informed Samuel's father of 
his son's whereabouts. According to Long, he became aware of 
Samuel's plight in 1862 and purchased him with the intent of 
returning the youth to his home after the war. Long even of-
fered to accompany Samuel on his return trip to Nassau. At 
first glance, Long's attitude appears very generous; however, 
several facts give the impression tha.t he was attempting to 
protect Crawford and Clark from possible prosecution. He did 
not, for example, mention Crawford and implied that he had 
purchased Edwards directly from Clark. Nor did he mention 
Clark's name. Considering later events, what he wrote about 
Clark was a brazen falsehood: "His kidnapper, who lived in 
Florida, was hung because of his habitual practice of stealing 
negroes and selling them." 19 
Despite Long's correspondence to the Edwards family, the 
youth was not located until the fall of 1866. In part, the slow 
movement of official mail caused the delay: almost a year 
elapsed between the date of Long's letter to Edwards's father 
and the receipt ofinstructions by William Tasker-Smith, newly 
appointed British consul at Savannah, to trace Edwards and 
send him to Nassau. During that time Edwards had fallen in 
love, moved to Florida with his girlfriend, and lost contact with 
Edward Long. As a result, Tasker-Smith had to undertake his 
own search, but his efforts were lackadaisical. 2o Tasker-Smith's 
chief concern centered on getting himself reassigned to a differ-
ent consulate. Before being named consul at Savannah, he had 
served as a member of the slave-trade commission in Mrica, 
and he was disappointed at being given another "hot weather'' 
post. Almost as soon as he arrived in Savannah, Tasker-Smith 
began a campaign for reassignment. For the next five years he 
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returned to England between May and November of each year 
to plead his case. 21 
In time Tasker-Smith succeeded in bringing Edwards to Sa-
vannah, and almost immediately the youth spotted Clark in 
the marketplace. On receipt of this news; the consul alerted 
HenryS. Fitch, United States attorney for the southern dis-
trict of Georgia. Fitch quickly apprehended Clark and brought 
him before United States Commissioner Amherst W. Stone, 
who under law was empowered to seek a grand jury indictment 
if enough evidence ·existed to charge Clark with a crime.22 
Stone considered two possible charges against Clark: engag-
ing in the international slave trade and violating neutrality 
laws between the United States and Great Britain. If found 
guilty of the first offense, Clark could be punished under one 
of two Federal statutes designed to curb the international 
slave trade. The first, passed in 1818, provided for fines up to 
ten thousand dollars and a prison term of three to seven years; 
the second, an act of May 29, 1820, declared trafficking in 
slaves from abroad to be an act of piracy, a capital offense.23 
The charge involving British neutrality laws was mentioned 
at the hearing but was never raised again. 
That the hearing, held between May 6 and May 14, 1867, 
created a good deal of public interest was evident by local 
newspaper coverage. Normally the Savannah News and Her-
ald reported legal proceedings on page three, giving each case 
only a few lines. The case of the United States v. Frederick 
Clark received front page coverage, with an entire column de-
voted to the first day's session. And the reporter took special 
notice of the "English Consul in the Court." Indeed, Tasker-
Smith's presence caused Clark's lawyers to ask if their client 
was being tried for the British government. 
The high point of the hearing was Edwards's testimony. 
Carefully guided by Fitch, Edwards told the story of his abduc-
tion and journey to Crawford's plantation. Although his ac-
count lacked specifics, it was still damaging. So much so that 
the day after Edwards testified a friend of Clark arrived at the 
British consulate and offered him one thousand dollars to re-
turn to Nassau immediately. When Edwards, on the advice of 
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the British consul, rejected the offer, the friend appealed to 
Tasker-Smith, claiming that Clark suffered from severe "heart 
problems" and probably could not endure the trauma of a trial 
and possible prison term. 24 
Clark's lawyers did raise several legal issues at the hearing. 
First, they contended that the Thirteenth Amendment ne-
gated all laws concerned with the international slave trade; 
since slavery no longer exited in the United States in 1867, the 
acts of 1818 and 1820 were no longer in effect. Thus, Clark had 
not violated them. Next, they maintained that "the offense, if 
any," was barred by the statute of limitations. Both. the stat-
utes of 1818 and 1820 required that the guilty party be appre-
hended and charged within five years of the alleged crime. 
Brushing the arguments aside, Commissioner Stone declared 
that his only duty was to determine if enough eviden.ce existed 
to seek a grand jury indictment against Clark; he had no au-
thority, he said, to settle legal questions.· With that he re-
quested the indictment, ordered Clark to post a bail of ten 
thousand dollars and to appear for trial before the next session 
of the United States District Court in August 1867.25 
When the case reached the district court, Clark's lawyers 
again raised the same legal points; this time their argument 
made impact. Judg~ John Erskine sent the case on to the cir-
cuit court. The judge noted that an act of Congress in 1846 
made district court decisions final in all cases involving the 
international slave trade.26 Neither side, Erskine said, could 
appeal the district court's decision. Since questions oflaw were 
involved, Erskine felt it would be fairer to both sides to send 
the case on to the circuit court. If the judges there disagreed on 
legal fine points, their decision could then be appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court.27 
For inexplicable reasons, the circuit court did not reach its 
decision until November 18, 1870.28 Then it quickly accepted 
the arguments of Clark's lawyer and agreed to quash the case 
on demurrer. 29 
The focus of Clark's defense rested on the vagueness of the 
indictment. It did not give a specific date for the alleged kid-
napping but merely stated that the incident occurred "on or 
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about the tenth day of May 1861." Nor was the indictment 
clear about the· exact nature of the crime committed. One 
clause charged Clark with aiding and abetting the kidnapping 
but failed to state specifically if he had masterminded the plot; 
another declared that he perpetrated the entire scheme "to 
hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of" Stirrup and Edwards. Thus 
one portion of the indictment charged Clark with a crime, 
while another declared that he merely supported the kidnap-
pers. Finally, the indictment was drawn up after the five-year 
limitation set by the statutes. Clearly, the indictment stated 
that the alleged crime occurred in the spring of 1861, but the 
indictment itself was drawn up on May 14, 1867, which was six, 
not five, years after the crime was supposedly committed.ao 
Ironically, it was John Erskine, now acting as circuit judge, 
who agreed to quash the case. at Giventhe speed with which he 
sent the case from the district to the circuit court and his will-
ingness to quash the case, one might suspect favoritism on the 
judge's part. Moreover, Erskine undoubtedly held nineteenth-
century Southern values. Although he was a native oflreland, 
Erskine had lived in the South since 1838 and had made close 
friendships·with some of Georgia's leading politicians. Gover-
nor Brown had given Erskine a civil appointment during the 
war to make him ineligible for the draft, and later, in 1869, 
both Brown and Alexander H. Stephens, former vice-president 
of the Confederacy, backed Erskine's nomination to the United 
States Supreme Court. In decisions involving racial issues or 
the rights of white Southerners, Erskine revealed a Southern 
point of view. He declared, for instance, that Congress could 
not forbid former Confederates from practicing law, and he up-
held Georgia's ban on interracial marriage;32 yet, ultimately, 
Erskine made the only decision he could in the Clark case. The 
indictment was vague for several reasons. Under cross-examin-
ation Edwards could not remember salient facts, and several of 
his comments attenuated charges in the indictment. Also, docu-
ments that would have made the indictment more precise were 
filed at the Foreign Office in London or at the State Depart-
mEmt in Washington and were not available to the prosecution. 
Probably because of his own confusion at the time of his 
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abduction and his lack of uilderstanding about how important 
certain facts might be later, Edwards could not remember spe-
cific information that would have strengthened the indict-
ment. He could not recall, for example, the day on which he 
was kidnapped; the indictment, as a tesult, placed the incident 
in May 1861. However, Governor Bayley's report of the kidnap-
ping, written shortly after it occurred, specifically stated that 
it had taken place on March 18, 1861. Nor could Edwards veri-
fy that he had ever been sold; he had never seen any money 
pass between Clark and Crawford. Still, Judge Burritt's state-
ment to United States naval authorities clearly stated that 
Crawford paid eight hundred dollars each for Stirrup and Ed-
wards. Neither Tasker-Smith nor Edwards's lawyers had any 
knowledge of the statement's existence, nor could they have 
called Judge Burritt as a witness; he had drowned at sea in 
1865.33 
On· other points Edwards also proved to be an ineffectual 
witness: he admitted that he boarded the Hebe of his own ac-
cord, he did not know how his boat had been set adrift, he had 
never seen Clark acting as either mate or sailor on the Hebe, 
and no person on the boat had ever told him that he was being 
kidnapped for the purpose of being sold into slavery. Finally, 
Edwards did not know if Clark owned all or a share of the 
Hebe. Under the law of 1820, owners or shareholders of vessels 
engaging in the international slave trade were liable for the 
crew's actions.34 
The vagueness of the indictment was also responsible for 
the failure of British authorities to follow certain suggestions 
as the case proceeded through the courts. Evidently U.S. Attor-
ney Fitch realized the weak points in Edwards's testimony fol-
lowing his cross-examination, so he proposed two moves the 
British government might make to strengthen the case. He ad-
vised that it should consider returning Stirrup to the United 
States to serve as a witness against Clark and that it might 
instruct authorities in the Bahamas to check customs records to 
determine the Hebe's stated purpose for being at Nassau as well 
as whether Clark was listed as a passenger or in some other 
capacity. Clark's lawyers, Fitch thought, would build their de-
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fense on the argument that Clark was merely a passenger on 
the Hebe and had not been involved in the kidnapping. as 
There are several possible explanations as to why the Brit-
ish government ignored Fitch's suggestions. By the opening of 
Clark's trial in 1867, the personnel at the British legation and 
at the Savannah consulate had changed totally. By 1865 Lord 
Lyons and William Stuart had left Washington for new assign-
ments. Both men had shown a keen interest in pursuing the 
search for Stirrup and Edwards during the war and probably 
would have proved valuable assets in Federal efforts to seek 
Clark's conviction. The new British minister to the United 
States was unfamiliar with the case, and in any case he died 
suddenly in September 1867. Allan Fullarton left Savannah in 
1863; although he returned to the city and his banking busi-
ness at war's end, he took no further interest in consular af-
fairs. The British government also may have been unwilling to 
spend the money necessary to carry out Fitch's suggestions: 
between 1866 and 1870 the British cabinet passed from the 
Liberals to the Conservatives and back to the Liberals again. 
Plagued by problems at home and within the Empire as well 
as by pressing issues with the United States, neither political 
party might have been willing to focus much attention on a 
six-year-old kidnapping case.as 
As of November 19, 1870, Clark was a free man. So was 
Edwards, but he had very little to show. for the years he had 
spent in slavery and as a trial witness. At the conclusion of the 
case, the United States government paid Edwards $108.45 for 
travel and per diem. 37 He had been required to appear at the 
original hearing in May 1867 and at every court session Un.til 
the case was quashed in 1870. He offered testimony at the 
original hearing only a:nd was never called again to take the 
stand. He would have fared better financially had he accepted 
Clark's offer of one thousand dollars and left the United States. 
The search for Stirrup and Edwards may have been the first 
time the United States government became actively involved 
in kidnapping cases involving black foreign nationals. No evi-
dence in either British or American diplomatic archives indi-
cates that Lyons sought Federal assistance in trying to locate 
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William Brodie or Martin Chartton, both kidnapped dwing 
the Buchanan administration. In appealing to the Lincoln gov-
ernment, Lyons hoped for a more sympathetic hearing, and he 
was not disappointed. True, wartime conditions slowed the in-
vestigation, but when fighting stopped the search for Edwards 
continued and Federal authorities in the South sought to bring 
the kidnappers to justice, demonstrating a commitment to pro-
tect blacks' rights dwing the early postwar years. 
The case of Stirrup and Edwards was, moreover, another in-
dication of Union cooperation to protect the rights of British 
nationals within the United States. While Seward pressed 
hard on issues of vital importance to American· interests, he 
respected British concerns about the treatment of its citizens 
abroad~ His willingness to cooperate in such matters stood in 
sharp contrast to the Southern attitude on similar issues. 
7 
Consular Problems 
in the South 
Throughout the war, Lord Lyons insisted·on impartiality from 
the consuls in their dealings With the two American govern-
ments. To avoid problems with the Confederacy, he asked the 
Southern consuls never to mention him or the legation in any 
way. He insisted that no reference to the Confederacy should 
imply actual or intended diplomatic recognition, and. he sug-
gested the use of the term "so-called Confederacy." Consuls in 
both the North and the South were to take no action or make 
any public statement that might indicate sympathy for either 
the Union or the Confederacy. 
Northern consuls abided by these stipulations and caused 
few problems, but the situation was different in the South. 
There Lyons found himself in conflict with three men who 
evaded the rules and incurred his disapproval: Henry Pinckney 
Walker at Charleston; Peter Goolrick at Fredericksburg, Vir-
ginia; and James Magee at Mobile. Lyons's reaction to Walker 
and Goolrick revealed how he dealt with consuls who side-
stepped his rules, but his response to Magee's action was the 
initial move that eventually cut all communication between 
Great Britain and the Southern government. 
The foreign minister's difficulty with Walker came with the 
removal of Consul Bunch from Charleston. When . Seward 
failed to issue formal notification withdrawing Bunch's exe-
quatur and made no demand for him to leave the Southern 
city, Lyons encouraged the Foreign Office to let him remain. 
''You will not have failed to observe that it is on him that we 
are mainly dependent for information," Lyons observed.l As a 
result, Bunch stayed in Charleston where he carried on all 
consular functions except the signing of formal documents.2 
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But, as military activity becan1e more intense in the Sea 
Islands and the surrounding regions, Lyons began to reassess 
Bunch's position. Suspecting a military move to capture Char-
leston, Lyons feared Bunch might be charged under the Logan 
Act if Federal troops captured the city, and he laid plans to 
remove the consul.3 With Bunch's withdrawal pending, both 
the legation and the Foreign Office pondered the question of 
replacement and the major problem it created: how to avoid 
applying for an exequatur and offending either the Union or 
the Confederacy. 
By late 1862 the British were aware that replacing any con-
sul in South might be troublesome. The Davis administration 
had not officially . changed its policy· regarding consular ap-
pointments and allowed all prewar appointees to continue in 
office. But increasing anti-British feeling was causing anum-
ber of Southern newspapers and congressmen to question the 
presence of the British consuls, demanding that they request 
exequaturs from the Confederate government. If public senti-
ment forced the government to press the issue, the Foreign Of-
fice would be caught in a dilemma. An application to the South-
ern government would anger the Union, and the Confederates 
would certainly take offense if Seward granted an exequatur. 
Lyons guessed the situation correctly when he wrote: "It is al-
most certain that they would refuse to recognize a consul ... 
who obtained an exequatur from the Federal government." 4 
Given the difficulty of the situation, the Foreign Office and 
the legation mulled the question of Bunch's replacement for 
several months. At first, James Murray, Russell's private secre-
tary, suggested turning the Charleston consulate over to the 
French consul in the city. While putting a consulate into the 
hands of a consul from another country was a relatively com-
mon practice, a Frenchman might not be able to protect British 
citizens from being illegally conscripted into the Confederate 
army or state militia units. Murray then proposed sending the 
consul from Buffalo, who was already accredited, to Charleston 
and simply explaining the move as a relocation. But Russell 
and Lyons rejected this solution as too obvious. The third possi-
bility was to promote Henry Pinckney Walker from vice-consul 
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to acting consul. It was within Bunch's authority to make such 
an appointment, and it would appear as if Lyons had not been 
involved in the selection. Then, too, acting consuls did not need 
to apply for exequaturs .. The only requirement was a notice in-
forming Union and Confederate authorities of the change.5 
Walker was born in England in 1820; he immigrated to the 
United States in 1839 and moved to Charleston. He became an 
American citizen in 1844 to meet the citizenship requirement 
for practicing law in South Carolina. From 1848 to 1860 he 
served as clerk of the City Court of Charleston but was forced 
to resign when he refused to take an oath of allegiance to 
South Carolina and the Confederacy. Out of concern for Wal-
ker's financial plight and his large family-he had eight chil-
dren-Bunch named him vice-consul in 1861. The salary was 
small, but Walker accepted the position because he had no oth-
er means of support. s 
Lyons had met Walker in June 1861 when he delivered 
some official correspondence to the legation and almost imme-
diately took a dislike to the man. Lyons objected mainly to 
Walker's strong sympathy for the South. Even though Walker 
was not a secessionist, he defended slavery and other aspects of 
Southern life. Writing his impressions of Walker to Bunch, 
Lyons stated, ''his having refused to become a citizen of the 'C' 
States does not amount to much," and he feared Walker was 
working at the consulate only to have protection from a foreign 
government if Charleston were invaded. 7 
Walker's action during the fall of 1861 only strengthened 
Lyons's suspicions. In August the Alliance, a British transport 
plying her way between Halifax and Havana, sailed into the 
harbor at Beaufort, South Carolina. Union blockading forces 
refused to let the ship depart. Merchant ships in Southern har-
bors or on the high seas at the time the blockade was an-
nounced were permitted to leave, as was evident in the case of 
the schooner Eliza and Catherine. That ship was on the high 
seas· when Lincoln issued his blockade proclamation on April 
19 and arrived in Charleston harbor at a time when blockad-
ing ships were temporarily absent. While the Eliza and Cath-
erine was in port, the blockade was reestablished but the ship 
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was permitted to depart because it had not known of the proc-
lamation when it entered the harbor. 
But the Alliance case was different. The ship had sailed di-
rectly from Halifax to Beaufort after Lincoln had issued his 
proclamation, and the captain had been aware of it; therefore, 
the ship was detained for failure to observe the blockade. In a 
letter to the British commander of the North American Sta-
tion, Walker suggested the use of force to free the Alliance; 
Bunch imprudently attached a supporting statement to it. The 
commander forwarded the consuls' correspondence to Lyons, 
who responded immediately. Declaring that the use of force 
against Union blockaders would surely lead to war, Lyons re-
jected Walker's suggestion and asked the commander to say 
nothing about it to the Foreign Office. He recounted the de-
tails of Bunch's recent troubles and concluded, "the authorities 
are out of humour with Mr. Bunch .... It might almost ruin 
[him] if [Walker's letter and his statement] came before the 
F.O. at this moment." Lyons recalled Bunch's good work, ''but 
this indiscretion about the use of force might upset him alto-
gether." He also fired off a letter to Bunch, returning the cor-
respondence and recommending its destruction. In addition, 
Lyons made his displeasure with Walker quite evident.s 
Because of his misgivings, Lyons sought to defeat Walker's 
promotion to acting consul. Stressing Walker's American citi-
zenship, Lyons declared that he could not claim protection as a 
British national if Charleston were invaded. An added problem 
was that Walker's two grown sons had joined the Confederate 
army and were stationed in the Charleston area, which would 
certainly create difficulty with Union authorities. Lyons pre-
dicted that Walker, because he had refused to take an oath to 
the Confederacy, would be ineffective in dealing with Southern 
authorities. Summarizing his objections, Lyons concluded, Wal-
ker "does not appear to me to be ... a person to whom the pro-
tection of British Subjects and British interest could be confi-
dently entrusted in critical and delicate circumstances." 9 
Lyons also responded strongly because he felt he had Bunch's 
support, and he did until the fall of 1862. Writing about a pos-
sible replacement inJanuary 1862, Bunch declined to endorse 
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Walker. He was "a Southern advocate of the extremist type," 
who might be entrusted with the consulate in ordinary times, 
but Bunch doubted that Walker was a satisfactory choice at 
the moment. to Then while Lyons was on leave in England dur-
ing the summer, Bunch changed his mind and pushed for his 
vice-consul's promotion. In a letter to William Stuart, charge 
d'affaires, Bunch described Walker as the "natural person'' to 
assume responsibility for the consulate: Russell and Lyons had 
already authorized Walker to sign all formal documents issued 
by the consul; and his experience would prove an invaluable 
asset. Bunch rejected the idea that Union authorities would 
find Walker unacceptable as acting consul. Walker "has strong 
prepossessions in favor of this section of the country," Bunch 
admitted, but he would not allow his sympathies to interfere 
with duty. Hearing of the change in Bunch's attitude, Lyons 
replied: ''If Bunch is now pushing Walker, a remarkable change 
appears to have taken place in Mr. Bunch's mind on this sub-
ject." Later, when Stuart asked about forwarding certain letters 
to Walker, Lyons wrote: "If you want to send the Letters ... go 
on and do so. I have written them chiefly out of civility and don't 
care whether they go on or not." n 
In the end Bunch made the final decision about his replace-
ment. Given only three days' notice to leave Charleston, Bunch 
merely turned over the consulate to Walker. Although he act~ 
ed within his authority,. Lyons remarked: "I am not entirely 
satisfied with this arrangement." In a last-ditch effort to keep 
Walker from assuming control, Lyons presented his objections 
directly to Walker and suggested that he turn the consular 
archives over to the French consul. Walker, Lyons believed, 
would have difficulty with Federal authorities if they captured 
the city. His refusal to swear allegiance to the Confederacy 
would mean nothing when compared to his former political posi-
tion and his sons' service in the army. Finally, Lyons hinted that 
Walker and his family would be safer outside of Charleston.t2 
As one might expect, Walker defended himself. He failed to 
understand why he would be a special object of discipline by 
the Federal military. He informed Lyons . that his sons were 
born in South Carolina and subject to Confederate and state 
law; further, they were eighteen and twenty years old, and he 
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could no longer control their actions. He could not leave the 
city: he had no home in the country, transportation for his pos-
sessions was not available, and he could not afford a move be-
cause his sole income was his consular salary. As if to impress 
on Lyons the necessity of accepting his appointment, Walker 
notified him that following a bombardment of Charleston, the 
French consul had left for New York City. In a final plea of 
patriotic sentiment, Walker concluded: "I am actuated by duty 
and the circumstances of the time. I am really disappointed 
that you want me to turn the consulate over." 13 
Lyons bowed. to the inevitable and concluded that Walker 
''will be as efficient as any person we can find." Still he could 
never bring himself to appreciate the efforts Walker would 
make on behalf of British subjects in South Carolina. Sensing 
Lyons's objection to him, Walker sent most of his correspon-
dence directly to the Foreign Office for the remainder of the 
war.14 
Although Walker remained in the consular service, Gool-
rick and Magee were quickly dispensed with. The elimination 
of Goolrick and his vice-consulate was facilitated by the fact 
that neither Union nor British authorities were aware they 
ever existed. 
Much to the· surprise of Federal troops temporarily occupy-
ing Fredericksburg, Virginia, in the spring of 1862, they came 
across Peter Goolrick, a storekeeper who claimed to be the 
British vice-consul. He hoisted the Union Jack over his door-
way, declaring that he held one thousand ba.I'rels of flour in his 
cellar belonging to James Gemmill, a British subject, and that 
the flag and his official position protected his store and resi-
dence from search. 
Conversations with Unionists in the city led Federal au-
thorities to doubt Goolrick's story. Locals Unionists said he 
might be a British vice-consul but he was also an American 
citizen, a notorious secessionist, and the cellar contained more 
than flour. When Federal troops learned that Goolrick had two 
cellars, one in which he kept flour and another in which he hid 
military supplies that Confederates had been secretly remov-
ing since their evacuation from the town, they raided his store 
and seized the flour, supplies, and all of his official consular 
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documents, including the British flag. When it was later dis-
covered that he had received formal authorization to act as 
vice-consul in 1853, his papers-but not the flag, the flour, or 
the other supplies-were returned.15 
At this time Lyons was on leave in England, so Seward 
raised several questions with William Stuart, charge d'af-
faires: was the legation aware of Goolrick's position, and would 
it explain why a vice-consulate was needed at Fredericksburg 
when Washington was only fifty-six miles north and Rich-
mond sixty-six miles south of the city? Seward also stated that 
he was willing to return the flour to Gemmill if it could be found. 
If not, Seward would compensate Gemmill if he were a British 
subject. In the event that Goolrick really was a vice-consul, the 
flag would be returned, but he doubted that · Goolrick could 
claim British protection because of his American citizenship. 
Seward finally suggested that Goolrick be discharged and re-
placed with a British citizen or at least a loyal American.16 
Stuart and Seward never developed the kind of relationship 
that existed between the secretary and Lyons, for Stuart tended 
to be much more critical of the Lincoln administration. He re-
ferred to the Emancipation Proclamation, for example, as a 
"cold, vindictive and entirely political" document designed to 
let friends of the Union keep their slaves while encouraging 
servile insurrection in the Confederacy. Still, Seward's letter 
caught Stuart by surprise. He responded that he knew nothing 
about Goolrick or the vice-consulate but would investigate the 
matter. He also requested Goolrick's continuance in office un-
til the inquiry was completed because he had no authority to 
terminate any department within the consular serviceP 
The investigation was more time-consuming than compli-
cated; it involved checking with the consulate at Richmond. 
But the response proved one thing: no one at the· Richmond 
consulate had ever heard of Goolrick. "I will only here state 
that I conceive him to be of no use whatever," replied Vice-
Consul Frederick Cridland to the question of Goolrick's effec-
tiveness. "He has never made any report to this Consulate~" 1s 
Whether Lyons discussed the matter with Russell while he 
was in England is unknown. Upon his return to Washington, he 
reviewed the correspondence, assessed the situation, and short-
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ly after informed Seward that the vice-consulate at Fredericks-
burg was closed and that Goolrick's services were terminated.19 
This action would undoubtedly have been taken under any cir-
cumstances. British officials were unaware that the vice-consu-
late existed, and Goolrick was ineffective. Further, Fredericks-
burg was hardly large enough or far enough from a consulate to 
justify a separate vice-consular office there. A few consulates or 
vice-consulates had been established in the interior of the coun-
try, but they were located at active trading centers. But Lyons's 
decision came much easier-and he made no effort to defend 
Goolrick-because of the evidence indicating the vice-consul's 
collaboration with Confederates. 
Among the consuls, none was appointed with greater public 
support than James Magee, and none left his post under a 
thicker cloud of disfavor. Magee had no prior experience in the 
consular service before his appointment as acting consul at 
Mobile. The Foreign Office hurriedly named him to the post in 
March 1861, just as the Confederate government was getting 
under way, to avoid the exequatur question with the new gov-
ernment and because Magee had local popular backing. A 
group of businessmen in Mobile had petitioned in support of 
his appointment.2o 
When journalist William Howard Russell traveled through 
the South several months later, he seemed impressed with Ma-
gee and implied that his performance was competent. Lyons, 
however, referred to him as "incapable" and said he only sent a 
few dispatches "recording the arrival and departure of vessels 
running the blockade." Magee also protested against the con-
scription of British citizens into Alabama militia units, which 
began shortly after the surrender of Fort Sumter, and into the 
Confederate army following passage of the draft law in 1862. 
His protests were so mild, however, that local recruiting offi-
cers ignored them. 21 
Magee's troubles began in November 1862 when Charles 
Walsh, president of the Bank of Mobile, inquired if he could 
arrange for the transfer of £29,806 ($155,000), in coin, to Eng-
land. The money, Walsh wrote, was payment on bonds issued 
by Alabama before the war and was payable to British citizens 
at several banking houses in London. Despite the conflict rag-
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ing in the South, Walsh continued, "the state wishes to meet 
its obligations and remain in good standing with its foreign 
creditors." Magee immediately responded in the affirmative 
and wrote to Acting Consul Coppell in New Orleans request-
ing a British warship to take the money to Havana, from 
which it could be shipped to England. He did not inform Lord 
Lyons of his actions until six weeks later, at about the same 
time that the money· was removed from the country. 22 
The warship arrived off Mobile on January 3,1863, and was 
allowed to pass into the bay after informing the Union block-
ading squadron that it had private business to transact with 
the consul. That same day the vice-consul at Norfolk, Virginia, 
sent a telegram, under Lyons's signature, forbidding Magee to 
send the money out of the country. The British ship left Mobile 
with the money on January 5, and Magee later claimed he did 
not receive Lyons's telegram until the next day.23 
Lyons refused to accept Magee's explanation. "Mr. Magee's 
conduct in the whole matter is ... inexplicable," he informed 
Russell. Magee's failure to inform him of Walsh's letter, his 
own request for a ship to take the money away from Mobile, 
and his failure to keep the foreign minister informed of events 
as they occurred could not be explained away as "oversights," 
Lyons insisted. Further, Magee's dispatches for twelve days 
following the sailing of the warship failed to mention its de-
parture or the receipt of Lyons's telegram. As far as Lyons was 
concerned, this was a "plan of the Confederate Secretary of the 
Treasury for sending specie to England by British Ships of War 
in payment for munitions of war." He suggested removing Ma-
gee before the United States government demanded his recall. 
Russell agreed, and on March 1, 1863-exactly two years after 
he had been appointed-Magee was dismissed from the con-
sular service and instructed to turn over the archives to the 
French vice-consul in Mobile.24 
Lyons attempted to arrange for Magee's departure from Mo-
bile during the following months but canceled all arrange-
ments upon learning that Magee had sailed out of New York 
City for Liverpool. Apparently he had made his own way out of 
the South; he had avoided Washington and Lyons entirely, and 
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he made no attempt to contact the Foreign Office upon his 
return to Great Britain.25 
The Confederate reaction to Magee's dismissal was quick and 
immediate and was, in fact, the initial step in the worsening of 
relations between the Southern government and the British 
consuls. Relating the entire incident to James Mason, Confeder-
ate commissioner in Great Britain, Secretary of State Benjamin 
concluded: "Debts due by a state are not subject to the laws of. 
war and are beyond the reach of confiscation." More important, 
he resented Lord Lyons's interference, terming it "unjustified" 
because Alabama had the right and obligation to pay it debts. 
He also questioned Lyons's authority to direct consuls in the 
South because he was accredited to the United States, a foreign 
country in Benjamin's view. Confronted with Benjamin's letter 
several months later, Lyons called the Southerner's argument 
about Alabama's debt "a sophistry": "Benjamin knew at the 
time the great anxiety of the Confederates to get specie through 
the blockade to pay for their purchases of warlike stores in Euro-
pe, and [ofl the great anxiety of the United States ... to prevent 
this." But he acknowledged as sound Benjamin's comments 
about his authority over the Southern consuls. Lyons had 
always maintained that the Confederate government, even 
though it was not recognized, was within its rights to question 
his direction of consular activities in the South. 26 
Benjamin's complaint came, in part, because Governor John 
Shorter of Alabama demanded a formal protest, a strongly 
worded statement insisting that Britain did not have the right 
to remove Magee. Benjamin disagreed. ·~ nation places a con-
sul in a port for her own convenience," he responded, "and she 
might withdraw him at pleasure, and decline to assign a rea-
son." In addition, Shorter suggested that a new consul not be 
accepted at Mobile unless Britain extended diplomatic recog-
nition to the Confederacy. While Benjamin was unwilling to 
commit himself immediately, he did ask to be informed if 
either Lyons or the Foreign Office assigned a consul to the 
city.27 
The manner in which Magee was replaced indicates that 
British officials suspected difficulties. Proper procedures were 
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followed in dealing with Seward, but Benjamin was deliber-
ately deceived. 
Lyons favored Frederick Cridland, vice-consul at Richmond, 
as Magee's replacement because he was already in the South 
and already a recognized vice-consul. If Cridland were sent to 
Mobile the only necessary action would be to notify Union and 
Confederate authorities. In May 1863 Lyons did inform Sew-
ard that Cridland was being transferred to Mobile as acting 
consul; no such statement was sent to Benjamin.28 The first he 
read about Cridland's move was a brief paragraph in the Rich-
mond Whig on May 18, 1863, stating that Cridland was to be-
come the "Lincoln consul at Mobile." Cridland read it too and 
rushed to the State Department to assure Benjamin that the 
statement was erroneous. He had not been named consul, he 
assured Benjamin, but was merely going to Mobile as a private 
citizen to look after British interests. Cridland claimed he did 
not have a consular commission from the Queen or an exe-
quatur from Washington; he had, he said, even asked the Whig 
to print a retraction. Benjamin accepted the explanation, tell-
ing Cridland that private citizens were free to travel in the 
Confederacy without restriction.29 
Several weeks after Cridland left Richmond, the naval com-
mander at Mobile informed Confederate authorities of his in-
troduction to the new British acting consul. The French consul, 
who had been holding British consular archives, introduced the 
two men and showed the commander a letter, signed by Lyons, 
appointing Cridland acting consul. When informed of the inci- · 
dent, Benjamin took immediate action. His chief concern was 
the manner of Cridland's appointment, rather thari the ap-
pointment itself: Cridland had been authorized to assume his 
position by Lyons who, according to Benjamin, had no authority 
to name Cridland to a post in the Confederacy. Benjamin also 
protested Lyons's action to the Foreign Office through James 
Mason. Russell ignored Lyons's role in the affair and stressed 
Britain's need to protect its citizens and their property in the 
area as justification for the appointment.3o 
Along with his refusal to accept Cridland as acting consul, 
Benjamin ordered him to leave Alabama and asked the local 
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military commander to keep him informed about Cridland's 
movements. Later Benjamin relented when Cridland requested 
permission to remain in Mobile until he received instructions 
about the disposition of the consular archives. Then, following 
the sudden death of the French consul, who had entrusted Crid-
land with the safekeeping of the French archives, Benjamin per-
mitted him to remain in Mobile but only as a private citizen.a1 
Four months after the Cridland episode ended, Benjamin 
expelled the British consuls in Richmond, Charleston, and Sa-
vannah and ordered them to leave the country. Because Crid-
land was the sole British consular official remaining in the 
South, although not recognized as such by the Davis adminis-
tration, Russell tried to contact the Confederate government 
through him. In February 1864 he sent Cridland a communi-
que and requested thatit be forwarded to Benjamin. The Con-
federate secretary refused to receive it until Cridland pre-
sented his authority to act as a courier. But Benjamin also 
refused to accept Russell's instructions to Cridland as proper 
authorization and returned the correspondence unopened. At 
the same time, he informed Cridland to "refrain from further 
correspondence with this government until you are clothed 
with official character and recognized in such character by 
this government." a2 
Lord Lyons made every effort to discourage any show of 
sympathy for the Confederacy among his Southern consuls. If 
Walker still approved of the Southern way of life after his ap-
pointment as acting consul (and he undoubtedly did), it never 
came through in his correspondence. He had come to realize 
the limits of expressing his personal attitudes and feelings. 
Dismissing Goolrick proved no problem for Lyons; his post 
would probably have been eliminated even in normal times. 
Magee's case was different. Lyons's response to Magee's act of 
sending· Confederate funds to England and his subsequent ap-
pointment of Magee's replacement brought into question his 
authority over the Southern consuls. It was the first step that 
would eventually eliminate any diplomatic contact, within the 
confines of the Southern states at least, between the Confeder-
acy and Great Britain. 
8 
Conscription, 
Confederate Style 
William Mure had been consul at New Orleans since 1843. He 
retired in the late summer of 1861, but his last months in office, 
from April to August, were the most hectic of his entire career. 
Explaining the reason for this predicament, Mure wrote: ''I 
have been so busy investigating cases ofimpressment ... that I 
have scarcely time for any other subject." Several weeks before, 
he had taken the issue public in a statement to the New Orleans 
Picayune: "Since the 28th of April to this present day, with 
very slight intermission, many British subjects, some of whoni 
[have been] only a few weeks in the country, w~re seized and 
forcibly carried off from the levee, steamboat landing, board-
ing houses etc., to the different places of rendezvous of mili-
tary companies. When the nien resisted they were frequently 
assaulted, knocked down, and being overpowered,. carried off 
in furniture wagons to the headquarters of these embryo com-
panies, where the most violent threats were used· to compel 
them 'to sign the papers.'" 1 
Mure's experience served as prelude to the situation every 
consul in the South would encounter before war's end: forced 
or fraudulent enlistment of foreign nationals, appeals to con-
suls by victims, consular pleas to civil or military officials, and 
decisions whether to release the victims or retain them in 
service. 
Although forced enlistments occurred in many areas of the 
Confederacy in the early months of the war, they appeared to be 
more blatantly carried out in New Orleans. Mure informed his 
superiors of the havoc and fear press gangs were causing in the 
city during April and May 1861. Hoping to protect British citi-
zens from being forcibly conscripted, Mure wrote to Governor 
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Thomas Moore explaining that it was illegal to induct aliens by 
means of coercion. Foreign nationals, he wrote, might be called 
upon to maintain domestic order, but under international law 
they could not be compelled to participate in wars with other 
nations. Apparently the. point was made, for Governor Moore 
issued a proclamation exempting from military service ''mem-
bers who are subjects of a foreign power and government." Sev-
eral months later when Moore summoned all men between 
eighteen and forty-five years of age into militia service, he stip-
ulated that foreign nationals would be used for local defense 
only.2 
After Mure's retirement, George Coppell, the new acting 
consul, persuaded Britons in New Orleans to form the "British 
Guard," a unit designed to maintain order within the city. 
Within two months Coppell found himself opposing the gover-
nor's effort to incorporate the guard and other foreign military 
groups into the regular militia. Only a conference between 
Moore and the foreign consuls in Louisiana persuaded the gov-
ernor to change his mind. a 
Mure's tactic of dealing directly with the governor won 
praise from the Foreign Office, and the office instructed other 
British consuls in the South to follow his example. As a result, 
consuls received promises from a number of Southern gover-
nors agreeing not to induct foreign nationals into military 
units organized to fight Federal troops.4 
The illegal conscription of foreigners was not limited to Brit-
ish citizens alone, nor was it confined solely to the South .. Men 
from every national group in the Confederacy faced the possi-
bility of forced service in the Confederate army or in one of the 
state militia units. To avoid conscription, French and Spanish 
nationals followed the British example and organized guard 
units to quell local disturbances. Germans, the second largest 
foreign group in the Confederacy, responded in various ways. 
Many, although not citizens,joined the Southern cause because 
they felt obligated to defend their new homes. Others went into 
hiding, while some even fled to Mexico. Constant pressure from 
military and civil authorities finally forced Germans in Texas, 
where the largest number lived, to submit. In January 1863 a 
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Texas recruiting officer wrote that Germans who had previ-
ously opposed the draft were now being quietly enrolled. 5 
Compliance was easier to obtain from non-British nationals 
because they lacked avenues of appeal. The number of non-
British consulates in prewar years were fewer and. mostly lo-
cated in·New Orleans. After Federal troops captured the city 
in Aprill862 and the French consuls left Charleston and Mo-
bile in early 1863, non-British citizens had no one to turn to. 
The few non-British consuls or consular agents in Galveston 
were too far removed from most of their countrymen to be of 
service. 6 Thus, the lack of European consulates left most for-
eign national groups vulnerable, while the presence of British 
consuls, until their expulsion in the fall of 1863, offered some 
means of protection, however slight, against conscription. 
Conscription also became a more pressing problem for Brit-
ish nationals as the war continued because they were singled 
out as targets for special Confederate hostility. Southerners 
had great expectations of support and approval from the Brit-
ish government when the war began. As hopes for diplomatic 
recognition faded,· they became antagonistic toward the Euro-
pean power. Even in the fall of 1862, when diplomatic recogni-
tion seemed most likely, Consul Magee complained about the 
anti-British attitude exhibited by the commander at a mili-
tary camp in Mississippi. He patiently listened to French and 
Italian nationals and released them from any military obliga-
tions, while he ignored the pleas of Britons and destroyed evi-
dence proving their alien status. Following the battles of Get-
tysburg and Vicksburg, when there remained little likelihood 
of British recognition, Thomas Wright wrote from Augusta, 
Georgia, ''the white Subjects of Great Briton [sic] in the South 
are Exposed to all manner of Insult." 7 
Finally, British citizens, including Irishmen, were more af-
fected by the conscription issue because they comprised the 
largest number of immigrants in the Confederacy: 138,067 out 
of 250,000 foreign-born nationals. While the 1860 census does 
not furnish detailed information on age, sex, and citizenship 
status of individuals born abroad, it is not unlikely that the 
majority of the unnaturalized males were of military age. s 
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Pressure brought upon British citizens to serve in the South-
ern military forced the British consuls to spend long hours safe-
guarding their fellow citizens. Frederick Cridland, then vice-
consul at Richmond, apologized both to Lyons and to Russell in 
the spring of 1862 for not responding to their correspondence 
more quickly. He was spending sixteen hours a day at the con-
sulate "protecting British Subjects who require passports and 
protections to prevent their being constantly annoyed by the 
military officers." In addition to working with individuals in 
person, Cridland sent "documents [to] numbers of counties 
where at present the ignorant militia officers are endeavour-
ing to compell [sic] Her Majesty's subjects to muster into the 
militia."9 
In the absence of a regular foreign minister in the Confeder-
acy, the work of the consuls began to assume a diplomatic 
character. Unlike Northern consuls, who seldom, if ever, corre-
sponded directly with the State Department, those in the 
South frequently appealed conscription cases directly to the 
Confederate government. The legation in Washington served 
as a channel of communication for Northern consulates; once a 
Northern consul asked for assistance from Lyons the case was, 
for all practical purposes, out of his hands. The lack of a lega-
tion in the Confederacy threw the burden of direct communica-
tion on the consuls themselves. 
James E. Haley's induction under the Confederate Enroll-
ment Act of 1862 shows the various steps that consuls had to 
take to secure an individual's freedom and the time it in-
volved. Haley, an Irishman, was seventeen when an enrolling 
officer forced him to sign enlistment papers at Chattanooga in 
September 1862. Before he could be sent off to camp, Haley 
fled to Knoxville, where he was apprehended, arrested, and 
shipped . to the front. When Consul Bunch heard of Haley's 
plight, he requested a discharge from his commanding officer 
on the basis of Haley's alien status and age. Bunch received no 
reply from the officer, but Haley wrote, complaining about fur-
ther mistreatment as a result of the consul's request. Bunch 
next wrote several letters to George Randolph, Confederate 
secretary of war, in which he restated his original argument. 
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Randolph had recently resigned, so Assistant Secretary of War 
John A. Campbell responded to Bunch's appeals. The consuls, 
Campbell informed Bunch, had no authority in conscription 
cases. If aliens· felt they had been illegally conscripted, they 
should seek redress through the courts, an:d not the consuls. 
Bunch immediately fired off another letter, insisting on his 
right to interfere, denouncing the treatment Haley had re-
ceived, and demanding his release. 
Bunch's response apparently caused something of a sensa-
tion in the War Department because one of its clerk's noted in 
his diary: ''A Mr. Bunch, British bonsul, has written an impu• 
dent letter to the Department, alleging that an Irishman, un- . 
naturalized, is forcibly detained in one of our camps. He says 
his letters have not been answered, which was a great discour-
tesy, and he means to inform Lord John Russell of it. The let-
ter was replied to in rather scathing terms as the Irishman 
had enlisted and then deserted. Besides, we are out of humor 
with England now and court a French Alliance." 1o 
The curtness of Campbell's reply indicated his own irrita-
tion. He reviewed the provisions of the Enrollment Act, even 
though he did ilot feel it necessary to defend the measure. M-
ter all, he informed the consul, Bunch was not an accredited 
diplomatic agent. Campbell denied that Haley had been forci-
bly inducted and declared that the youth would have been giv-
en every consideration had he told the enrolling officer of his 
alien status. The proper time to appeal induction wa:s before, 
not after it occurred, he wrote. To Bunch's complaint about his 
letters not being answered, Campbell replied that the War De-
partment had treated Bunch with the same respect and "pa-
tience as if you had been regularly accredited to this Govern-
ment .... Under the sense of what is becoming and proper it 
has replied to your letter without the slightest expression of 
complaint about the tone you have thought proper to assume." 
The record indicates no further correspondence between 
Bunch and Confederate authorities on the Haley case. Perhaps 
Bunch felt he had reached a dead end, or perhaps he became 
absorbed with the details involved in his own departure from 
Charleston. Just as Bunch was about to leave his post, Confed-
Conscription, Confederate Style 97 
erate authorities acceded to his demand and discharged Haley 
on February 5, 1863, five months after his induction.ll 
Problems iil the South were made more complex by the vari-
ous draft laws the consuls had to contend with. Even after the 
enactment of the draft law of 1862, states continued to muster 
men into their own militia. Depending upon the law in ques-
tion, a consul might find himself appealing to an enrolling of-
ficer, the commandant at a camp of instruction, a commanding 
officer of a military unit, a governor, the Confederate secre-
tary of war, or the secretary of state. These laws affected white 
men only; the Davis administration did not make provision to 
enlist blacks until the last months of the war. 
Before April 1862, every state called out militia units. The 
terms of the acts varied, but generally men between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five were declared eligible for militia ser-
vice. Each state, except Louisiana and Texas, provided for alien 
exemptions. Louisiana drafted foreign nationals to preserve 
local order, and Texas called out all men who had lived in the 
state for one month. On April 16, 1862, the Confederate Con-
gress passed an act making all men between the ages of eight-
een and thirty-five eligible for service; the bill contained pro-
visions for various exemptions, including nondomiciled aliens. 
The following September, the Southern Congress raised the 
age limit to forty-five. In February 1864 it adjusted the age 
limits from seventeen to fifty, but declared that men over 
forty-five were to be used for local defense only. None of these 
acts provided for.the drafting of foreign nationals living in the 
Confederacy. While debating the last act, a few lawmakers 
called for the conscription of aliens, but Congress rejected the 
demand. Some congressmen as well as members of the Davis 
administration feared such a move would anger European 
powers and in retaliation they might expel Confederates from 
their countries.12 
The passage of the Confederate draft laws did not deter 
states from adding to their militia units after 1862. Following 
the fall of Vicksburg in 1863, South Carolina, North Carolina, 
Mississippi~ and Georgia ordered all males not serving in Con-
federate or state forces into militia service to defend the states 
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from invasion. The age limits varied, but included men from 
eighteen to fifty years old; in 1864 Georgia raised the age limit 
to fifty-five. None of these state laws exempted aliens for any 
reason, no matter how long they had lived in the state.13 
If the various conscription laws in the South differed in spe-
cifics, they did establish a fairly uniform and direct process for 
inducting the men. An enrolling officer, usually a commis-
sioned officer in the army, supervised conscription procedures 
in each state. Under his direction, noncommissioned officers 
oversaw enrollment at the local level. They ordered eligible 
draftees to assemble, typically at the county seat; there squads, 
each consisting of about ten men, were inducted and sent to 
camps of instruction. Local civil authorities arrested individu-
als who failed to report for muster and held them in jail for the 
enrolling officer. The new draftees received physical examina-
tions at camps ofinstruction and, if accepted, were turned over 
to the camp commander for training. Training periods were 
not specified but were virtually eliminated as the need for 
men at the front became more acute. By 1863 camps of instruc-
tion became mere rendezvous points: men shipped out as fast 
as they arrived. Officers in charge of detailing assignments 
sent the new inductees to units containing men from ~eir lo-
cal area whenever possible. Serving with friends and neigh-
bors, it was believed, created more camaraderie and discour-
aged desertion.14 
As he reached each point during the induction process-the 
enrollment assembly, the camp of instruction, or the military 
unit~ the alien inductee could present evidence of his alienage 
and request a release from service. He had to present proof of 
his foreign citizenship and evidence that he was not domiciled 
in the Confederacy. For those who needed proof of alienage, 
consuls supplied certificates of nationality; these were usually 
based on affidavits made by local residents. Consuls were so 
lax about questioning statements made by friends and rela-
tives and so quick to grant certificates that military personnel 
considered many of them worthless. Consul Magee at Mobile 
claimed he issued five hundred certificates in the spring of 
1862 alone.15 
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Proving that one was not domiciled was more complicated 
because the legal, Confederate definition of the word "domi-
cile" was vague and not acceptable to everyone. Military per-
sonnel throughout the South defined the word to fit their im-
mediate needs. With the passage of the Enrollment Act in 
1862, Attorney General Thomas Watts decided that individu-
als were domiciled only if they planned to remain permanently 
in the Confederacy and did not plan to return to the land of 
their birth: "Long residence, of itself, does not constitute domi-
cile. A person may acquire domicile in less than one year, and 
he may not acquire it in twenty years' residence." The "exercise 
of the rights of citizenship," marriage, and the acquisition of 
property, Watts continued, could be regarded as evidence of the 
intention to remain in the country, but they were not conclu-
sive proof.ts 
Watts's definition caused confusion and resentment. British 
subjects wrote to consuls asking for clarification. Bunch com-
plained to Benjamin because local enrolling officers were not 
abiding by Watts's definition. And, he asked, how could the 
Confederacy be certain that an individual planned· to live in 
the ~ountry for the rest of his life? When officials intl::te Mobile 
area began to conscript aliens under the Enrollment Act, Con-
sul Magee obtained an order from the War Department forbid-
ding the action: '~ll enrolling officers are hereby expressly 
prohibited from enrolling as conscripts foreigners not domi~ 
ciled in the Confederate States. By domicile is meant perma-
nent residence." Within a short time the Mobile Sun declared 
that "it is astonishing to observe the great number of 'foreign-
ers' in our midst and therefore exempt from the Conscript 
Act .... Nearly every town and city in the South is full of this 
class of persons-most of them able-bodied young men who 
ought to be in the tented fields in defense of the government of 
their adoption." 11 
Adding to this confusion was the fact that the official South-
ern definition of "domicile" did not conform with the British 
understanding of the word, which was broader and less restric-
tive. Law officers of the Crown declared that domicile should 
not be determined merely by an individual's intention to re-
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main permanently within a country. Aliens who had voted, 
had served on juries, or had acquired substantial property 
might also be considered domiciled; they could be required to 
serve as long as they were not brought into contact with Feder-
al troops. An individual who declared his intention to become 
a citizen but had not engaged in "activities of the state" was 
not eligible for military service until he officially changed his 
allegiance. If he refused to serve, however, he could be ex-
pected to leave the country. 
In judging the question of domicile, British officials also 
considered length of residence. In June 1863, Charles Powers 
appealed to Consul Lynn at Galveston to secure his exemption 
from the draft. Powers had lived in Texas for over twenty 
years-since the days of the Texas Republic. During that time 
he had exercised the rights of a citizen by voting and serving 
on juries, and he had acquired $135,000 in property. Powers 
based his claim for exemption on his British citizenship and 
his stated intention not to become a citizen of the United 
States. Reviewing all the circumstances in the case, Lyons de-
clared that Powers had not forfeited his British nationality but 
that he could hardly consider himself entitled "to Her Majes-
ty's protection ifhe should find himselftreated as a citizen." IS 
If Attorney General Watts and Crown lawyers differed on the 
meaning of "domicile" and their ideas about the obligations of 
aliens, so did Southern courts. Generally the courts agreed that 
aliens should be compelled to perform some service, but they 
differed on the extent and became more unyielding as the war 
continued. In 1861 the South Carolina Court of Appeals decided 
that resident aliens were only liable for militia and patrol duty 
for the maintenance of public order. Aliens who had voted, de-
clared a Savannah court in 1862, could not claim exemption 
from military service. In February 1863, the Richmond Circuit 
Court declared a foreigner eligible for the draft if he had previ-
ously served in any Southern military unit, as either a volun-
teer or a conscript, no matterhow short the time. Two months 
later the Confederate District Court of Mobile contradicted the 
central government, declaring all alien residents to be domi-
ciled; it ordered consuls to stop claiming "domicile" as a basis 
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for exemption. Finally in July 1863, Judge A. G. Mcgrath, for-
:qter justice on the United States District Court, ruled that 
aliens who had voted or lived in the South for an extended time 
could not claim exemption from the draft. Assistant Secretary 
of War Campbell, who had served as an associate justice on the 
United States Supreme Court, disagreed with Mcgrath's deci-
sion. Possibly because of Campbell's opposition, the central gov-
ernment never adjusted its definition of "domicile" to conform 
to court decisions on the subject.19 
In addition to the courts, Southern civil and military offi-
cials devised their own definition of "domicile." W.P. Miles, 
chairman of the committee on military affairs in the Confeder-
ate House of Representatives, opposed exempting aliens who 
had lived in the South since the beginning of the war. Most 
state governors defined "domicile" in broad terms and advo-
cated the conscription of long-time resident aliens. Governor 
Joseph Brown of Georgia was so adamant about the subject 
that he took personal action in one case. When an Englishman 
applied to Brown for permission to leave Georgia in 1863, the 
governor ordered him into the state militia.2o 
Military commanders could be as rigid on the subject ofalien 
service. In the spring of 1863, James Healy, an Irishman, led a 
movement for higher wages among his fellow workers at the 
Charleston Foundry and Machine Shop. The police took Healy 
before.an enrolling officer, who forced·him to sign enlistment 
papers. Consul Walker sought a discharge on the basis of 
Healy's alienage but got nowhere. General Thomas Jordan, the 
district commander's chief of staff, rejected the request, argu~ 
ing that Healy's voluntary employment in a war industry ne-
gated his exemption because of alienage and made him liable 
for service under the 96th Article of War. But Jordan's true 
reason for Healy's induction slipped out: fears that his contin-
ued attempts to incite discontent about wages might upset the 
stability of the civilian community. In reporting the case, 
Walker expressed concern for the broader implications of Jor-
dan's decision. Many British men, Walker wrote, worked in 
war-related industries and women worked in the quartermas-
ter corps making uniforms because they could not leave the 
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Confederacy and were compelled to take any employment to 
earn a livelihood. The Confederates had use of their labor for 
wages far below the rate of inflation, and now Jordan's inter-
pretation declared all the men liable for military service. Un-
doubtedly Walker felt a sense of relief several months later 
when the War Department rejected Jordan''s reasoning and or-
dered Healy's release.21 
Even military officers of a lesser rank than Jordan decided 
for themselves which aliens should or should not serve in the 
military. In June 1863, Consul Lynn at Galveston wrote to the 
officer in charge of recruitment in Texas, demanding the re-
lease of seven British subjects who had recently been taken to 
a camp of instruction. The officer agreed to release two of the 
men but insisted the others serve because they had either 
voted, sat on juries, purchased property, or married local wom-
en. In another case an enrolling officer refused to release an 
inductee because he had voted once. 22 
Some commanders became quite adamant about their refus-
al to release aliens. John B. Weems, commandant at the camp 
of instruction at Decatur, Georgia, complained bitterly to Con-
sul Fullarton about his constant pleas seeking the release of 
British subjects. He agreed that these men had signed state-
ments declaring their intention to return to Britain, but their 
past actions belied the1r declarations. They had enjoyed the 
protection of the government, Weems wrote, and they had ap-
pealed to its courts, invested money, voted, married, and en-
gaged in other activities that gave more "intention as to per-
manent residence here, than can be disclosed by any affidavit 
to the contrary." 23 
Occasionally, high ranking military officers who came across 
injustices took pains to correct them. Henry Wayne, adjutant 
general of Georgia, for example, asked Consul Fullarton in 
1863 to secure the release of an illegally conscripted teenager. 
Seventeen at the time of his induction, Frank Miller had come 
to the United States with an uncle in 1859 to engage in watch-
making. Within a short time the uncle died. Caught by the 
war and destitute, Miller became an itinerant laborer, hoping 
to work his way back to England. He came under Wayne's no-
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tice after he was fraudulently enrolled, and the officer ap-
pealed to Fullarton: "He is sober, steady, industrious, and 
faithful and in every way deserving. If you can't get him home, 
can you give him papers that will protect him?"24 
Wayne's efforts on behalf of Miller indicate that higher level 
officers were easier to deal with than officers of lesser rank. 
Consuls felt this especially true when appealing conscription 
cases to enrolling officers and commanders at camps of in-
struction. ''If we have to depend upon enrolling officers," wrote 
Bunch, "not one application in ten would reach the War De-
partment. The sentiment of that office is decidedly in favour of· 
forcing all foreigners into service. There is scarcely a day that I 
have not had to remonstrate here against it."25 
A major complaint of the consuls was the failure of enroll-
ing officers or camp commanders to reply to their protests. 
Consul Magee at Mobile informed the legation in Washington, 
at the end of October 1862, that he still had no response to 
communiques he had written in early September about the 
conscription of seven British subjects. Consul Lynn in Texas 
spent seven months writing letters of complaint about the in-
duction of several Britons to at least four different officials 
and never received any replies. "I am of the opinion," Lynn 
concluded, ''that neither the Military or State Authorities in-
tend to redress the grievances to which British Subjects are 
exposed or that any notice will be taken of the remonstrances I 
have made." Often when consular correspondence had not been 
answered for some months and the consul made another inqui-
ry, the commander informed him that the individuals in ques-
tion had been transferred and that he was unaware of their 
present location. 26 
In dealing with foreign nationals, military officers kept or 
"mislaid" certificates of nationality, jailed conscripts, or refused 
to letthem contact friends or consuls. During his last months in 
Charleston, Bunch heard about two British subjects who had 
been imprisoned for the past nine months in Salisbury, North 
Carolina, for refusing to enlist, but he was unable to find out any 
details about.the situation. Nor was this an isolated instance. 
An enrolling officer in Atlanta jailed Michael Greenan for re-
104 British Foreign Service and the Civil War 
fusing to enlist and did not allow him to change clothes, bathe, 
or contact friends. When Greenan demanded his certificate of 
nationality, the officer said it was lost and could not be found. 
Enrolling officers dealt with Thomas McCormick more harshly. 
After being jailed for six months, stripped of all clothing except 
for a blanket, and deprived of adequate food, he agreed to enlist 
ifhe were assigned to an artillery company. Sometimes harsh 
treatment resulted in death. When Thomas Hearn, age twenty-
-two, was sent to the jail in Charleston, he contracted typhoid 
fever. His jailers refused to take note ofhis illness until it was too 
late; he died shortly after being admitted to the hospital. At the 
time of Hearn's death, Consul Walker's permission to act as con-
sul had been with withdrawn, and despite his knowledge of the 
affair, he did nothing for fear of bringing attention to himself.27 
Unfortunately, a potential conscript's problems were not 
over if he persuaded one enrolling officer· of his ineligibility. 
Enrolling officers frequently changed, and when a new one 
came into the district, foreign nationals found themselves star-
ting over. The new enrolling officer in Georgia revoked Henry 
Fetherston's previous exemption, tore up his certificate of na-
tionality, and gave him fifteen days to obtain exemption papers 
from the War Department in Richmond.2s 
In several instances punishment for refusing to enlist be-
came severe. One enrolling officer threatened to shoot Thomas 
Neill when he refused to enlist. Another did shoot Michael 
McNamara "clear through the body" after he declared he 
would not enlist for any reason. John A. Lee in Texas agreed to 
enlist after he was chained to a wagon and paraded through 
the town. Enrolling officers took R. Belshaw of Montgomery, 
Alabama, to a camp of instruction at Tullahoma, Tennessee, 
and hung him from a rafter by his thumbs, allowing only the 
tips of his feet to touch the ground. At the same camp, officers 
hung J.J. Kelly by his heels with his head just above a tub of 
water and lowered him into the tub periodically. Kelly nearly 
drowned before he agreed to enlist. An enrolling officer in Sul-
livan City, Tennessee, struck a British subject with an axe for 
resisting enlistment in the state militia.29 
The most inflexible of commandants at instruction camps 
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was Major Clarke of Brookhaven, Mississippi. In October 1862 
Consul Magee informed the legation in Washington that no 
British subject could expect consideration from the officer: "He 
defies all British protection, takes the men's certificates from 
them and places them in jail, feeding them on bread and wa-
ter." Magee even complained to the War Department that 
Clarke had publicly declared that "he don't regard one British 
Protection." By January 1863 Clarke devised a somewhat grim 
method of chastising those Britons he released: on their certif-
icates of exemption he wrote, "it is urged upon all persons not 
to give employment in any way to this class of exempts, they 
having become a nuisance to the Southern Confederacy." After 
James Nelson received his discharge from Clarke, he made his 
way to New Orleans and informed the consul that "many Brit-
ish Subjects" were being exposed to Clarke's cruelty but un-
able to get away. 30 
During the months that George Wythe Randolph headed the 
Confederate War Department, March 19 to November 22, 1862, 
the central government indicated a willingness to work with 
the consuls for the release of aliens from military service. ''The 
Secretary of War," wrote Cridland, "seems determined not to 
allow any violation of the rights of aliens ... and whenever I 
have laid a case before him showing that the party arrested was 
· a British Subject and not domiciled, he has promptly ordered 
his release."3t On a number of occasions Randolph sent instruc-
tions to commanders in the Deep South, informing them that 
nondomiciled aliens were not eligible for induction and to re-
lease any who had been enrolled. 32 
Within a month of Randolph's departure, the War Depart-
ment began to reveal a less lenient attitude. The first indication 
came with Assistant Secretary Campbell's reply when Bunch 
complained about James Haley's conscription. Several months 
later Consul Moore of Richmond informed Lyons that he now 
communicated only with noncommissioned officers. When he 
called at the State Department, Secretary Benjamin required 
Moore to wait several days before he would see him. Subordi-
nates made excuses for their superiors at the War Department 
and at Richmond military headquarters whenever Moore went 
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to those offices. ''The authorities are leaning very hard upon 
British Subjects for conscription," Moore told Lyons. They de-
prived them of their certificates of nationality or arrested them 
if they refused to enroll. Others were forced to work on public 
projects for resisting induction. 33 To an acquaintanCe . Moore 
wrote ''the apparent apathy and indifference with which the 
War Department seems to regard cases of the most atrocious 
cruelty, quite baffle all my preconceived opinions of my own 
kindred race." 34 
When in February 1863 Moore complained to Benjamin 
about General Henry Winder's policy regarding aliens leaving 
the Confederacy, he received a cold shoulder. Winder, comman-
dant at Richmond, agreed to issue passports to foreign nation-
als wishing to leave, but he singled out Britons for special cen-
sure. They were required to list any service in the Confederate 
army or in a Southern state militia unit on their passports. 
This stipulation, Moore claimed, ''places them in extreme dan-
ger if they are apprehended by Federal troops while traveling 
north." He considered the requirement partly a reaction to 
Britain's rejection of Napoleon ill's mediation proposal but 
also a diabolical means of keeping British subjects confined to 
the Confederacy, where they would be subject to military ser-
vice or forced to work in military-related industries. Benjamin 
was unconcerned and saw no major problem with Winder's pol-
icy. Moreover, he informed Moore, it was purely a military 
matter. On hearing of the affair, Lyons responded: ''I have read 
your despatches with much concern. I learn with much regret 
of Benjamin's attitude. I cannot come to your assistance be-
cause Benjamin would be less disposed to deal with me than 
you. All I have been able to do is to refer your despatches to 
Russell." 35 
Moore was not alone in noticing a growing inflexibility in the 
South about the conscription of aliens and an increasing dislike 
of Britons in particular. Informing Consul Fullarton of his 
brother's murder in Columbus, Georgia, John O'Connell insis-
ted that his only crime was being British. ''They are all down on 
us here," he wrote. Authorities did not arrest the murderer, he 
lamented, "so you see there is no justice for us." From some-
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where in Virginia, British citizens petitioned Lord Russell to 
intervene with the Confederate government so they could leave 
the country, and another group from Galveston, Texas, re-
quested a man-of-war to take them to a British colony. Russell 
regretted his inability to help the petitioners; he suggested they 
try to solve their problems by working through the consuls. He 
was aware from correspondence from both the legation and the 
consuls that his oppressed countrymen· would have little suc-
cess. Growing anti-British sentiment was causing Confederate 
officials to become uncooperative on most issues raised by the 
consuls or by British nationals. Although he was disturbed by 
their harsh treatment, Russell could do little to prevent it. as 
What he could not know, however, was that Benjamin would 
shortly expel the consuls, and then British citizens would be 
without any avenue of appeal. 
9 
Expelling the 
Southern Consuls 
Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin expelled 
the British consuls during the sUinmer and fall of 1863. Pub-
licly he stated that the action was necessary because of the 
consuls' efforts to prevent the conscription of British nationals 
into the Confederate army and state militia units. Yet, that 
was not the sole reason. Behind the dismissal lay a growing 
antipathy toward Britain for its failure to extend diplomatic 
recognition and a Confederate desire to retaliate in the only 
way it could-by dismissing the consuls. 
Most nineteenth-century Americans, in both the North and 
the South, harbored suspicion and distrust of Great Britain. In 
part a carryover of antipathy created during the Revolution 
and the War of 1812, the attitude flared up again over various 
boundary disputes between the United States and British 
North America, and was exacerbated by the arrival of numer-
ous Irish immigrants, few of whom had any affection. for the 
English. William Howard Russell, the journalist, quickly be-
came aware of dislike for England when he traveled through-
out America at the beginning of the war. Welcomed at first, 
Russell soon found himself an object of censure after he pub-
lished remarks that Northerners or Southerners considered 
uncomplimentary. I 
Animosity against Britain grew rapidly in the South during 
the war because Southerners expected more than the British 
government was willing to give. Confederates believed Europe's 
· need for cotton would force both Britain and France to recognize 
their nation and break the blockade in order to obtain the fiber. 
Indeed, Russell commented after conversing with several South-
ern leaders: "They assume the British crown rests on a cotton 
Expelling the Southern .Consuls 109 
bale."2 But France would only extend diplomatic recognition in 
conjunction with Great Britain, and the failure of the Foreign 
Office to support such a move caused Southerners to place the 
blame on Britain alone. 
·The high point of Southern diplomatic success came early, 
on May 13, 1861, when Britain and France extended bellig-
erent status to the Confederacy and declared. their neutrality 
in the war. From then on, Confederates considered Britain's 
every action a setback. On June 1, Britain closed her ports-
including those in· the West Indies-to both Northern and 
Southern privateers. When friends of the South in Parliament 
tried to force a debate on diplomatic recognition in September 
1862, Lord Russell squelched the attempt. Several months 
later, in November 1862, Britain rejected Napoleon ill's sug-
gestion to press mediation on the North and South. Then on 
September 4, 1863, the British government detained the Laird 
Rams and other ships being built for the Confederacy in Eng-
lish shipyards. The following month, on October 8, the Foreign 
Office ordered the seizure of the ships, the same day that Ben-
jamin expelled the last remaining consuls. a . 
Throughout the war, Britain observed the Union blockade 
despite Confederate claims that it was ineffective. In January 
1863, Confederate ironclads attacked the Union blockading 
squadron off Charleston and forced it to withdraw. Under nine-
teenth-century international law, foreign nations were permit-
ted to send ships to ports where blockades had been broken. 
Other European nations followed Britain's lead in ignoring 
Benjamin's notification of the break, and the Union quickly re-
established the blockade. Months later Walker wrote: ''Many 
people in Charleston [still] denounce England for her faithless-
ness in the blockade." 4 
Lord John Russell strained an already difficult relationship 
by refusing to receive James Mason, Confederate commis-
sioner to Great Britain. That this treatment rankled was evi-
dent. During a meeting with Benjamin in the spring of 1863 
when the secretary seemed particularly inflexible, Consul 
Moore asked why he was being treated so curtly. Benjamin 
made several comments about Russell's refusal to meet with 
110 British Foreign Service and the Civil War 
Mason and ended by saying: "The interview I give you now is 
more than Lord Russell accords Mr. Mason." 5 
Increasing anti-British feeling began to surface in the Con-
federacy about a year after the war started. When Henri Mer-
cier, French foreign minister to the United States, returned 
from Richmond in 1862, Lyons quizzed him about Confederate 
attitudes toward foreign nations. Mercier replied, "there ap-
pears to be a very good disposition toward foreigners in gener-
al; ... less good perhaps toward the English ... because more 
has been hoped from that country than from any other, and the 
disappointment has consequently been greater." Nine months 
later, just after Britain rejected Napoleon III's mediation pro-
posal, Consul Moore described the general dislike for England 
in Richmond and the growing appreciation for the French. At 
the same time John B. Jones, a clerk in the Confederate War 
Department, wrote, "we are out of huinor with England now 
and court a French Alliance."6 
Bunch's correspondence to the Foreign Office catalogues 
growing Southern antagonism. Even before the war began, 
Bunch remarked about Southern wariness of Britain because 
of its antislavery policy. Referring to South Carolina he wrote: 
"This commonwealth ... is conducting itself in a truly Repub-
lican manner, by guaranteeing to everyone absolute freedom 
of thought and speech-provided the conclusion and language 
happen to be very much in favour of slavery." When the first 
group of Southern commissioners-William L. Yancey, Pierre 
Rost, and Dudley Mann-went to Europe in 1861, Bunch cau-
tioned Russell that he might find them insincere, for Southern 
people dislike "us violently ... on account of our hostility to 
Slavery." Three months later he wrote of Southern disappoint-
ment because England· and France had still failed to recognize 
the Confederacy. But Bunch did not advocate quick recognition 
because be believed that "from the good. will of the new Confed-
eracy we have nothing to hope. Hating us, as it does, ... it will 
gladly hail any opportunity of embarrassing us!' As he was 
about to depart the South, Bunch continued in much the same 
vein: "Our known antipathy to slavery adds another element 
to Southern dislike. If, at times, in the earlier stages of this 
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contest, some kindlier feelings have been expressed towards 
Great Britain, they have been prompted by the hope that we 
would be useful to the Southern cause, either by raising the 
blockade, or in some other way become embroiled with the 
United States. . . . We have nothing to expect from the good 
will of the South." 7 
Animosity toward the British grew as the South encoun-
tered devastating defeats on the battlefield. Consul Walker at 
Charleston noted heightened bitterness toward Englishmen 
following the defeat at Gettysburg and the surrender of Vicks-
burg. Britons were being discharged from their employment 
and harassed for not joining the army, or they were being ar-
rested and freed only after enlisting. Nor did this antagonism 
cease after the consuls were expelled. "The hatred publicly ex-
pressed against England," wrote Cridland from Alabama in 
late 1863, "makes it far from pleasant to be known here as a 
British Subject and in some instances no language or threats 
seem sufficient to express the growing enmity." s 
From the beginning of the war, Southern editors and con-
gressmen raised questions about Davis's decision to accept the 
foreign consuls. Led by the Charleston Mercury and the Rich-
mond Whig, newspaper editors began asking whether the Con-
federacy or the United States had granted exequaturs to the 
.consuls, and if the latter, what right did it have to confer con-
sular authority within the Confederacy? By early 1863, the 
Whig was demanding the expulsion of the British consuls as a 
"vindication of our self-respect."9 
During the fall of 1862, members of the Confederate Con-
gress began to question whether consuls sanctioned by the 
United States should be allowed to remain in the Confederacy. 
Benjamin, in response, admitted that only one consul in the 
entire Confederacy (Ernest Raven, consul for the state of Texas 
from Saxe-Coburg and Gotha) had received his exequatur from 
the Richmond government. In asking for the exequatur, Ra-
ven's government made clear that its request did not imply or 
extend diplomatic recognition. All other exequaturs held by 
consuls had been granted by the United States government 
and consuls in the South were still receiving instructions and 
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transmitting correspondence thrQugh their nation's diplomatic 
agents in Washington, D.C. Benjamin discouraged Congress 
from demanding expulsion by pointing out that the presence of 
the consuls was beneficial: their correspondence permitted 
"correct information to reach foreign nations on matters which 
are highly important to the public interest." 1o 
Despite Benjamin's argument, agitation in Congress caused 
the Davis administration to discuss the matter of expulsion. 
One month after his report to Congress, Benjamin informed 
Mason: ''The President has further under consideration the pro-
priety of sending out of the country all British consuls and con-
sular agents, and I will give you early advice on his conclusion 
on this point." Indeed, Davis's cabinet met on several occasions 
to deliberate the issue but decided to take no action; however, it 
attempted to terminate consular connections with legations in 
Washington. Benjamin ordered all foreign consuls, in June 
1863, to stop transmitting communications through their lega-
tions and to send all future correspondence to their home gov-
ernments through neutral countries.n 
The first indication of a more rigid attitude directed specifi-
cally toward the British consuls came when Benjamin refused to 
acknowledge Frederick Cridland as acting consul at Mobile in 
May 1863. Previously he had accepted Allan Fullarton and H. 
Pinckney Walker as acting consuls at Savannah and Charles-
ton. Benjamin did question Walker about the source of his au-
thority but seemed satisfied when he learned that Bunch had 
made the appointment. Benjamin objected to Cridland because 
Lyons had named him to the consular post, and in Benjamin's 
view Lyons had no authority to select consuls in the Confeder-
acy. While Benjamin refused to recognize Cridland as consul, he 
permitted him to remain in Mobile as a private citizen.12 
· The first consul to be expelled was George Moore at Rich-
mond. Moore had been consul at Ancona, Italy, for twenty years 
before being sent to Richmond, and he had immediately disliked 
his new assignment. He often complained of his own depression 
and of illness in his family.1a As a consequence most of the work 
fell to his vice consul, Frederick Cridland. Magee's removal and 
Cridland's transfer to Alabama forced Moore to become more 
involved in daily affairs at the Richmond consulate. 
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U.S. Grant's military moves toward Vicksburg in early 1863 
marked the beginning of Moore's downfall. In mid-February, 
as pressure against Vicksburg intensified, the Mississippi leg-
islature ordered all men between eighteen and forty-five years 
of age, including foreigners, into the militia to defend the state 
against Federal invasion. Hearing of the order, Moore fired off 
a letter to Benjamin calling the Mississippi law a violation of 
the Confederate conscription acts. He presumed the exemption 
provisions in the Enrollment Act took precedence over state 
law. Moore also complained ·about a British citizen, Thomas 
Jones of Rankin County, who had been assaulted, imprisoned, 
and seriously injured in one eye for resisting conscription. He 
was presently housed in the jail at Jackson, Mississippi, and 
Moore demanded his release.l4 
Benjamin responded. by putting Moore on the defensive; The 
consul quickly found himself being questioned about his right 
to deal with conscription problems outside of Virginia. On 
what basis, Benjamin demanded, was Moore involving himself 
with affairs in Mississippi? His exequatur limited his authori-
ty to Virginia only, ''but since you are raising a question re-
garding the laws and actions of Mississippi, it is well you pre-
sent your authority for the precise nature and extent of your 
function." 15 
Unable to present such a document, Moore obtained an in-
terview to settle the controversy. Benjamin was unyielding; he 
refused to allow Moore to deal with problems outside of Virgin~ 
ia hut agreed to permit enrolled Britons in outlying areas to 
correspond directly with. the State Department. Finally, the 
secretary declared, he had no objection to appointments of un-
accredited consuls in states where there were none. He also 
ordered Moore to take up any future matters involving con-
scription directly with the State Department and not to refer 
them to the War Department.1s 
Shortly afterward Moore received an appeal from J.B. Cald-
well, an attorney in White Sulphur Springs, Virginia. Two of 
his clients, Nicholas Moloney (also spelled Malony) and Eu-
gene Farrell, both British subjects, had been conscripted into 
the Confederate army and were seeking discharges. Ignoring 
Benjamin's instructions, Moore contacted James Seddon, sec-
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retary of war, requesting releases for the two men. An investi-
gation convinced Seddon that the men were domiciled and not 
eligible: both had purchased land, voted, married, and raised 
families. Neither had ever indicated his intention to return to 
his native Ireland.17 
During the time it took the War Department to investigate 
Moloney's and Farrell's backgrounds, Moore vented his anger 
to lawyer Caldwell: "I have lived thirty-two consecutive years 
in despotic countries, and I am compelled to bear witness that 
I have met in those foreign countries more official courtesy 
and consideration from the local authorities, on my represen-
tation of grievances, than I meet at the hands of my own blood 
and lineage." Apparently Caldwell was not sympathetic to 
such sentiment, for he forwarded Moore's letter to Seddon and 
Benjamin.1s 
It did not take Benjamin long to react. On June 5, 1863, he 
informed the consul that President Davis had signed letters 
patent revoking his exequatur. Moore, according to Benjamin, 
had disregarded the limits of his authority by undertaking 
consular functions outside Virginia, and he had demonstrated 
disrespect for the Confederate government by corresponding 
with the War Department, ignoring instructions to the con-
trary. Benjamin did not mention Moore's letter to Caldwell.19 
In an emotional response, Moore informed Lyons that the 
Confederate government was ignoring the "sanctity of person-
al freedom" and becoming unnecessarily sensitive about any 
opposition expressed toward it. The demand that "our per-
secuted countrymen ... serve in an army not their owri' com-
pelled British subjects to act contrary to the wishes of their 
own sovereign, but this was of little concern to the Confeder-
acy as it moved forward in its "merciless career, of compulsory 
enrolment for its army." Moore ended his abusive denunciation 
with a request for permission to leave this ''wretched place."20 
Two months after dismissing Moore, on August 4, 1863, Ben-
jamin terminated Mason's mission to Great Britain. 
The controversies involving Fullarton and Walker originated 
at the state level following the surrender of Vicksburg. On July 
17, 1863, Governor Joseph E. Brown increased Georgia's militia 
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to eight thousand men, and the state's adjutant and inspector 
general ordered enrolling officers· in every county to fill their 
quotas by August 4. He also stipulated the enrollment of "un-
naturalized foreigners," because they were ''bound to defend 
[their] domicile, and liable to be drafted by the State and com-
pelled to do so." Although the ostensible purpose of the draft was 
to defend the state, the order directed militia commanders to 
place the new inductees under the direction of Confederate com-
manders if the need arose. 21 
Fullarton complained to Brown as soon as the conscription 
order became public. He understood the purpose of the draft 
but strenuously objected to placing British nationals under the 
command of Confederate officers. "Her Majesty's Government 
accepts the proposition that British Subjects are liable to local 
defense and in some instances to protect from local invasion,'' 
Fullarton wrote, but because this was a civil war, British citi-
zens should not have to face the possibility of fighting Union 
troops and being labeled as traitors.22 
Brown excused Fullarton's brashness because the consul did 
not understand the intent of the draft. The men were being 
called for local defense only, but it might be necessary to mus-
ter them into Confederate service in order to achieve better 
coordination of military movements and to enable those cap-
tured by the enemy to Claim the rights and privileges of prison-
ers of war. The main reason for increasing the state militia, 
claimed Brown, was to quell possible slave insurrections. Union 
forces urged slaves to flee from their masters and encouraged 
them to engage in depredations against white Southerners. In 
addition, Union military units were now raiding deep into Con-
federate territory. When Confederate army soldiers were not 
available to repulse these raids, it would be necessary to call out 
the militia. But Brown did not expect militia troops to come into 
contact with units of the United States Army because Confeder-
ate soldiers would hold them back. Finally, Brown informed 
Fullarton that British subjects who refused to serve in the mili-
tia could leave the state.23 
Frustrated by his inability to persuade the governor to change 
his mind and exempt foreigners, Fullarton issued a public 
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statement that "ordered British nationals· conscripted to ser-
vice ... to throw down their arms if they come into contact 
with troops of the United States." Angered that a mere consul 
would presume to issue such a command, Brown responded in 
kind. Any militiaman who refused to fight Union troops, Brown 
wrote,."will be dealt with as a dishonorable soldier." Georgia's 
draft did not violate British policy regarding military service 
by foreign nationals, he insisted. Fullarton had admitted· that 
British subjects could be required to put down local insurrection 
and to defend a state against foreign invasion. Since Brown re-
garded the United States as a foreign country (although Fullar-. 
ton did not), he saw no discrepancy between the draft order and 
British policy.24 
Walker's problems in South Carolina were similar, but they 
involved men already enrolled in the militia. Five British 
workers at the Charleston arsenal had previously been in-
ducted into the '1\rsenal Guard," organized to defend the arse-
nal itself. They were never called· to active duty because the 
arsenal had never come under threat. Then in June 1863 the 
local militia commander decided to reorganize his force, incor-
porating the various segments of the militia in Charleston into 
one unit; the entire unit would be called out when necessary. 
The British members of the '1\rsenal Guard" refused to partic-
ipate in the reorganized militia, and Walker encouraged them. 
Briefly, he argued they might be brought into contact with 
United States troops·and, if captured, treated as traitors. Like 
Fullarton, Walker encouraged the men, and all other British 
subjects serving in state forces, to lay down their arms should 
they encoUnter Union soldiers. · 
When the '1\rsenal Guard" refused to serve in the militia, 
the local commander arrested them and informed the enroll-
ing officer for the Confederate army of their availability. After 
they were inducted into Confederate forces, Walker. took up 
their case with General Thomas Jordan, the local commander's 
chief of staff, but he proved unsympathetic. Arguing that the 
men had forfeited their claim to neutrality by working at the 
Charleston arsenal, a war-related industry, Jordan refused to 
release them. Walker next appealed to P.G.T. Beauregard, com-
mander of the district, who also declined to issue· discharges. 25 
Expelling the Southern Consuls 117 
While Walker was defending the members of the ·~senal 
Guard" he was also working on behalf of Michael Barlow. A 
volunteer in the state militia, Barlow had been assigned to the 
General Clinch, a ship carrying military supplies between 
Charleston and outlying fortifications that were under attack. 
Because Barlow might be required to fire on Federal troops, 
Walker requested a change of assignment or a discharge. 
When authorities denied his appeal, Walker again issued a 
plea to British subjects in the militia, Barlow included, to lay 
down their weapons rather than fire on United States forces.26 
Next, Walker petitioned Milledge L. Bonham, governor of 
South Carolina. Stressing former Governor Pickens's procla-
mation of November 1861, which forbade the use of foreign 
nationals in dangerous duty, Walker insisted that Bonham 
was still bound by the order. Unsure of himself, Bonham de~ 
cided to seek an opinion from the state attorney general. In the 
:meantime, the local militia commanders in Charleston and 
Georgia complained to Benjamin about Walker and Fullarton, 
and undoubtedly they complained to DaVis when he toured the 
states' defenses in early October 1863.27 
The blow fell on October 8, 1863. While Davis was away 
from Richmond visiting General Braxton Bragg's army at 
Chattanooga, Benjamin took an exceptional step: he called a 
meeting of the Confederate cabinet, and the group voted unan-
imously to expel those British consuls still resident in the 
country. Informing Fullarton and Walker of the decision, Ben-
jamin lectured them about their assertion that soldiers could 
throw down their arms: "This assumption of jurisdiction by 
foreign officials within the territory of the Confederacy, and 
this encroachment on its sovereignty cannot be tolerated for a 
moment .... I am directed, therefore, by the President to com.,. 
municate to you this order, that you promptly depart from the 
Confederacy, and that in the Dl.eantime you cease to exercise 
any consular functions within its limits." Because Walker and 
Fullarton were acting consuls and had never received exe-
quaturs, it was not necessary to issue letters patent. 28 
Benjamin's action-calling a special cabinet meeting while 
Davis was not in Richmond-was an unusual step, and he 
would not have taken it unless he knew the president ap-
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proved. Davis's opinion about expelling the British consuls is 
unknown, but he likely supported such a move. As secretary of 
war in Franklin Pierce's administration, Davis had expressed 
his distrust of Great Britain, an attitude strengthened by sto-
ries his brothers had told him about British atrocities during 
the War of 1812. Distrust grew to dislike during the Civil War. 
Davis resented references to his country as the "so-called Con-
federacy," even though they were diplomatically correct, and 
he came to believe that Britain's policy was a "hollow profes-
sion of neutrality." Every step the Foreign Office took with re-
gard to the South drove a wedge between it and the Confederacy 
and increased his antipathy toward the power. Historians note 
that Davis was quick to reprimand members of his cabinet if he 
disapproved of their actions. Given his anti-British perspective 
and his apparent lack of comment about Benjamin's expulsion 
orders, Davis's silence indicated his approval.29 
In expelling the consuls, Benjamin overlooked Consul Lynn 
at Galveston; his exequatur was not revoked and he never re-
ceived an order to leave the Confederacy. It is possible that 
Benjamin was totally unaware of Lynn's presence. He had 
written only one letter to the Confederate State Department 
and merely received an acknowledgment from an assistant 
secretary. When he heard of Walker's and Fullarton's dismiss-
al, Lynn decided to remain in Galveston. During the next year, 
he reported that some Confederate civil and military officials 
in Texas refused to recognize him as consul, while others 
treated him no differently than before. 30 
Benjamin defended his revocation of Moore's exequatur and 
his expulsion of Walker and Fullarton in a long, somewhat 
rambling letter to John Slidell, Confederate commissioner to 
France. Moore, wrote Benjamin, had deliberately ignored a re-
quest that he not correspond with the War Department and 
"his remarks touching the conduct ofthe Confederate authori-
ties in relation to two enlisted . soldiers" were offensive. The 
actions of Walker and Fullarton were more repugnant: they 
regarded their own certificates of nationality as proof of the 
fact that an individual should be exempt from military ser-
vice. These certificates were based on statements by the inter-
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ested parties themselves, and a number of them had proved to 
be fraudulent. The consuls were, in effect, deciding for them-
selves who was eligible to serve in Confederate forces. By en-
couraging soldiers to lay down their arms when coming into 
contact with Federal troops, Walker and Fullarton were de-
nying military commanders control over their own forces and 
were encroaching on the nation's sovereignty.at 
Much of Benjamin's letter also dealt with Britain's with-
drawal of Consul Magee from Mobile and the financial obliga-
tions of nations at war. Southern newspapers published the 
letter and Walker sent Lyons a copy. After reading it, he in-
formed Russell: "Mr. Benjamin's lecture on the duty of Bellig-
erents to pay their debts is totally beside the purpose." But 
Lyons was not unsympathetic to Benjamin's action. "I do not 
think," he wrote Russell, ''that [Walker] or Mr. Fullarton ... 
managed their correspondence with the Confederate Authori-
ties with all the tack and prudence which their peculiar posi-
tion with regard to those authorities rendered advisable." In-
deed, Lyons seemed more surprised by Benjamin's original 
acceptance of Walker and Fullarton as acting consuls than he 
did by their dismissal. Although he did not consider the Con-
federacy an independent nation, Lyons understood that Con-
federates regarded their country as a sovereign entity and 
would be offended by the presence of consuls approved by the 
Union and supervised by the British legation in Washington. 
On a number of occasions he suggested that the Foreign Office 
sever any connections between the legation and the Southern 
consuls and inform the Confederate government of its action. 32 
Lyons read more into Benjamin's reasons for expelling the 
consuls then the secretary himself was aware. He asserted that 
there "was evidently a predetermined manifestation'' whose ob-
jective was contemplated before the action was taken.33 Lyons's 
statement deserves attention even though it may not be possi-
ble to determine positively what he meant by "predetermined 
manifestation." Benjamin, according to one historian, "was one 
of the most secretive men who ever lived." He destroyed his pri-
vate papers for the war period, and only a portion of his official 
correspondence-which later fell into Union hands-remains. 
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Not only was he secretive, but ''few among the members of the 
Cabinet could hate as bitterly as Benjamin." He made diplo-
matic recognition from Great Britain his chief objective and 
turned against the country when he failed to achieve his goal. 
Ironically, he was born in the West Indies and by British law 
was still considered a British citizen during the Civil War. After 
the war he escaped to England and, using his rights of citizen-
ship, established himself in a successful legal career. 34 
Some historians regard Benjamin's expulsion of the British 
consuls as an act of frustration resulting from his failure to 
secure British reoogniti'on, or they· see it as a decision to give 
up on Britain and rely solely on France, with whom Confeder-
ate foreign relations had 8Iways been more favorable.35 Con-
temporary evidence also suggests that Benjamin surrendered 
to public opinion. In June 1862, fourteen months before dis-
missing the consuls, Benjamin informed Cridland, still acting 
consul in Richmond, that it would be a "very unwise policy" to 
remove any of them; They conveyed "proper information'' to 
their governments and were the only means of Confederate 
contact with foreign powers. In late 1862 and early 1863, as 
demands for the removal of foreign consuls mounted in both 
the press and the Southern Congress, Benjamin repeated his 
contention. However, cabinet discussions about expelling the 
British consuls weakened his determination. When he in-
formed Davis of the special cabinet meeting and the decision to 
expel the British consuls, Benjamin wrote: "Several members 
of the Cabinet expressed the opinion that this action on the 
consuls was very fortunate, as it enabled us by sending them 
away for a cause that so fully warrants their expulsion to satis-
fy public sentiment, which woula have been quite restive un-
der their continued residence here." 36 
Another indication that the expulsion of the consuls came 
in response to public demand was Benjamin's inconsistent poli-
cy in forcing the consuls to leave. If a consul's continued pres-
ence might draw public attention, Benjamin required him to 
withdraw from his district; otherwise, he seemed unconcerned. 
Moore did not even inquire ifhe might be permitted to· stay 
in Richmond. Eight days after Benjamin revoked his exe-
Expelling the Southern Consuls 121 
quatur, Moore left for Washington. There he informed Lyons 
that he had hired a lawyer to handle cases involving the con-
scription of British subjects, and he departed for England and 
retirement. 37 
A week after his expulsion, Fullarton requested permission 
to remain in Savannah. His nonconsular responsibilities as a 
banker, he wrote, required his presence to look after the af-
fairs of his clients. At the same time the president of the Bank 
of Savannah made a similar request, and a group. of citizens 
petitioned Benjamin on Fullarton's behalf. Benjamin rejected 
the request and ordered Fullarton to leave the country. 38 But 
when a British warship arrived off Savannah to remove the 
consul, the commander of the Union blockading force refused 
to let the ship through. 
Where Fullarton lived for the remainder of the war is un-
known; he did not correspond with the Foreign Office followip.g 
his dismissal. Probably he simply went into the countryside. 
After the capture of Savannah in 1864, a resident informed the 
legation that Fullarton had left Savannah on December 21, 
1863, and that no one had seen him since; however, he had re-
turned to Savannah by September 1865, when he signed an affi-
davit detailing the damages to Consul Molyneux's home. He 
must have then devoted his entire attention to private business, 
for he is not mentioned after 1865 in British diplomatic ar-
chives.39 
Walker remained in Charleston and the government at 
Richmond seemed unconcerned: In fact, Confederate action 
kept him there. In early November 1863 HMS Plover received 
permission from the Union commander to enter Charleston 
harbor and bring Walker out through the blockade, but the 
Confederates refused to let the ship dock because Walker had 
been expelled. Two months later Walker informed Russell that 
he was still in . Charleston and that the consulate remained 
open. He refrained from any correspondence with the Confed-
erate State Department or with local militia commanders but 
continued to advise British subjects about how to avoid con-
scription. To protect the consular archives he had moved them 
to a private home, beyond the range of Federal guns,40 
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Walker's letters to Russell during 1864 chronicle Southern 
steps to force eligible men, citizens or not, into military ser-
vice. In January he reported that British subjects in South 
Carolina and Georgia who refused to enlist were being fired 
from their jobs and not allowed to leave the city or county in 
which they lived. By June he estimated that five hundred Brit-
ish subjects had been thrown out of work. Evidently the dam-
age this policy might cause concerned Jefferson Davis, for he 
appealed to the governors to reconsider: ''Men who are em-
ployed in manufacturing and preparing munitions of war or 
military supplies are as effectively engaged in the defense of 
the country ... as the soldiers in the field." 
Unfortunately there was nothing Walker himself could do 
for conscripted British nationals. However, he did engage a 
lawyer to make appeals to military authorities. In July 1864 
Walker related that James Gorman, a British subject, was 
taken from his place of employment and jailed for fourteen 
days for refusing to enlist. When authorities released him and 
he returned to work, his employer fired him and refused to pay 
$147 dollars in back wages. According to Walker, Gorman's 
case was not unique. By August, governors in the Deep South 
were issuing declarations that required foreign nationals to 
enlist or leave the state. The policy forced virtually all foreign-
ers to enlist because they could not pass through military lines 
into Union held territory or leave by sea. In their quest to find 
eligible men, local authorities even attempted to draft Walker, 
and the forty-eight year old consul was forced to appeal his 
own conscription on the basis of his British citizenship and 
consular status. In his last letter before the fall of Charleston, 
Walker recounted that thirty-one British citizens had recently 
applied at his office, asking him to intercede of their behalf. 41 
In retrospect, Benjamin's dismissal of the British consuls 
turned out to be an order to stop engaging in consular activ-
ities rather than outright expulsion. Only Consul Moore at 
Richmond left the Confederacy, and he was required to depart 
because President Davis had signed letters patent. Walker, 
Fullarton, and Cridland remained in the Southern states but 
as private citizens. Although he was not included in the expul-
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sion order, Consul Lynn was unable to play any kind of role 
that might lessen tensions between Richmond and London. Be-
fQre 1863 he was too far from Richmond to act as a means of 
communication; after Vicksburg fell he was totally cut off from 
the Southern capital. Both the Foreign Office and the Confed-
erate State Department recognized this fact. Neither gave any 
indication of wanting to employ Lynn's services in the few dip-
lomatic contacts attempted between them. 
Following the expulsion of the consuls, Edwin DeLeon, con-
fidential agent for the Confederacy in France, told Benjamin 
that his action was a great mistake. It was insulting to Britain 
and left little hope for British sympathy or intervention. De-
Leon predicted that, as a result of Benjamin's expulsion order, 
Britain would cut itself off from the Confederacy; he was only 
partly correct. Perhaps because of Walker's letters or other in-
formation it received about the. conscription of British nation-
als, the Foreign Office made three attempts in 1864 to contact 
the Confederate State Department. The first came in January 
with an appeal to Seward. Lyons requested permission for the 
consul general at Havana to pass through the blockade at 
Wilmington or Charleston to contact leaders at Richmond. 
Lyons stressed that the sole purpose of the trip would be to 
confer about the protection of British subjects. Seward ap-
peared sympathetic, thought Lyons, but refused, saying, ''the 
United States would never ~anction any communication with 
rebels within or outside the country.".The Foreign Office now 
turned to Cridland, sending him a communique and request-
ing that he forward it to Benjamin. After Benjamin rejected 
the British correspondence, Lyons again approached Seward 
and was again rebuffed. Thus, one appeal to the Confederacy 
and two to the Union got the British nowhere.42 
The final diplomatic contact between the Confederacy and 
the Foreign Office came with the Kenner mission to London. In 
March 1865, Benjamin sent his friend and Confederate con-
gressman from Louisiana, Duncan F. Kenner, to England with a 
last ditch proposal: the Confederacy would abolish slavery in 
return for diplomatic recognition.43 The Confederate govern-
ment was aware that slavery had long been a stumbling block to 
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English acceptance of the South as an independent nation; still, 
by 1865 the Southern offer was an impotent gesture. No matter 
how the war ended, slavery would not survive. In March 1865 
the Confederate Congress authorized the enlistment of black 
troops and the Davis administration promised them freedom in 
return for military service. The end of the war in April pre-
vented the legislation from becoming effective. Two years ear-
lier, in 1863, the Union had begun recruiting black soldiers; and 
of the 178,895 that enlisted, some 134,000 had been slaves. 
None of these men would ever return to bondage. Lincoln's 
Emancipation Proclamation had freed all the slaves in areas 
captured by the Union since January 1863. Scores of slaves had 
fled from plantations and could never be forced back. The final 
stroke came on January 31, 1865, just before Kenner went to 
England, when the United States Congress approved of the 
Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery. In effect, the Con-
federacy played its trump card when the game was.over. With 
slavery on the road to extinction and cotton likely to become 
· available again when the South returned to normalcy, Britain· 
had nothing to gain by recognizing the Confederate States of 
America. 
10 
Conscription, 
Union Style 
The Confederate government designed its draft system to raise 
troops; the Union devised its enrollment policy to encourage 
volunteering. Under the Federal Enrollment Act of 1863, dis-
tricts that reached their quotas through volunteers could sus-
pend the draft until the next call. Out of the seven hundred 
thousand men who entered service after passage of the Enroll-
ment Act, only ten thousand were actually drafted. The Union's 
conscription procedure differed from the Confederate's in other 
ways too. Both sides permitted substitution-paying another 
individual to take the draftee's place. In the South, however, 
substitution remained insignificant because, even if an individ-
ual found a substitute, he still remained eligible for service; in 
the North his name was removed from the roll. Both sides per-
mitted exemptions, but the li~t was far more extensive in the 
South, where it included officeholders, members of the state 
militia, certain factory workers, college professors and teach-
ers, and supervisors of twenty or more slaves. The only valid 
reasons for seeking exemption in the North were physical or 
mental disability, financial dependency of parents, and alien-
age. Northerners could also avoid service by paying a three 
hundred dollar commutation fee until1864, when Congress re-
pealed the provision. Southerners never established a bounty 
system; that is, paying men to volunteer for service. In the 
North the bounty system flourished and eventually lead to the 
worst evil of the entire system, the evolution of the bounty 
broker.1 
The process of acquiring men in the Union underwent three 
distinct phases. During the first year of the war the govern-
ment relied on volunteering. All previous American wars had 
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been fought without resorting to a draft, and since both South-
erners and Northerners expected the war to be brief, they 
thought a volunteer force would be sufficient. When volunteer-
ing failed to produce the vast numbers of men needed, Con-
gress, in July 1862, authorized Secretary of War Stanton to 
draft state militiamen. Then on March 3, 1863, Lincoln signed 
the Enrollment Act making all eligible men between the ages 
of twenty and forty-five liable for military service. 2 
In the early months of the war local authorities used subtle 
pressure to encourage enlistment by foreign nationals. Shortly 
after the surrender of Fort Sumter, for instance, Consul Archi-
bald complained that the chief recruiting office in New York 
City had just opened in the same building as the consulate and 
that anyone coming to his office had to pass by it. ''The whole 
thing was done," he wrote, ''to mislead British Subjects into 
believing that it was done with my knowledge and authority." 
Given the war fever sweeping the city, Archibald wondered 
how he might discourage British citizens from volunteering. 
He feared any public comment on his part would appear "un-
gracious and obnoxious to the whole community" and might be 
regarded as conveying sympathy for the South. 3 
When Britain declared its neutrality in May 1861, the gov-
ernment also invoked the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819, 
which forbade British citizens from taking part in wars be-
tween hostile nations. As a result Lyons announced to his con-
suls that he did not consider British subjects who volunteered 
in either the Union or Confederate military ''to have ... any 
claim upon my good office." His only exception was seeking 
discharges for minors who had enlisted without parental con-
sent. As he explained, his action was dictated more out of con-
sideration for the parents than for the youths themselves.4 
Most enlisted minors were caught up in the wartime fervor 
and hoped to find glory on the battlefield. But when the hor-
rors of war became real and the hardships of life in the field 
became too much to endure, they implored their parents to get 
them out of an unbearable situation. Parents then appealed to 
the consul in their district or to the legation itself. 
Seward seemed as willing to discharge British minors from 
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the army as he had been to release from jail British citizens 
accused of breaching the blockade or engaging in treasonable 
activities. In cases where he could not comply, Seward sent a 
copy of the War Department's investigation, which proved in 
most instances that the individual was not a min.or. But corre-
spondence between the State Department and the British lega-
tion between April and December 1861 indicates that Seward 
procured discharges for most British minors whose cases Lyons 
presented. On December 9, Lyons submitted a list· of ninety 
names, and Seward responded that these youths would be dis-
charged if investigation proved them to be minors and British 
subjects; however, he did warn Lyons that the War Department 
might be less obliging in the future. 5 
The policy changed abruptly after Stanton assumed direc-
tion of the War Department in January 1862. When in April 
Lyons asked why minors for whom he had requested dis-
charges were still in service, he was told that the new secre-
tary of war would be guided by the ·circumstances in each case 
and that "minority alone" did not make an individual eligible 
for discharge. Shortly afterward Stanton announced the War 
Department's new policy: the age an individual gave at the 
time of his enlistment was considered his true age. The army 
did not enroll anyone under eighteen without his parents' con-
sent, and therefore "the enlistment of a minor cannot be con-
tested." The policy held during the entire war. The War De-
partment denied release to a Canadian youth in 1864 even 
though his father proved he was a minor. Besides refusing to 
consider his age, the department maintained the youth's ac-
ceptance of all bounties placed him under obligation to fulfill 
his commitment.& 
FolloWing the passage of the Militia Draft in July 1862, 
Lincoln called for three hundred thousand men for a three-
year period; the next month he asked for three hundred thou-
sand more to serve for nine months. These calls created panic 
among British nationals. William Stuart, charge d'affaires su-
pervising the legation during Lyons's absence, noted that in-
creases in state and local bounties encouraged some British 
nationals to enlist, but the majority wished to avoid military 
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service. Stuart persuaded the State Department not to detain 
British subjects wishing to leave the country, but he felt that 
the achievement was not enough. 7 
The major threat to Britons lay in the Western states. The 
Militia Act required state governors to increase the size of 
their militia units, and governors in the West wanted to draft 
the foreign-born, a substantial element in the western popula-
tion, to achieve the goal. Writing to Stanton, Governor Edward 
Salomon of Wisconsin asked for clarification on alien exemp-
tions. Almost half of the able-bodied men in his state, Salomon 
claimed, were forei~ers who had declared their intention to 
become citizens and were now demanding exemption because 
of alienage. Moreover, the governor declared, under Wisconsin 
·law aliens could vote upon declaration of intention to become a 
United States citizen, and large numbers of these men had 
voted. Expression of intent, replied Stanton, did not make a 
man liable for military service, but exercising the right of suf-
frage did. s Despite this distinction by the Federal government, 
Governor David Tod of Ohio declared all foreign nationals who 
had signified their intention to become citizens eligible for the 
militia draft, even if they ha<l not completed the naturalization 
process. Almost immediately Stuart began to receive com-
plaints from British nationals about forced enlistments in the 
Buckeye state.9 
To ease fears of his fellow countrymen, Stuart sent H. Percy 
Anderson, special British agent in the United States, to dis-
cuss the situation with Midwestern governors. During Sep-
tember 1862 he traveled from Columbus, Ohio, to St. Louis, 
and then south to Memphis. Governor Tod readily agreed to 
exempt those Britons who held certificates of nationality. At 
first he insisted that certificates should be issued by a consul, 
but when Anderson pointed out the lack of a consulate be-
tween the East Coast and St. Louis, Tod relented and agreed to 
accept affidavits sworn before a notary public. The governors 
of Illinois and Indiana and General William T. Sherman, in 
command of the Memphis Military District, agreed to the 
same stipulation.to 
Anderson found the governors willing to cooperate, but real 
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implementation of his agreement depended upon local offi-
cials. And as Consul Wilkins wrote from St. Louis: "The out-
rages were not done by anyone occupying an official position, 
nor have they been directed against persons of any particular 
nationality." In Missouri, Wilkins blamed extreme Union parti-
sans and the rabid German element for ignoring the agreement 
between Anderson and the . governors. As a result, Wilkins 
made most of his appeals for discharge after a British national 
had been inducted into the army. He found General John 
Schofield, commander of the Military District of Missouri from 
1861 to 1863, usually cooperative and willing to release Brit-
ish subjects.n 
Britons in other Western states were not as fortunate. Dur-
ing the fall of 1862 Charge d'affaires Stuart reported several 
instances in Kentucky and at least six in Ohio in which Brit-
ish nationals were deprived of all proof of their foreign nation-
ality and forced to enlist on threat of imprisonment or personal 
injury.12 
The Militia Act failed to produce as many volunteers as the 
government had wished. Lincoln's call for six hundred thousand 
men only resulted in: securing 519,546. But the Midwestern 
states had been more successful in raising troops than those in 
the East, so by the end of 1862 the pressure on foreign nationals 
lessened somewhat. Still, the need for men remained, and Con-
gress, at Stanton's urging, passed the Enrollment Act of 1863. 
With it came renewed and greater difficulties for aliens intent 
on avoiding military service in the Union army. 
Under the Enrollment Act, the Federal government took di-
rect control of the conscription process. No longer were state 
governors in charge of raising troops; instead, the Federal gov-
ernment levied quotas on enrollment districts, which could be 
met by supplying volunteers as well as draftees. The Enroll-
ment Act also stipulated the conditions of alien eligibility: all 
foreigners were required to enroll if they had declared their 
intention to become citizens, had voted, or had held public 
office.13 
Apparently this requirement caused some concern, for Lyons 
asked Seward for clarification. Compelling registration of ali-
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ens who had announced their intention to become citizens, the 
secretary told Lyons, was a concession to the Western states, 
where much irritation existed over the large numbers who had 
made citizenship declarations but were now finding their old 
allegiance too cherished to abandon.14 
Concerning the franchise, the administration had decided 
earlier that men who had accepted the privileges of citizenship 
were now required to fulfill a citizen's obligations. The voting 
issue became troublesome because a number of Western states 
(Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, and Kansas) permitted im-
migrant males to vote once they met the state residency re-
quirement and announced their intention to become United 
States citizens. Moreover, in some of these states individuals 
were required to make declarations of intention in order to 
purchase public land. Until the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868 there was no Federal definition of citizen-
ship: states determined an individual's status by granting or 
withholding the right to vote. It must have been with surprise 
that Lyons read Seward's response to his queries about citizen-
ship: '1\. person may be a citizen of a State and entitled to vote 
there, without being a citizen of the United States." The situa-
tion became more apparent to Lyons when authorities in Indi-
ana refused to release two British nationals because they had 
voted. In Indiana and other Western states, authorities con-
tended, voting was considered equivalent to naturalization.15 
Governor Salomon pushed the voting issue even further by 
attempting to enroll draft-age children whose immigrant fa-
thers had voted but had never completed the final steps toward 
naturalization; the children themselves had never voted. Local 
judges authorized· Salomon to draft these youths, but the For-
eign Office opposed the decision; According to Crown lawyers, 
minor children of British subjects became naturalized Ameri-
cans when their father's citizenship became final. If, however, 
the fathers failed to take the final steps toward citizenship, the 
children remained British subjects.l6 
The section in the 1863 Enrollment Act making men who 
had declared their intention to become. citizens liable for ser-
vice was a complete reversal of previous policy. In 1862 both 
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the War and State departments announced that a declaration 
of intention did not make a man eligible. As Seward wrote, the 
State Department ''would not give [such a man] a passport, so 
it cannot require service of him."t7 
The change may have been a concession to the Western 
states, as Seward claimed, but it was dictated as well by the 
growing need for soldiers in 1863. Undoubtedly, the realization 
that too many immigrants were using their alienage to escape 
service encouraged the modification. Under the old policy many 
long-time British residents in the United States, as well as oth-
er immigrants, remembered their alien status and, rushed to 
consular offices to apply for certificates of nationality. Consul 
Kortwright at' Philadelphia issued twenty-six hundred "protec-
tion papers" before the passage of the Enrollment Act. Consul 
Wilkins even persuaded military officers in the western theater 
to release conscripted aliens who had made declarations of in-
tention but had not completed the citizenship process. So many 
men began to rely on their foreign birth as a safeguard against 
conscription that Seward informed the British legation, even 
before the change of policy took effect, that a certificate was not 
enough to exempt a man from military service.1s 
When Lyons informed the Foreign Office that the Enroll-
ment Act made foreigners who had declared their intention to 
become United States citizens eligible for the draft, Russell 
voiced his disapproval. Aliens who had announced their inten-
tion to become citizens and who had voted, he responded, should 
be allowed to leave the country before they were drafted. These 
people had remained in the United States believing no military 
obligation would be required of them; to demand it now was a 
breach of faith and at variance with the "comity of nations." 19 
Russell's argument made some impression on Lincoln and 
the State Department. On May 11, 1863-approximately one 
month after Russell expressed his opinion-Lincoln issued a 
proclamation announcing that foreign-born residents who had 
stated under oath their intention to become citizens or who 
had voted could no longer claim alienage in seeking exemption 
from conscription. They were given sixty-five days to leave the 
country or face the possibility of service. Harsh as the procla-
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mation may seem, it satisfied both the Foreign Office and 
Lyons. "I have now to state to Your Lordship," wrote Russell, 
''that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the period 
of 65 days is with reference to all the circumstances a reason-
able period."20 
Thereafter Russell accepted the new Union policy. In August 
1863 several British subjects asked Lyons to request their ex-
emption, deClaring they had only announced their intention to 
become citizens in order to purchase public land. In response to 
a query from Lyons, Russell replied: "The cases with which 
you are concerned do not call for any interference on our 
part ... and it is not unreasonable to expect [these men] to 
perform military service." Russell's acceptance ·of the new 
American policy in turn hardened Lyons's attitude. Respond-
ing to a similar case, he wrote: "I do not think these declarers 
deserve any sympathy from us, though I think they have been 
severely treated by those for whom they intended to renounce 
us."2t 
Lyons not only accepted the American stipulations, but he 
added two of his own. He consistently refused to consider any 
appeal if the personhad previously volunteered for military ser-
vice or if he had accepted bounty money. Justifying his attitude, 
Lyons wrote, "those who voluntarily enlist lose the Queen's Pro-
tection during their enlistment period." With respect to boun-
ties, he added: "There is no doubt that some of the persons who 
apply to me are not entitled to British protection [because they] 
enlisted with the intention of securing the bounties, and then 
obtaining their discharge by addressing the Legation as British 
Subjects." In addition, Lyons carefully investigated each appeal 
to ascertain its honesty. In 1862 he refused to intercede on be-
half of a Canadian after learning that the young man "was 
drunk and took the shilling in the regular way [when he en-
listed]. He nowtired of the service and falls back on his being a 
British Subject." 
Lyons received Russell's support in the stipulations he laid 
down. The foreign secretary informed Lyons, in 1864, not to pur-
sue the request of several British sailors for discharges from the 
United States Army. Evidence indicated that each man received 
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a "certain amount of bounty. It is questionable if men who re-
ceive a bounty are entitled to complain." Learning from his own 
exchanges with Charles Francis Adams, United States minister 
to England, whom he considered the "most frank and cordial" 
foreign representative he had to deal with, Russell urged Lyons 
to "continue to go on quietly with Seward; I think this is better 
than any violent demonstrations ... which might sour like beer 
if there should be a thunderstorm." 22 
Under the Enrollment Act the Federal government placed 
alienage exemptions on a uniform basis and standardized the 
process of appeaL Like every eligible citizen, the alien was sub-
ject to call, and ifhis name was drawn on the day of the draft, he 
had to appear before the enrolling board in his district. There he 
requested an exemption and presented his evidence: his certifi-
cate of nationality along with proof that he had never voted or 
declared his intention to become an American citizen. If satis-
fied, the board discharged him; if doubt remained, it forwarded 
the papers to the provost marshal general in Washington, who 
transmitted them to the State Department for a final decision. 
Seward informed all foreign ministers that the induction of 
these individuals would be suspended until the State Depart-
ment reached a decision and that all decisions would be made in 
consultation with the legation of the man's nationality. '~1 
things considered," Lyons informed Russell, "I have formed the 
opinion that these regulations do not render the establishment 
of claims to exemption unreasonably difficult, nor impose any 
excessive burden on Foreigners." Lyons asked his consuls to 
abide by Federal government policy, and he rejected a sugges-. 
tion by Consul K.ortwright to procure exemption because of 
alienage before the individual was called before the board.' Too 
many appeals would be made, and neither the consuls nor the 
legation had the time or staffto handle all the cases that would 
be presented.2s 
If Lyons admitted the ·fairness of Federal policy and the 
State Department in dealing with the question of alien exemp-
tions, he soon came to realize that difficulty lay at the more 
local level, with district provost marshals, enrolling officers, 
and lower grade officers in the army and navy. One month 
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after be informed Russell of the procedure aliens should follow 
to secure exemption, Lyons admitted, ''the government here is 
certainly desirous of behaving fairly toward aliens in the mat-
ter of the draft, but it is difficult to keep the subordinates in 
order." 24 
Local enrolling officers were more interested in filling quo-
tas than in dealing with requests for exemption. Then, too, 
many draft officials felt that long-term residents who had en-
joyed the benefits of living in the United States should not be 
exempt. They distrusted most claims of alienage and often cast 
aside the evidence offered, ordering the man into service. "Ex-
tended experience," wrote an enrolling officer in Wisconsin, 
"fully satisfied the Board that persons, who, after having en-
joyed the many inestimable blessings freely bestowed upon 
them by this generous Republic, will, in time of national dis-
tress, seek to screen themselves from the dangers of war under 
their shield of alienage [and] will not hesitate to commit no 
less mean or unmanly act of perjury." 25 
The most frequent complaint of British nationals about 
draft officials was their refusal to accept certificates of nation-
ality and.their attempts to make securing exemption as diffi-
cult as possible. Forced into the army by his enrolling board in 
Louisville, Kentucky, J.S. Shaw, a Canadian, attempted to 
show his affidavit of citizenship, embossed with the Canadian 
seal. The company commander directed him to headquarters 
where ''the major there told me to get back to duty. He would 
imprison any British Subjects seeking exemption." When an-
other British citizen, also forcibly conscripted in Kentucky, 
presented his certificate, his oommanding officer threw it on 
the floor and said it meant nothing to him.26 
Nor were such instances limited to Kentucky. From Boston, 
Consul Lousada wrote that none of his certificates were ac-
cepted in the 3rd and 4th draft district in the city. Enrolling 
boards there required aliens to seek assistance from certain 
lawyers, who charged enormous fees for useless advice. In ad-
dition, the boards used "obnoxious language" ~d made insult-
ing statements about England and the British. "It works in 
this way," Lousada concluded, ''that the person notified gets 
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disgusted at so many hindrances and goes away home, then 
they pounce upon him for not having shewn [sic] valid cause of 
exemption & thus gain their point."27 
In Philadelphia, Consul Kortwright reported that local 
draft officials paid little attention to Federal regulations. One 
enrolling officer refused to look at Thomas Armrod's protec-
tion papers. ''I don't want to see them," he declared, "because 
they are of no use whatever." After the officer discovered that 
Armrod had lived in a number of places before finally settling 
in Frankford, a Philadelphia suburb, he demanded Armrod 
present affidavits from every county he had ever lived in or 
traveled through signifying that he had never voted in any of 
those locations. Kortwright pointed out, in addition, the in-
tense hardship being encountered by British subjects who 
worked in more rural areas of Pennsylvania, especially those 
in the western mining and manufacturing districts. Their dis-
tance from the consulate made it difficult to obtain evidence of 
their alien status, .even if it were accepted by local enrolling 
officers. Kortwright was thankful, he told Lyons, that Britons 
could appeal to the courts. But then in September 1863 Lin-
coln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in all cases involving 
the draft, and this action, Kortwright insisted, put foreign na-
tionals completely at the mercy of the enrolling boards and 
military officers. "Unless the War Department at Washington 
be moved to issue stringent orders [compelling enrolling offi-
cers] to give due weight to the rightful claims of Aliens, the 
efforts to afford protection ... will be ineffectual," he wrote.2s 
From New York to St. Louis, the consuls' observations were 
similar. ·In 1864, Pierrepont Edwards, acting consul at New 
York City, interviewed several British subjects at the induction 
center on Hart's Island, a rendezvous point for the area. At first 
they were reluctant to discuss their situation because military 
officers derided them as "Lord Lyons men'' and "Consul men'' 
and threatened severe punishment if they revealed too much. 
But finally the men informed Edwards that officers had been 
told of the consul's impending visit several days eadier and 
had shipped off a large number of soldiers who claimed to be 
British citizens. 
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Even Wilkins, whom Lyons regarded as the most successful 
consul in dealing with military officers, wrote of his difficulties 
in the St. Louis draft district after Schofield was transferred to 
the East. He kept track of the num,ber of exemptions granted in 
1863 and counted less than five hundred. "I am fully aware how 
difficult it is for the central power to keep in check outlaying 
[sic] subordinate officers," he told Lyons, ''but at the same time I 
thought it prudent to inform Your Lordship ofthe independent 
position assumed by many Boards of Enrolment." 29 
When British subjects and other foreign nationals were not 
intimidated by verbal abuse or refusals to accept their proof of 
alienage, draft personnel resorted to more extreme methods. 
Iri late 1864, Robert Dickson, a visiting Englishman, struck 
back at a would-be robber on the streets of Cincinnati and was 
arrested. The chief. of police encouraged him to enlist, but 
Dickson refused. The officer then placed him in a small cage 
and gave him "very little food over the next four days." After 
Dickson finally agreed to enlist, he received a hundred-dollar 
bounty. Later, Dickson learned that he was a substitute for a 
wealthy, locai resident who had staged the. entire scenario, and 
the police had received seven hundred dollars in bounty money 
that should have been paid to him. ao 
John Flynn's confinement lasted longer and was more bru-
tal. When he refused to join the army, Flynn· was taken to a 
military prison in Alexandria, Virginia. Prison officials re-
fused to let him contact family members until someone acci- · 
dentally or purposely allowed one of Flynn's letters to slip 
through to his brother, Patrick. In the months that followed, 
Flynn told his brother that military personnel at Alexandria 
had stolen his money, broken his nose, and kept him "almost 
naked" in their efforts to force his enlistment. Apparently he 
gave in, for in February 1865 John informed Patrick that he 
had been fined three months back pay by a court martial-but 
that he was unaware of any crime he had committed. Still, he 
was not surprised that the court deprived him of his salary 
because, ''the whole crew of them ... are a lot of robbers and 
swindlers ... this war is being carried on to make money for 
themselves and [their] friends." A month later John wrote to 
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Patrick, telling him that he was now attached to the 3rd U.S. 
Infantry at General George Meade's headquarters and that he 
was hoping tO bring his situation to the general's attention. At 
that point the correspondence between the brothers stopped. a1 
Most galling to the personnel at the British legation was 
the "shower-bath treatment," usually administered in cold 
weather. The man was stripped of his clothes and hosed down 
with forced cold water. Although the treatment was probably 
not used extensively, it still incensed Lyons when he became 
aware that British citizens were subjected to it. His objections 
did not put a stop to the practice, however. In April1865, after 
Lyons had returned to England, Luke Riley finally got word of 
his suffering to the legation. Until the end of the war, his offi-
cers destroyed any mail Riley attempted to send. Riley was 
hired in New York City to transport horses to Washington, 
D.C. Upon his arrival in the capital, two army officers appre-
hended him as a deserter and took him to a military prison. He 
was subjected to nine cold showers a day in zero degree weath-
er, he claimed, kept in solitary, and fed only bread and water. 
When Riley became ill he was transferred to Alexandria, 
where "Captain Petted" pistol-whipped him, handcuffed him 
with his hands behind his back, and hung him from the ceil-
ing. Riley wrote that Petted "kept me in that position for three 
. days up and down every half hour," before sending Riley to the 
New York Cavalry. As a last warning, Petted told Riley not to 
co,ntact anyone in the British diplomatic or consular corps, "or 
he would send me where the British Consuls could not find 
me."32 
In addition to confronting inflexible enrolling boards and 
ruthless military personal, Britons also faced the possibility of 
falling into the clutches of bounty brokers or runners. This 
group sprang up almost as soon as Federal, state, and local 
governments started paying bounties, but their numbers be-
came greater and their methods more sinister after the pas-
sage of the Enrollment Act of 1863. Discontent over the draft 
caused local communities to increase bounties in order to en-
courage enlistment, and the prices wealthy men were willing 
to pay for a substitute increased as well. Bounty brokers did 
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not prey on British subjects alone; they had little concern 
about the nationality of their victims. They tended, however, 
to hang around the docks of eastern cities looking for un-
suspecting immigrants, and a substantial number of British 
citizens were duped by their methods. Indeed, some ships' cap-
tains allowed brokers to begin recruiting activities on their 
boats even before they docked. 
The bounty broker's sole objective was· money. He received 
payment from the local community for bringing in volunteers 
and took as much of the enlistee's bounty as he could get his 
hands on. Fees paid by states and local communities ranged 
from twenty-five to thirty dollars per volunteer, but Federal, 
state, and local bounties together could amount to seven hun-
dred dollars or more. For example, men enlisting in Indiana-
polis in 1864 received the following bounties: three hundred 
dollars from the Federal government, one hundred dollars from 
Marion County, and $375 from the municipal government. As 
the charge d'affaires remarked, "the large bounty offered is 
such a temptation to the worthless men who ply their infamous 
trade that it seems doubtful whether it can ever be effectively 
put a stop to." Brokers kept close track of bounties offered and 
engaged in running, taking their victims to localities that of-
fered more money. Brokers also preferred to deal with state or 
local recruiting officers because they were less concerned with 
the volunteer's physical condition and paid bounties in lump 
sums, whereas the Federal government paid in installments to 
discourage bounty jumping and desertion. 33 
Brokers had no legal position in the recruiting process, but in 
time the more naive came to believe that their assistance was 
necessary to enlist. Some brokers hung around recruiting of-
fices and offered assistance to potential recruits, and once the 
recruit received his bounty, the broker took his share. Others 
sought recruits in the city and brought them to enlistment cen-
ters. Until1863 most brokers used persuasion, but as the de-
mand for volunteers became higher and bounties larger, many 
resorted to giving their victims drugged liquor, enlisting them 
under false pretenses, and taking most of the bounty. By 1864 
the system became so notorious that the New York Times re-
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ported: "these harpies [are] ever ready to fleece their victims. 
The recruit seems to have no friends. He is hustled off without 
knowledge of what he is entitled to, or how he is to get it, and if 
he is without a well-informed personal friend to look after him, 
he will very likely turn up minus his bounty money." 34 
Most brokers belonged to the criminal element of society, 
but they did not work alone. Bartenders provided drugged li-
quor, barbers made overaged men look younger, boarding-
house and hotel keepers informed brokers of likely victims, 
and unscrupulous women posed as mothers of minor children 
and consented to their enlistment. But perhaps the system 
flourished because recruiting officers, in their zeal to fill quo-
tas, ignored the deceit and corruption-and often participated 
in it by taking a share of the bounty. When the brokerage sys-
tem became so blatant that it could no longer be ignored, the 
War Department assigned detective LaFayette Baker to inves-
tigate. Recalling his investigation, Baker declared: "The lenity 
of our military authorities, in regard to the punishment of of-
fences [sic] against the law and loyalty, was a fruitful cause of 
the boldness with which [bounty brokers] acted, and the air of 
respectability worn by the crime itself." 35 
The activities of bounty brokers became so widespread and 
affected British subjects so broadly that by May 1864 Russell 
considered it the most troublesome issue between the United 
States and Great Britain. And the situation was exacerbated 
by the bounty brokers' lack of conscience: they sought out any 
likely prospect. In the fall of 1864 an Englishman named Perk-
ins frantically appealed to Lyons for aid. His fifteen-year-old 
Asian-Indian servant boy, who spoke no English, had been 
drugged and enlisted in New Hampshire and was about to be 
sent to the front. At almost the same time Lyons reported the 
case of another fifteen year old who had been kidnapped and 
drugged while on an errand for his father. Once inducted he 
was immediately shipped off, without any training, to the 67th 
Regiment of the New York Volunteers.3s 
The old and the sick could fall victim as well as the young 
and healthy. In June 1864, George Watson, age seventy, was 
drugged, robbed, and enlisted in the army. Lyons appealed for 
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Watson's immediate release, without the usual War Depart-
ment investigation, after the man became seriously ill and was 
confined to a hospital in Washington, D.C.a7 
In one case, Lyons demanded monetary compensation for 
the victim's family. In September .1864, John Davis, a Cana-
dian who had been gravely ill for six weeks, took a cruise on 
the Great Lakes to restore his health. Soon after Davis arrived 
in Detroit, a bounty broker drugged ~d robbed him, and per-
suaded local recruiters to accept him into the army. Unable to 
endure the rigors of military life, Davis died two months after 
his e:rilistment. When informed of Davis's death, Lyons's tem-
per flared. The case had been "shamefully handled," he told 
Seward. The man was ill at the time of his physical examina-
tion and the doctor chose to ignore his physical debility. Not 
only did army recruiters induct the man, but the broker or the 
recruiters stole all of his Canadian money and the entire boun-
ty as well. Because Davis left a wife and children without any 
visible means of support, Lyons demanded a search for the 
thieves and compensation for the Davis family. Davis's treat-
ment so upset Lyons that, for once, he lost his composure: "The 
outrages practiced on recruits are too unjust to be borne and in 
some cases too loathsome to be detailed. Almost every imagin-
able form of outrage and deception has been developed .... 
there is no artifice or fraud which has not been resorted to in 
carrying out this system of pillage. Old men and boys and per-
sons labouring under incurable diseases are in numerous in-
stances thrust into the service under the system of public plun-
der alike fraudulent to the recruits and the Government."as 
When the British legation received word of a fraudulent or 
forced enlistment, it demanded an investigation from the State 
Department.· The War or Navy departments then conducted 
the investigations, such as they were. In most cases they mere-
ly queried recruiting officers and accepted their word as truth. 
The investigation of Patrick McCann's enlistment is typical. 
McCann claimed he was drugged and inducted at Buffalo, New 
York. DUring its investigation, the War Department contacted 
McCann's commanding officer and the recruiting board in Buf-
falo. The commanding officer believed McCann's charges, but 
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the recruiting officer testified that McCann arrived by himself 
·and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol; at the 
time he answered all questions intelligently and did not imply 
that any pressure was being put on him to enlist. Using the 
latter testimony as its justification, the War Department re-
fused to release McCann. 39 
British diplomatic and consular personnel had little faith in 
the investigative process. "In point of form," wrote Lyons, 
''there is little to complain of .... From the nature of the case 
there can seldom be any evidence, except that of the recruiting 
officer on the one side, and the enlisted man on the other, and 
commonly the United States Government gives credence by 
preference to its own officers and retains the recruits in ser-
vice." Vice-Consul Edwards referred to the investigations as 
"unworthy of credit" and "difficult to deal with." To a friend 
Lyons wrote: "I receive endless complaints from men that they 
have been improperly enlisted in the U.S. Army, some appar-
ently well founded, some clearly unfounded, the greater part 
doubtful. The usual result is that the U.S. officers declare the 
enlistment was perfectly. correct and regular and that the 
Govt. believe its own officers and keep the recruit. From the 
value of the case, there can seldom be any evidence of third 
Parties in the man's favor."40 
Other complaints of the British legation focused on the 
length of investigations, the slowness in releasing men, and 
the policy of keeping them assigned to their units while inves-
tigations were being carried out. It was not unusual for both 
the War and Navy departments to lose all evidence andre-
quest its resubmission. ·In May 1864, Lyons found it necessary 
to inquire about four Britons who had been granted discharges 
but who remained in service. One of them was still with his 
unit two months after the War Department had recommended 
his discharge.41 
The case of Patrick Cunningham indicates that delay some-
times led to tragic results. lliegally inducted into the New 
York Volunteers in January 1864, Cunningham and his wife 
both applied for his release. The investigation went slowly be-
cause the War Department lost all correspondence and it had 
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to be resubmitted. Six months after his induction, the War De-
partment decided in Cunningham's favor, only to learn that 
Cunningham had· been killed in battle a month before. The 
government extended its regrets and offered to make restitu-
tion to Cunningham's family, but correspondence between the 
State Department and the British legation indicates that none 
had been paid as late as February 1866.42 
As the number of fraudulent enlistments increased, espe-
cially in 1864, the War Department began to demand return of 
any bounties received before releasing an alien, a decision that 
only added to the inductee's hardship. In many instances the 
money had gone to the bounty broker and could not be re.,. 
trieved; thus, the soldier was forced to repay money he had 
never received. Even if the money was repaid, the process was 
cumbersome and the military kept the man in service all the 
while. The money was sent to Lyons, who turned it over to the 
Treasury and showed Seward the receipt. Seward then in-
formed the War Department and the soldier was released 
within the next several months. 43 
Requiring repayinent often resulted in additional foul-ups. 
When John Arthur Verner was killed in action in January 
1864, his mother wrote a blistering letter of complaint about 
the runaround she had been given. Initially she was required 
to resubmit evidence about her son's fraudulent conscription. 
After the War Department agreed to a discharge, it required 
her to repay the son's bounty; still, she heard nothing more 
until she received news of his death. In this case, the fault lay 
not with the government: without telling his wife, Verner's fa-
ther had never forwarded the money. In another case the mon-
ey was paid by the parents of a fifteen year old inducted in 
May 1864. But the boy's commanding officers did not release 
him until a year later and. then refused to pay him, claiming 
that he was not entitled to any compensation because he was a 
minor.44 
Of the five hundred thousand foreign-born who fought for 
the Union, approximately 189,000 were English and Irish. 
Ella Lonn concluded that of these, 235 were fraudulent enlist-
ments. This figure is somewhat low for several reasons. The 
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legation asked for the release of over one hundred Britons in 
1861 alone, and requests increased in the following years. In 
November 1863, Lyons received "more than nine hundred 
notes from Mr. Seward already this year" dealing with fraudu-
lent enlistments. Lonn diligently researched correspondence 
between the State Department and the British legation and 
perhaps reached her conclusion by counting the number of let-
ters. Frequently, however, individual letters mention three or 
more names and sometimes as many as six or seven. A more 
reasonable estimate of the number of British subjects who 
brought their cases to Lyons's attention would be somewhere 
between 450 and 500. Correspondence between British lega-
tion and State Department between January 1, 1862, and 
April 15, 1865, contains the names of 4 73 individuals who 
claimed to·have been fraudulently conscripted into the Union 
army or navy.45 
Ultimately, an accurate figure can perhaps never be reached. 
In his instructions to the consuls, Lyons urged them to forward 
only cases they could not resolve; thus, many were never en-
tered into legation records. Lyons also understood that a defi-
nite number offorced enlistments would be impossible to deter-
mine. Many British subjects were unaware that they could 
appeal to their consuls or to the legation and made no efforts to 
do so. Others were prevented from contacting British officials. 
Both Edwards and Archibald wrote that Union army and navy 
officers kept foreign recruits from corresponding with consuls 
or relatives: they destroyed draftees' letters, threatened to as-
sign draftees to arduous duty assignments, and even shipped off 
recruits when they knew a foreign consul might be visiting a 
rendezvous center. After a trip to Hart's Island in 1864, Ed-
wards related that "in many of these cases even where the par-
ties are aware that their proper course would be to have their 
complaints before the consul, . · .. their short time on the island 
would preclude the possibility of application."46 
Determining the exact number of forced enlistments of Brit-
ish subjects is further complicated by imperfect military record 
keeping during the Civil War era. Enlistment papers and ser-
vice records indicate places of birth but fail to state whether a 
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foreign-born individual was naturalized. In addition, bounty 
brokers declared aliens to be American citizens and even en-
listed them under false names. That sometimes worked to the 
aliens' advantage. Lyons was able to secure the release of about 
a dozen fraudulently enlisted Britons ''by reason that [their 
names were] never borne on the Records of the Army of the 
United States."47 
Numbers aside, the tension that forced enlistment caused 
was mitigated by cooperation on both sides. Seward sought as 
best he could within War Department regulations to procure 
discharges for individuals whose complaints were valid. Nor 
did Lyons demand redress for every case brought to him, espe-
cially appeals from long-time residents in the United States.48 
Difficulty arose when Americans conscripted newly arrived 
immigrants or .lured British citizens from their homeland un-
der false pretenses. Even though the Federal government did 
not sanction such practices, they caused as much tension be-
tween the United States and Great Britain in 1864 as had the 
Trent affair in 1861 and the Laird Ram crisis in 1863. 
11 
Preying on the 
Innocents 
Approximately eight hundred thousand immigrants arrived in 
the North during the Civil War, about two-thirds of them men 
between eighteen and forty-five years of age. Of these, 183,448 
served in the Union army.l Few fought for ideals; many were 
attracted by huge bounties or were lured into the military by 
force or fraud. British subjects who fell into the "newly arrived" 
category came mainly from three regions: British North Ameri-
ca, Ireland, and Great Britain. At the beginning of the war, 
bounty brokers and military personnel focused on Canada as a 
locality for obtaining fighting men. As the need for soldiers be-
came more acute and bounties increased, brokers made greater 
efforts to entice newly arrived immigrants, and finally to trans-
port them from their European homeland to the United States 
under false pretenses. Following is a summary of attempts to 
lure British immigrants into the Union military and efforts by 
Northern consuls and legation personnel to mitigate the prob-
lem. 
The first group of recruiters consisted of state militia or fed-
eral military personnel who sought out British servicemen in 
Canada and encouraged them to desert. Because many were 
Irish, the Americans played on their anti-English feelings or 
emphasized monetary advantages to be gained by changing loy-
alty. They also hinted at rapid promotions because of the sol-
diers' experience. Whereas noncommissioned officers in British 
North America received only forty cents a day, the promise of 
collecting a Union army sergeant's pay of $1.00 to $1.60 was an 
attractive incentive. In addition, volunteers would receive Fed-
eral, state, and local bounties and money for serving as substi-
tutes.2 
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These promises of money and advancement were successful. 
Desertions by British soldiers prompted Denis Donohoe, con-
sul at Buffalo, to remark that "every Irishman would desert 
from the Sixteenth Regiment when there was an opportunity 
for doing so." By the fall of 1861, American recruiting activ-
ities in Upper and Lower Canada become so blatant that Sir 
Edmund Head, governor general, asked Lyons to discuss the 
issue with the State Department. Head estimated that Ameri-
cans had distributed sonie eight hundred circulars, which of-
fered unseemly inducements, among soldiers. They made ap-
peals particularly to commissioned officers. One colonel from a 
Michigan militia unit tried to persuade several officers of a top 
British regiment to enlist in the United States Army. When 
Lyons raised the issue, Seward assured him that such activ-
ities were not authorized by the Federal government, but he 
gaye no assurance that he could stop them. 3 
Within a short time, early in 1862, crimps-the Canadian 
term for bounty brokers-entered the recruiting scene to lure 
British soldiers and Canadian civilians into the Union army. 
Some worked alone, while others employed bartenders or boar-
dinghouse keepers to be on lookout for likely prospects. Most 
crimps dressed well and gave every appearance of being gen-
tlemen. Usually they struck up a friendship with victims and 
entrapped them through friendly conversation and drugged li-
quor. In 1864, for example, a landlord in Quebec City intro-
duced three British sailors to another tenant: They accepted 
several drinks from their new friend and upon awakening 
found themselves in army uniforms in Lebanon, New Hamp-
shire, fresh recruits in the United States Army. Of the seven 
hundred dollar bounty due each of them, the sailors received 
two hundred dollars apiece while the crimp, by then long gone, 
took the rest. 4 
If drugging failed to achieve their objective, crimps engaged 
in kidnapping. One official in Canada reported that men liv-
ing near the United States-Canadian border found it unsafe to 
be out alone after dark, ''while [citizens] protested that they 
would be awakened at night by the screams of people being 
kidnapped." 5 
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Crimps brought their victims across the border by boat and 
overland. Frontier lakes and rivers, Donohoe reported, were 
crowded with small craft used by crimps to row their victims to 
the American shore. Others hired yacht owners to take their 
"cargo" to the United States. In winter, crimps resorted to 
sleighs and crossed the border in out of the way places to avoid 
both American and British customs officials. 6 
Crimps, however, preferred to entice likely prospects to the 
United States rather than to sneak them across the border, 
thus avoiding colonial officials, who were becoming increas-
ingly alert to crimping activities. Usually they promised well-
paying jobs, sometimes with attractive side benefits. Because 
immigration from Europe declined from its yearly 1850s levels 
during the early part of the war and an increasing number of 
men left civilian life for the fighting front, a severe labor 
shortage existed in sections of the North, and Canadians look-
ing for work were easily persuaded to come to the United 
States. 
Both Lyons and his charges d'affaires-William Stuart and, 
after mid-1864, Joseph Hume Burnley-made frequent pro-
tests against the "nefarious practice" of enticing youths from 
British North America with promises of jobs and then forcing 
them to enlist in the army. Consuls became so suspicious of 
employers looking for workers that they discouraged Cana-
dians from seeking employment in the United States. In 1863, 
when a Vermont quarry owner asked Consul Lousada in Bos-
ton to issue a public statement that unnaturalized aliens were 
not eligible for the draft, the consul refused. Lousada feared 
the workers might be fraudulently enlisted once they arrived 
in the United States. Following a similar request several 
months later, he suggested that Lyons warn colonial officials 
of a possible raid on military-age men. 7 
Instances of kidnapping or drugging of Canadians working 
within the United States were numerous. For example, when 
friends told John Casey, a newly arrived immigrant from Ire-
land, about job opportunities in Vermont, he left Canada for 
the United States. On his first day of work, Casey was drugged 
and inducted into the 2nd Vermont Regiment. Caught at-
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tempting to desert after he arrived at the front, he was court-
martialed and sentenced to ten years of hard labor o:n the Dry 
Tortugas. It was from there that he was able to send an appeal 
for help to Consul Archibald in New York City.s 
Another case involved James Fitzgerald, age fifty-seven, 
who obtained a discharge, but not his freedom, after his induc-
tion into the army. On his way from India to England, Fitz-
gerald stopped in Canada to earn passage money for the last leg 
of his journey. His Canadian employer requested his company 
on a business trip to the United States. When the men arrived 
in Battleboro, Vermont, the employer introduced Fitzgerald to, 
the local provost marshal, who drugged and conscripted him 
into the army. Afterhe arrived at a rendezvous and complained 
to his commanding officer, Fitzgerald recalled, ''he laughed at 
me & said he was glad I was sucked in, and to say no more about 
it if I did not want to get a hole in my jacket." The officer also 
intercepted a letter Fitzgerald had written to Lyons; he con-
fronted Fitzgerald and ''told me that if I • ever wrote another 
such, I would be kept from writing for some time." Finally sent 
to the Virginia front, Fitzgerald was caught attempting to de-
sert. He exposed his fraudulent enlistment at his court-martial, 
and the court agreed to discharge him. Still, he did not gain his 
freedom. Military authorities confined him for a time to Old 
Capitol Prison in Washington, D.C., then sent him to the Dry, 
Tortugas, where he was told he mm~t stay for the duration of the 
war.9 , 
Some historians claim that immigrants in the Union army 
were exemplary soldiers. Such may be case with those who en-
listed willingly, but correspondence from soldiers forcibly con-
scripted indicates many tried to desert whenever possible. 
Their statements also indicate that they were closely watched 
and regarded as potential deserters. Provost Marshal General 
James B. Fry believed desertion was the most common crime 
of the foreign enlistee. Following the war he wrote: "It is a 
notorious circumstance that the great mass of professional [de-
serters] were Europeans." 1o 
While deserters were usually apprehended, James Conway's 
account indicates how successful some could be. A sailor on the 
Coral Queen of London, Conway was drugged in a New York 
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City tavern and, upon awakening, found himself "in a village 
in the state of Ohio, dressed in the garb of an American sol-
dier." When his commanding officer refused to release him be-
cause his bounty had already been paid, Conway gave the ap-
pearance of accepting his situation. Shortly thereafter he was 
assigned to a unit near Nashville, Tennessee. While on night 
sentry duty, Conway took off and hid among cotton bales on a 
steamboat headed for the Ohio River. He left the ship in Indi-
ana and made his way on foot to Pittsburgh, where he worked 
until he saved enough money for rail fare to New York and 
passage to England.n 
From the beginning of the war, the colonial government in 
British North America did all within its power to discourage 
crimping in Canada and to prevent its citizens from crossing 
into the United States. Fitzgerald remembered his employer 
telling the provost marshal in Battleboro how difficult it was 
to cross the border, even though both men were British citi-
zens. In 1863 the colonial government authorized a fifty-dollar 
reward for the apprehension of crimps or their agents. The fol-
lowing year it raised the sum to two hundred dollars. Individu-
als found guilty of enticing Canadians into the United States 
military were liable to a six-month sentence at hard labor and 
a one h\indred dollar fine. Finally, in November 1864, the colo-
nial government placed special agents in the border counties 
to prevent men and boys from being taken into the United 
States. Informing Seward of the new measures, Charge d'af-
faires Burnley said the colonial government would be forced to 
protect its citizens as long as the United States allowed "this 
source of evil" to continue.12 
In the United States itself, New York City became the focal 
point for bounty brokers hoping to entice immigrants into the 
Union military. So flagrant were their methods and so willing 
were local recruiting officials to accept immigrants, that even 
General Isaac Wistar, commander of United States forces at 
Yorktown, Virginia, remarked about the quality of recruits he 
was receiving: 
I think I am justified in saying that most of these unfortunate men 
were either deceived or kidnapped, or both, in the most scandalous 
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and inhuman manner, in New York City, where they were drugged 
and carried off to New Hampshire and Connecticut, mustered in and 
uniformed before their consciousness was fully restored. Even their 
bounty was obtained by the parties who were instrumental in these 
nefarious transactions, and the poor wretches find themselves on re-
turning to their senses, mustered soldiers, without any pecuniary 
. benefit. Nearly all are foreigners, mostly sailors, and both ignorant of 
and indifferent to the objects of the war in which they thus suddenly 
find themselves involved.1s 
Consul Moore at Richmond, before the Confederacy revoked 
his exequatur, also complained about enlistment frauds in 
New York City. Men were enlisted under the influence of li-
quor and drugs and then sent to the fighting front without 
training. If they deserted, the men were too frightened to flee 
north; instead, they came into the Confederacy where they 
were arrested on suspicion of being Northern spies.14 
Widespread induction fraud became so much a part of the 
enlistment process in New York City by 1864 that the Federal 
government found it impossible to rely on the urban police force 
to stop it. Many police officers, as well as recruiting agents, 
cooperated with brokers and received a share of the bounty for 
their collaboration.15 The government finally assigned War 
Department detective LaFayette Baker to investigate the sys-
tem, and his recollection of what he discovered was anything 
but encouraging:· "It would be impossible to give a correct idea 
or understanding of the condition in which I found the recruit-
ing business .... The great and urgent demands of the govern-
ment to fill up the ranks of our depleted army ... were seized 
upon ... to perpetrate forgeries and frauds upon the Govern-
ment and soldiers, the extent and enormity of which I believe 
are unparalleled in the history of the world." 16 
Bounty brokers focused on New York City for several rea-
sons. The government imposed larger draft quotas on New 
York, Pennsylvania, and the New England states than on 
states to the west. The larger populations in the Eastern states 
justified the higher quotas; also the Western states had met 
their quotas during the Militia Draft period of 1862, whereas 
the eastern states had not. It was also much easier to find pub-
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lie transportation from New York City to nearby localities 
where higher bounties were offered. In addition, most immi-
grants entered the country through New York City, and their 
papers were processed at Castle Garden, a former opera house 
converted into a central immigration depot in 1855. There the 
new arrivals, each eager to find a friendly face, were easily 
taken in by offers of jobs, housing assistance, transportation, 
or simply a drink and friendly conversation at the local tavern. 
The increasing presence of bounty brokers at Castle Garden 
and the openness of their activities caused the general agent of 
immigrant commissioners to publish a notice in the New York 
Times, asking individuals who expected friends or relatives 
from Europe to leave their addresses at his office, so that new 
arrivals could be sent quickly on their way. "If this is done," he 
wrote, "the liability of emigrants [sic] to be swindled or led 
astray by vagabonds, who constantly infest every locality in 
the vicinity of Castle Garden may be avoided.'~17 
In most cases of fraudulent conscription a broker lured an 
immigrant without assistance. Usually he pretended to be a 
concerned individual, offering to help the newcomer but even-
tually treating him to liquor or soda that had been heavily 
drugged. When the profits seemed worth the risk, however, 
brokers worked in pairs, kidnapping three or four men at a 
time. Such, at least, was the case with James Johns and his 
friends. The kidnapping was carried off so cleverly that Consul 
Archibald might never have been aware of it had not J. T. 
Brown, examining physician in Wilmington, Delaware, in-
formed him of the fraud.lB 
The folir men, all blacks, were natives of St. Vincent in the 
West Indies and had been hired as laborers on a ship sailing for 
New York City. After the ship docked, an American black came 
on board and inquired about sailing times and passenger rates. 
Striking up a conversation with the four, he asked them to re-
quest a brief shore leave and accompany him to a local tavern. 
Once the men were away from the ship, their newly found friend 
disappeared. '1\vo white men soon arrived and, despite the sail-
ors' apprehensions, lured them into a nearby house and drugged 
them with liquor. The next day the abductors took the sailors to 
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Philadelphia but, apparently dissatisfied with the bounties of-
fered, pushed on to Wilmington. Johns's friends were inducted 
under false names to avoid detection; Dr. Brown rejected Johns 
because he was missing an ear. Each of the inductees received a 
bounty, but the brokers took the money as payment for helping 
the men enlist. They also returned Johns to Philadelphia, 
where they abandoned him, penniless. A passerby took pity on 
the sailor and provided shelter for several days and transporta-
tion money to New York City. By the time Johns arrived back at 
his ship, Archibald had received Brown's letter and contacted 
Johns for a statement.19 
Subsequent investigation revealed that men fitting the de-
scriptions of the· bounty brokers did not live at the address 
where the sailors had been taken. Moreover, the local provost 
marshal in Wilmington denied every assertion Dr. Brown and 
Johns had made. According to him, the sailors arrived alone at 
the recruiting station, were sober, and claimed they aban-
doned their ship in order to join the army and receive the 
bounty. On the basis of this statement, the War Department 
refused to discharge the men. Responding to the investigative 
report, Burnley almost called the provost marshal a liar. "I 
feel satisfied," he wrote, ''that if a full and fair investigation 
had been made of this case, instead of a reference to the enlist-
ing officer, the War Department would have come to a differ-
ent conclusion respecting it." 2o 
Just before he left the United States for England, Lyons in-
formed Lord Russell that Archibald and Edwards were han-
dling the bulk of fraudulent immigrant enlistments Qecause 
brokers concentrated their activities in New York City. Archi-
bald's problems were compounded by his dealings with the 
navy, which was less willing thanthe army to cooperate with 
consular efforts. "I must do General Dix the justice to say he has 
& does, now, all in his power to help our poor people out of diffi-
culty," Archibald told Lyons, "I wish I could speak as [well] of 
naval [personnel]. This navy in which Secretary Welles per-
sists, is enslaving the naval recruits, on the representation of 
their recruiting agents here."21 Even Russell became concerned 
about naval recruiting practices: "The excesses of the U.S. Navy 
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encouraged by Mr. Welles are much to be feared ... but I trust 
you and Mr. Stuart will contrive with Mr. Seward & his Presi-
dent to keep things straight." 22 
According to LaFayette Baker, naval personnel made it easy 
for bounty brokers to bring in recruits: of the seven naval re-
cruiting stations in New York City, three were located behind 
"public drinking saloons of the lo~est and vilest character." To 
him it seemed as if taverns were "necessary appendages to a 
[naval] recruiting depot." 23 Once recruiting officers accepted an 
inductee, they sent him to the USS North Carolina, a receiving 
ship docked in New York harbor, Officers there quickly moved 
him on to another destination within two or three days.24 
Naval officers did everything in their power to frustrate 
consular investigations. They refused to allow consuls to board 
receiving ships or to question the men. If a consul presented 
evidence of a fraudulent enlistment, he was often greeted with 
insult and ridicule. When Vice-Consul Edwards inquired about 
the forced induction of John Maggs, the officer in charge 
"treated my request very rudely and dismissed [me] in a very 
uncourteous manner, intimating that the despatch, which I 
have received from Your Lordship ... was 'not genuine."' Oth-
er officers loudly told a story about a naval captain who "didn't 
care a d--- for the consul anyhow. I write this," Edwards 
concluded, "solely to illustrate some of the difficulties in the 
way of dealing with these cases."25 
· The most tragic forced enlistment into the navy involved 
Michael Quinn, a newly arrived Irish immigrant. Quinn and 
Rose, his sister-in-law, arrived in the United States in 1863 on 
their way to join Quinn's brother in California but discovered 
they had only enough money for one person to continue on to 
the West Coast. Michael urged Rose to complete the journey 
while he stayed in New York City to await passage money from 
his brother. Almost as soon as Rose left, a bounty broker be-
friended and drugged Quinn. Unaware of what was happening, 
Quinn was inducted into the navy and kept in the brig for two 
days before being handcuffed to a· fellow recruit and sent to 
join the Western Flotilla. 
On the train between Chicago and Cairo, Illinois, Quinn's 
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partner devised a plan of escape: he and Quinn would go into 
the toilet compartment, slip off the handcuffs, and jump out 
the window. The plan went awry almost immediately. Quinn's 
hand was too large to slip through the handcuffs, and they 
caught when he jumped from the train. As the farmer who 
found him informed Consul Archibald, Quinn's "leg is cut to 
the bone and the flesh stripped off about four inches long [and] 
his left arm is so strained that he cannot use it; but that is not 
as dangerous as inward bruises. His bowels, they are the 
worst." 
In Quinn's case the evidence was too blatant to be ignored. 
A naval investigation resulted in a discharge, and Admiral 
Andrew Foote, in charge of recruiting, ordered the naval offi-
cers responsible to the Western Flotilla. In time Quinil made it 
back to New York City, where Archibald arranged passage to 
California. 2s 
The United States government did not condone the entrap-
ment of immigrants into the Union military; still, it did little 
to discourage the practice until the close of the war. In fact, in 
1862 Seward sent a circular to all American embassies and 
consulates in Europe, extolling the opportunities for employ-
ment in the United States. While it did not emphasize the mil-
itary, it mentioned military service as one of several options. 
Then in 1864 Congress passed the Contract Labor Law. Origi-
nally suggested by Seward, the act authorized private persons 
and companies to bring foreign nationals to the United States 
as laborers. Under its provisions immigrants could be required 
to pledge all or part of their wages for one year to pay their 
travel expenses to the New World. The act was not designed to 
expand the military, but stipulations in many contracts con-
formed very closely to military salary and subsistence scales. 
Conscripted immigrants often noted that the promised jobs 
paid between $11 and $16 dollars a month, and they were to be 
supplied with food, housing, and all equipment necessary to 
complete their work.27 
Even before Congress authorized the importation of foreign 
labor, Russell raised questions about the recruiting activities of 
Americans in the British Isles, especially in Ireland. Charles 
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Francis Adams asserted that most of the agents were attempt-
ing to obtain workers for American companies and not recruits 
for the military, and he even produced statements and letters 
from companies explaining their need for laborers and the con-
ditions of employment. Since recruiting laborers from one 
country to another: was not a violation of international law, 
there was little Russell could do to stop American agents. Still, 
he informed Lyons to have the Northern consuls be on the 
lookout for possible attempts to conscript these "workers." In 
his opinion, too many of Ireland's unskilled poor were being 
encouraged to immigrate to the United States.2s 
It was the forced induction of Thomas 'fully (sometimes 
spelled 'fulley) and six fellow Irish immigrants that finally 
caused the Lincoln administration to curb bounty brokering 
activities. Indeed, the treatment of 'fully and his colleagues 
became a matter of public notoriety in Boston, and in Great 
Britain it created tremendous resentment against American 
recruiting practices.29 
The case began i:ri. Ireland in 1864 when a man named Fin-
ney contracted with 120 Irishmen to come to America as rail-
road workers.ao Each man agreed to work for $10 dollars a 
month until their ship passage was paid; after he would re-
ceive a full salary of $11 or $13. Room, board, and clothing was 
to be provided. a1 
Finney arranged steerage passage for th~ men on the Nova 
Scotia, and on February 25, 1864, the ship left Liverpool for 
the United States. The trip was uneventful, except that one of 
the Irishmen overheard Finney say "that [the men] had better 
be prepared to take the musket when they land," and he hoped 
to make thirty thousand dollars on ''this trip!'32 On March 9, 
the Nova Scotia docked at Portland, Maine, where the Irish 
workers caught the train for Boston. Only 113 men made the 
train trip; seven remained behind in Portland. 
When the men arrived in Boston, Finney took them to a 
vacant building on Bunker Hill Street. They were given no 
food the first day and served only whiskey on the second. Then 
Finney informed them that the promised jobs "were not yet 
ready" but that they could enlist in the army-he recom-
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mended the 28th Irish Regiment. While he spoke, police ar-
rived and blocked the doors so the men could not leave.aa 
The commotion brought out neighbors, who forced their way 
into the building and rescued those men who had not already 
enlisted. At a protest meeting held later, it was pointed out 
that the man behind the whole scheme was Jerome G. Kidder. 
Finney was merely his agent; but all the same, both men were 
described as. "notorious brokers." One speaker claimed that 
Kidder had no intention of providing employment for the men 
and that, given the current bounty of between seven hundred 
and eight hundred dollars for each man, he hoped to clear. be-
tween eighty thousand and ninety thousand dollars from their 
enlistments. Shortly thereafter, Kidder announced that he had 
offered the men jobs at the Charleston Water Works but that 
they had refused to take them. 34 
The fate of the men who escaped the clutches of Finney and 
Kidder is unknown, but they probably left the neighborhood to 
escape recruiting agents. Kidder and Finney's dreams of a for-
tune did not materialize; indeed, they may have lost money. Ac-
cording to Consul Lousada, only eight or ten men enlisted. Fin-
ney even had the impudence to visit the consulate-''A more 
villainous specimen of humanity ... I have rarely seen'' -and 
inquire if the men could be sued for breach of contract under 
British law. He also told Consul Lousada that he was going to 
the "Secretary in Washington to reclaim the fares of those who 
had not enlisted." 35 
Meanwhile, in Portland, the seven immigrants who had re-
mained behind-Thomas Tully, Michael Byrne, James Hig-
gins, Michael Moran, Edward Cassidy, Thomas Burke, and 
Martin Hogan-were encountering difficulties of their own. 
When the Nova Scotia had landed, several strangers had of-
fered liquor to the seven Irishmen and, after giving them a 
number of drinks, called in the police to arrest them for public 
drunkenness. According to Tully, the spokesman for the group, 
the men spent the next thirty hours in jail without food and 
water. The chief of police offered to release them if they would 
enlist, but they refused; Tully demanded to see the British con-
sul, John Henry Murray. The chief denied the request and 
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threatened to keep the men confined without food or drink for 
sixty days. Finally, in desperation, they consented and were 
marched to. the recruiting office. 'fully later stated that he 
agreed to enlist only to get released from jail and have an op-
portunity to contact the British consul. At the recruiting of-
fice, the examining physician refused to pass the men, but the 
recruiting officers enlisted them anyway and assigned them to 
Company D of the 20th Maine Infantry. Each man received 
two hundred dollars of his bounty, but the police and recruit-
ing agents forced them to purchase ·~unk items" they were 
selling.36 
As soon as he was able, 'fully contacted Consul Murray, who 
immediately asked the local provost marshal to detain the 
men in Camp Barry, the rendezvous outside Portland. By the 
time the provost marshal's order arrived, the men were al-
ready on their way to the Army of the Potomac. 37 
Urged on by Murray from Portland and by 'fully, who wrote 
appeals from the fighting front, Lyons demanded an immedi-
ate investigation. He also insisted on the removal of the men 
from the combat zone so there could be no chance of their being 
injured or killed. The War Department ignored the latter re-
quest but quickly initiated an investigation. Usually investi-
gations began several months after being requested; the Tully 
investigation was held two weeks after the men left for the 
front. 
The investigation was cursory at best, but it differed from 
others of its type. Instead of merely gathering written evidence 
from recruiting officials and commanding officers, the War 
Department sent an examining board to Portland, where it 
questioned police officers and recruiting officials. Police de-
nied withholding food and water and swore under oath that 
'fully demanded release to enlist and get the bounty. The re-
cruiting officers maintained that the mcim were sober and 
signed the enlistment papers willingly and agreed without 
hesitation to purchase the items offered them. Reviewing the 
report of the investigation, the War Department recommended 
against discharge. 38 
The decision infuriated Lyons, and he refused to accept it as 
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final. Soon after, Tully became ill and was sent to a hospital in 
Washington. Lyons arranged a meeting and obtained a state-
ment from him declaring the entire testimony given at Port~ 
land to be false. When milit~y officials discovered that Tully 
had been in contact with the legation, they immediately sent 
him to a hospital in Philadelphia. But, using Tully's statement 
as a basis, Lyons demanded another hearing in Portland. This 
time, however, he insisted that the Irishmen be present to testi-
fy on their own behalf and that they be represented by legal 
counsel. 39 Shortly afterward, Lyons contracted typhoid fever 
and suffered a physical breakdown and Charge d'affaires Burn-
ley took over the direction of the legation. 
Both the State and the War departments accepted Lyons's 
demands. The army returned six of the Irishmen to Portland 
but, according to Tully, army personnel mistreated them at 
every step of their journey. While in.Washington, D.C., the 
men were confined to Old Capitol Prison, and from there they. 
were sent to Portland in handcuffs and under guard. The sec-
ond investigation took place in early August. The police and 
recruiting officers stuck by their original testimony and did 
not waiver from their conviction that the seven had been in-
ducted legally. Of the Irishmen, only Tully, Higgins, and Mor-
an testified and, according to Consul Murray, their statements 
were confused and inconsistent. The soldiers' lawyer, although 
he charged three hundred dollars, was of little help to his cli-
ents. In early October the War Department again refused to 
discharge Tully and his comrades. Giving his own impression 
of the investigation, Murray concluded: ''There is evidently 
false swearing somewhere though not more perhaps than is to 
be expected where there is an allegation of fraud and the inter-
ested persons are examined as witnesses." 40 
At Burnley's urging the men were kept in Portland until the 
matter could be referred to the Foreign Office. In. his letter 
transmitting the full report of the investigation, Burnley noted 
that Seward had agreed with the War Department's decision. 
Burnley considered Seward's opinion of little value because, 
according to him, it was based on a summary and not the com-
plete report. In England, Russell turned the report over to 
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Crown lawyers, who disagreed with the American decision and 
insisted that the entire affair was "a plot of the recruiting offi-
cers and the police." Still, the War Department refused to re-
verse itself and returned the men to the front.41 
The fortunes of the seven.Jrishmen varied. Thomas·Burke 
met his death in the Battle of the Wilderness on May 8, 1864, 
before the second investigation was held. On the same day, Ed-
ward Cassidy was wounded, and there is nothing further in his 
record. No record exists for Martin Hogan. Michael Byrne de-
serted after the group was returned to Maine and probably 
fled to Canada. Michael Moran and James Higgins became 
prisoners of war after being sent back to the front. Paroled in 
March 1865, they received discharges in June. Tully reenlisted 
at the end of the war and served as a private at various West-
·ern posts until1869. He entered a soldier's home in Leaven-
worth, Kansas, in 1890, and died there in 1898.42 
In the midst of the 'fully investigations, Seward remarked 
to Lyons on the "good relations" between Britain and the 
United States. The comment took Lyons by surprise: "I could 
not take quite so complacent a view as Mr. Seward .... Per-
haps I attach too much importance to cases of impressment 
which are the labour of my life. It is not true that British Sub-
jects suffer more in these respects than Frenchmen or other 
Foreigners though it would be natural they should. They suf-
fer rather less than American citizens, of course." 43 
Regardless of what he said, Seward knew that fraudulent 
enlistments remained a point of contention between the two 
nations, and he sought to ease the situation. In August 1864 
he persuaded the War Department to hold all men claiming to 
be foreign nationals at their rendezvous until their cases were 
resolved. The same month, he approved new regulations rela-
tive to contracts with immigrants: every new arrival who en-
listed in the army had to renounce his former allegiance and 
declare his intention to become an American citizen, and all 
records concerned with his enlistment were to be forwarded to 
the Central Recruiting Board in Washington. Feeling a sense 
of elation, Burnley wrote to Russell: "If these rules and regula-
tions are consistently carried out, I have no doubt that they 
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will tend to [lessen] many of the evils which have arisen lat-
terly in Ireland." 44 
Still, it. took one more incident for the Lincoln administra-
tion to tighten its regulations. In January 1865, the Great 
Western arrived at New York City with ninety-six Irishmen, 
supposedly brought to work at the Bliss, Ward, and Rose glass 
factory. After they passed through immigration, the men were 
sequestered in a private room, plied with liquor, and encour-
aged to enlist. Sixty-two men enlisted, and those who refused 
were set at liberty without employment. When Consul Archi-
bald inquired into the matter, General Dix agreed that the en-
listments were questionable. However, all the regulations had 
been complied with; further, it would not have been feasible to 
seek discharges because the men had been shipped out imme-
diately and were assigned to various military units in Virginia 
and the further South. 45 
Shortly after the Great Western incident, the imnrigration 
service issued orders forbidding ships carrying imnrigrants to 
be boarded by private individuals before they were docked. In 
an amendatory act to the Enrollment Act of 1863 passed 
March 3, 1865, Congress stipulated that any individual or mil-
itary officer who forcibly or fraudUlently enlisted another per-
son could, upon conviction, be fined up to one thousand dollars 
and imprisoned for two years. 46 This provision, and the end of 
the war, eliminated bounty brokers from the recruiting scene. 
For some, their activities had been lucrative. Throughout the 
war, Federal, state, and local governments had paid close to 
$600,000,000 in bounties. How much of this money fell into 
the hands of brokers is unknown, but as early as March 1864, 
General Dix estimated they were pocketing eight-tenths of all 
bounty money paid.47 
The fraudulent induction of British nationals into the Union 
army gave Southern sympathizers in Parliament their chance 
to criticize Northern action and to demand punishment for the 
United States. The blatant conscription of 'fully and his com-
rades even brought denunciations of Lyons and accusations of 
ineptness on his part. Defending his minister, Russell declared, 
"I can only say for Lord Lyons that he has continually remons-
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trated ... with Mr. Seward .... Nothing has given him greater 
vexation and distress of mind than these proceedings. I say 
nothing about myself except that I have seconded the efforts of 
Lord Lyons." When the Earl ofClanricarde, a staunch Confeder-
ate sympathizer, demanded war because of fraudulent conscrip-
tions in the Union, Russell, aware of what went on behind the 
scenes, responded quickly and to the point. He admitted that 
the number of Britons inducted in the North was larger than in 
the South, but he pointed out that the Lincoln administration 
was keeping the door open to negotiation and was attempting to 
cope with the situation. Conversely, when the consuls remons-
trated in the South, they "were sent away altogether .... If war 
is our only remedy," Russell concluded, ''we must go to war with 
both belligerents."48 In his view, war with either the Union or 
the Confederacy was untenable; in the matter of conscription, 
one side was as guilty as the other. 
12 
At War's End 
Being a prisoner of war under any circumstances is a trauma-
tic experience. For an alien conscripted into the Confederate 
army and then captured by Union forces, the predicament was 
more distressing: first he had been compelled to· fight for a 
nation and a cause in which he had little or no interest, and 
then, because the Federal government required an oath of al-
legiance before releasing any prisoner, he was forced to take 
an oath to a nation even though he was not one of its citizens. 
Wilkins, the only consul in Union-held portions of the Mis-
sissippi Valley, encountered this problem shortly after the bat-
tles of Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, and by the 
end of the year he had received two hundred applications from 
British subjects requesting release from prisoner of war camps. 
When he sought direction from Lyons, the foreign minister sug-
gested that Wilkins "exert all his influence unofficially in [the 
prisoners'] favor. I do not feel justified ... to apply officially for. 
their liberation as a matter of right." But as the numbers grew, 
Lyons appealed for an established policy from the War Depart-
ment. He hoped the department would devise an oath of neu-
trality similar to the one Seward had designed for arrested Brit-
ish civilians in 1861, which would permit alien soldiers to 
subscribe it rather than to take an oath of allegiance.! 
At first the War Department tried to evade the issue, declar-
ing it would deal only with specific cases. The department, 
wrote Assistant Secretary Wolcott, received daily requests from 
prisoners of war who claimed they had been forced to fight un-
willingly, and "it refused to take action in such cases."2 
Even though Lyons submitted specific names and requested 
releases for these individuals, the War Department procrasti-
nated. In every case it insisted on proof, other than the claim-
ant's word, of his ·alienage and his forceful conscription. As 
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Lyons and several of the consuls realized, such evidence was 
almost impossible for a prisoner of war to. obtain, and slowly 
they became aware that most prisoners who claimed foreign 
citizenship had little chance of freedom before the end of the 
war. Finally, in desperation, Lyons appealed to the War De-
partment to allow these men to take an oath of neutrality to 
prevent them from being exchanged and possibly thrown into 
the fighting again. a 
Lyons approached the prisoner of. war issue halfheartedly. 
From the beginning he had realized that British citizens in the 
Southern army would find it difficult or impossible to prove 
their forced enlistment. As Seward informed him in 1863, 
"cases of a similar character are constantly occurring [and] it 
is inexpedient to grant release at present." The burden of proof 
lay with the prisoner and placed nearly impossible conditions 
on him. Lyons also empathized with the War Department's re-
luctance to free prisoners on a decla:ration of alienage alone 
because he knew that such a policy could work against its 
strategy of depriving the Confederacy of soldiers. In the end he 
merely informed his consuls to present only those cases in 
. which proof was incontestable. To· forward applications made 
merely on the basis of personal statements, he concluded, 
would "cause irritation and prejudice any cases having out-
standing claims." 4 
Even after the fighting ended, the War Department contin-
ued to demand oaths of allegiance from men held as prisoners 
of war. As late as August 1865 Frederick Bruce, Lyons's re-
placement at the legation, appealed fot the release of British 
subjects still imprisoned. As one of them reported from the 
prisoner of war camp on Johnson's Island in Lake Erie, Con-
federates were being released at. the rate of two hundred to 
three hundred a day, but he remained because he refused to 
take the oath of allegiance. 5 The record does not indicate 
whether the holdouts finally swore allegiance to the United 
States, but given the unyielding attitude of the War Depart-
ment it seems likely they did. 
With the ending of the war, the Foreign Office assessed the 
work of its legation in Washington and the British consuls in 
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the Union and Confederacy. Lord Russell said little about the 
Northern consuls and, instead, focused on those in the South. 
Possibly his concern lay there because of the total collapse of 
communications between Britain and the Confederacy and be-
cause of the expulsion of the consuls in 1863, He was also more 
aware of Southern consular problems because the Southern 
consuls had corresponded frequently with the Foreign Office, 
whereas consuls in the North had worked through the lega-
tion. Most of Russell's comments dealt with the expulsion of 
the Southern consuls. Unlike Lyons, who blamed both Walker 
and Fullarton, Russell directed his enmity at Fullarton alone. 
While he approved of the consul's efforts to keep British sub-
jects out of the Southern army, he thought Fullarton's state-
ment advising these men ''to desert their colors at the moment 
of action'' was unjustifiable. Had Benjamin communicated 
Fullarton's comment to the Foreign Office, Russell would have 
''thought it right to reprimand and even dismiss the consul 
who had acted in so improper a manner."6 
Viewing Russell's attitude with historical hindsight, it ap-
pears somewhat harsh. The burden of preventing forced con-
scriptions into the Confederate army fell on Walker and Fullar-
ton, and neither had experience or training as a consul or a 
diplomat. Each was named to his post as a matter of expediency, 
and, in his anxiety to avoid any problems with the Richmond 
government over exequaturs, Russell overlooked the appoin-
tees' lack of experience. And Walker and Fullarton found them-
selves dealing with situations that would have challenged even 
trained diplomats. 
In retrospect, George Moore at Richmond deserves as much 
criticism, or even more. Having been a consul since 1836, his 
experience was more extensive,7 but ill health and a dislike of 
Richmond caused him to foist most of the work off onto Crid-
land. When Moore was finally forced to assume total responsi-
bility, he showed as little diplomatic skill as his fellow-consuls 
to the South. Because his involvement came just as public pres-
sure to expel the consuls reached its height, he probably would 
not have been able to prevent his own expulsion· at any rate. 
Another drawback for the Southern consuls was their inabil-
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ity to seek advice from either Lyons or the Foreign Office at the 
time their difficulties were occurring. Between 1861 and 1863, 
communication with the world outside the Confederacy was er-
ratic at best; after that date it became even more difficult. The 
increasing effectiveness of the blockade and doubts about the 
abilities of individual blockade runners to get through, left oc-
casiomJ:l British men-of-war the only sure means for the consuls 
to contact London or Washington. Dates of receipt stamped on 
Walker's correspondence to the Foreign Office between 1863 
and 1865 indicate that his letters arrived six to eight weeks 
after they had been written. Before the war it usually took two 
weeks for a letter from Charleston to reach London. s The inabil-
ity to communicate quickly with their superiors forced both 
Walker and Fullarton to act without direction. 
On the matter of conscription, consuls in the South had to 
deal with two governmental entities, the individual states and 
the State Department at Richmond. After the passage of the 
Union's Enrollment Act of 1863, the Federal government han-
dled the issue of alien conscription. Thus, consuls in the North 
could refer their insolvable problems to the legation, which of-
fered solutions or took over the more difficult cases. 
The ease with which Northern consuls confronted issues 
can be attributed to direction from the legation. Communica-
tion between the Northern consuls and the legation was rapid 
and constant, and as a result, policies were uniform. 
The N()rthern consuls also had the advantage of experience. 
A few. had only recently taken up their posts in the United 
States, but, at the beginning of the war, the average length of 
. service for Northern consuls was ten years. Archibald's experi-
ence as consul was not as extensive, but his long career in New-
foundland politics made up for his lack of consular training.s 
Finally, Seward's willingness to understand concerns about 
the treatment of British citizens paved the way to solving indi-
vidual problems, which improved relations as the war contin-
ued. Lord Lyons reported to the Foreign Office Seward's efforts 
to resolve difficult issues as best he could within the depart-
mentalized structure of the American government. Whereas 
Seward's cooperation served the Union well, the South's grow-
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ing hostility toward Britain worked against it. By expelling the 
consuls and cutting all communications with Britain, the South 
became its own worst enemy in achieving its diplomatic objec-
tives. 
The end of the war brought a number of changes within the 
consular corps and at the legation. The majority of the "consuls 
retained their posts and continued their usual duties; Archi-
bald, Bunch, Cridland, and Walker were exceptions and re-
ceived significant recognition from the Foreign Office. 
Archibald remained consul general at New York until his 
retirement in 1882, but he was appointed to the British dele-
gation that settled the Alabama claims in Geneva, Switzer-
land, in 1872. This British-American commission drew up a 
settlement of outstanding claims between the United States 
and Great Britain as a result of the Civil War. Undoubtedly, 
Archibald's role as consul gave him deep awareness about the 
validity of claims filed by British citizens.1o 
Russell named Bunch as consul general of Cuba in 1864, and 
two years later reassigned him to the same position in Col-
ombia. The promotion came as a result of Bunch's role in gain-
ing Confederate consent to the Declaration of Paris in 1861 and 
as a result of Lyons's efforts on his behalf. "I hope I am not doing 
wrong in saying," Lyons wrote to Russell as early as 1862, "that 
it would be very painful to me personally, if, in consequence [of 
the withdrawal of Bunch's exequatur] he should find himself in 
a worse position professionally than that in which he now 
stands, as consul at Charleston." Lyons went on to extol Bunch 
as a ''valuable public servant" and the only reliable source on 
information on events in the South. "My object is to lay before 
you my own personal desire," he concluded,''that ifnot a gainer, 
he may at least not be a loser, professionally, by what has oc-
curred." Informing Lyons of his new position, Bunch acknowl-
edged the foreign minister's support: "Had it not been for your 
warm recommendation ... I might, very probably, have been 
'left out in the cold.'" u 
Cridland and Walker were appointed to full consulships. Af-
ter long· years as vice-consul, Cridland became consul at· Mo-
bile in 1865.12 Over Lyons's objections, Russell named Walker 
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consul at Charleston at the same time. Still retaining some the 
animosity he felt toward Walker during the war, Lyons op-
posed the appointment, but Russell felt some obligation be-
cause Walker "has been acting as [consul] with great vigilance 
and ability." As evidence of Walker's diligence, Russell pointed 
out that he had sold his home and personal possessions follow-
ing his expulsion and had remained in Charleston to look after 
British interests. Walker, moreover, had paved the way for his 
own advancement by persuading Union military authorities to 
recognize him as consul when Charleston fell into Northern 
hands. 
Although Russell conferred the post on Walker, the terms of 
the appointment indicated a decline in Charleston's position as 
a listening post for events in the South. Whereas Bunch had 
been restricted to consular duties only, Walker was permitted 
"to trade." His duties became chiefly commercial and did not 
stipulate any "special considerations" as did Bunch's.1a 
These postwar appointments recognized important wartime 
roles or responsibilities of the consuls, for each in his own way 
gave advice that helped discourage either diplomatic recogni-
tion of the South or attempts at mediation. Because the For-
eign Office regarded the consular corps as distinct from the 
diplomatic, Russell probably would have denied any influence 
on the consuls' part; still, a comparison of consular correspon-
dence with events taking place in England indicates their 
influence. 
The crisis point in British-American relations came in the 
late summer and autumn of 1862. In August, Prime Minister 
Palmerston, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gladstone, and Rus-
sell were slowly coming to the conclusion that an offer of medi-
ation to both the Union and the Confederacy would be a hu-
manitarian gesture sanctioned by international practice and 
would also serve British interests by making available sup-
plies of raw cotton. Yet, in November, the British cabinet re-
jected just such a proposal. On October 30, 1862, Napoleon III 
communicated a suggestion to Russia and Great Britain that 
along with France they formally propose. a six-month armi-
stice, during which time the Union blockade would be with-
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drawn and the belligerents would attempt to reach a peaceful 
settlement, with the powers serving as mediators. Russia re-
jected the proposition outright. Britain also declined but left 
the impression it might consider such a proposal in the future. 
The fortunes of war began to favor the Union, especially after 
Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and further suggestions for joint 
intervention and mediation were never made.14 
The most persuasive arguments against mediation were 
made in Britain by George Cornewell Lewis, secretary for war, 
in a number of memoranda to the cabinet and in letters to the 
Times of London. Lewis contended that mediation would lead 
to diplomatic recognition, an honor the Confederacy did not 
deserve. Lee's recent defeat at Antietam and the Union's con-
tinued ability to hold New Orleans, the South's major port, 
indicated weaknesses on the Confederacy's part and raised 
doubt that it could maintain its independence. The force of 
Lewis's argument was strengthened by a letter from Consul 
Cridland, stating that morale in Richmond was a its lowest 
ebb, inflation so rampant that average citizens found the price 
of food beyond their reach, and drunkenness and robbery so 
common that many people "carry all their possessions on their 
persons to keep them safe." 15 
Lewis also claimed that England could expect to gain little 
diplomatic advantage from a mediation effort and that all hon-
or would be placed in the hands of "our copartner" (France). 
That the Confederacy would not be inclined to give England 
credit is borne out by Bunch's letters, which were the best 
source of information the Foreign Office received on Southern 
attitudes toward England. A reading of his comments indicates 
a lack of sincerity in the initial declarations of appreciation for 
English government and culture and a growing resentment 
slowly turning to outright hostility. By the fall of 1862, anti-
British feeling had grown to such proportions that Bunch could 
only relate to his government: ''We have nothing to expect from 
the good will ofthe South."16 Given Southern antagonism to-
ward Britain, the Confederacy, in all probability, would have 
given France full credit for a successful mediation effort. 
If England had little to gain because the growing enmity of 
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the South, she had more to fear from the Northern reaction to a 
mediation proposal, claimed Lewis. Interference in the Ameri-
can conflict would almost certainly lead to a war, and Britain 
would have to confront the growing American army and the 
Union navy, now almost as strong as Britain's. In all likelihood 
the Union would attack Canada, and the logistics of transport-
ing a military force to North America would be formidable. Al-
most simultaneously with the presentation of Lewis's argu-
ment, Consul Archibald warned that any attempt at mediation 
would bring war. ''The present conjuncture of affairs demon-
strates the wisdom of abstinence from recognition or media-
tion," he wrote. ''It will give scope for political combinations, in 
which unscrupulous men will not hesitate, if practicable, to 
embroil this country in a war with England in order to pro-
mote their projects of reconstruction of the Union. I cannot 
help feeling that there has not yet been a time when it would 
be more important than at the present ... to adhere to the 
observance of strict neutrality."17 That Archibald's thoughts 
made an impression on the Foreign Office is evident. His let-
ter was stamped "confidential" and circulated among members 
of the cabinet. 
Even Lyons became involved in the argument against medi-
ation. On leave in England as the issue was coming to head, he 
urged caution, but caution gave way to outright opposition 
sometime between his departure from England and his arrival 
in the United States in early November 1862. Lincoln's dis-
missal of General George B. McClellan and recent Republican 
losses in the congressional elections fostered the change in 
Lyons's attitude. McClellan's dismissal, surmised Lyons, indi-
cated Lincoln's capitulations to the radical element of his par-
ty and the probability of his caving in to their future demands. 
If mediation were suggested, radical Republicans would in 
turn insist on war as a means of regaining popular support 
and remaining·in power. Even if war were not an outcome, an 
offer of mediation at the present time would be rejected and 
would weaken any subsequent. offers the powers might make. 
'~ll things considered," the minister concluded, "my own opin-
ion certainly is that the present moment is not a favourable 
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one for making an offer of mediation." 1s The input of Lyons 
and his consuls considered as isolated statements, might ap-
pear to have had little impact, yet taken together and coming 
about the same time, they strengthened Lewis's argument 
that mediation was not in Britain's best interest in the fall of 
1862. 
In addition to recommending a policy of restraint, through-
out the war, Lyons kept the Foreign office aware of Seward's 
efforts to solve contentious issues. It was fortunate for both the 
United States and England that Lyons and Seward became 
warm and cordial friends. When Lyons informed Russell in 
1861 that he regarded Seward as an inappropriate choice for 
secretary of state, he could hardly have guessed that two years 
later he would write: Seward "has so much vanity, personal 
and natural, that he seldom makes a favourable impression at 
first. When one comes really to know him, one is surprised to 
find much to esteem and even to like in him." 19 
Informing Seward of his departure from his post as minister 
in March 1865, Lyons concluded his letter by saying, ''I must 
therefore bid you farewell. I do so with much gratitude for the 
kindness you showed me for many years, ... I trust that when 
all these troubles are overpast, you will remember not alto-
gether without satisfaction the official as well as the private 
relations which we maintained during the trying time we 
went through." 2o 
During his years in Washington, Lyons had maintained cau-
tion, discretion, and a. steadiness of purpose that garnered re-
spect for him personally and for his country. Although not as 
outgoing as the other foreign ministers in Washington, he im-
pressed Seward as being more trustworthy. His lack of flam-
boyance did not detract from his sincerity. Lyons never ex-
pressed his distaste for slavery publicly, but undoubtedly it 
came out in the many private conversations between the min-
ister and secretary of state. Their mutual desire to prevent a 
British-American war and their growing ability to work in cor-
diality and to appreciate each other's viewpoints created a 
friendship between the two men. This was evident in Seward's 
response to Lyons's announcement of his departure: "I have 
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never desponded of my country, of emancipation of her slaves, 
and of her resumption of her position as an agent of peace, 
progress, and civilization, interests which I never fail to be-
lieve are common with all branches of the British family. So I 
have had no doubt that, when this dreadful war shall be ended, 
the United States and Great Britain would be reconciled and 
become better friends than ever. I have thought that you are 
entitled to share in these great successes, as you have borne so 
great a part of the trials of the war." 21 
Nor did Russell overlook Lyons's achievements. Ill when he 
left the United States, Lyons spent several months recuperat-
ing in England. After he regained his health, Russell appoin-
ted him ambassador to Turkey, which was considered a prime 
British diplomatic post in the nineteenth century. Two years 
later Lyons was named ambassador to France, where he re-
mained until his retirement in 1887. 
Lyons was replaced by Sir Frederick Bruce, a man of wide 
experience who as minister to China had gained the Lincoln 
administration's respect by refusing to grant British registra-
tion to Confederate ships in Asian waters. ·Bruce, however, 
never developed a rapport with the State Department and 
with Seward. He arrived in Washington the week of Lincoln's 
assassination and the attack on Seward. Because the secretary 
was bedridden for the next several months, Bruce worked 
chiefly with Frederick Seward, assistant secretary, and clerks 
in the State Department. Then, in 1867, approximately two 
years after his arrival in the United States, Bruce suddenly 
died while on a trip to New York City.22 
If Archibald's correspondence to the British legation and the 
Foreign Office is any indication, consular duties became less 
concerned with wartime issues during the early months of 
1865. His last correspondence over the enforced conscription of 
immigrants dealt with the Great Western affair in January. 
From then on, his duties became routine: reports of marriages, 
deaths, and the increases in shipping. He also informed the For-
eign Office about the search for a fugitive from justice; the 
granting of passports, and problems in aiding destitute Britons 
stranded in the United States.2a 
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Nevertheless, Archibald and his fellow consuls reflected on 
the war and the changes it had brought. Always pro-Union, 
Archibald praised the Union's military success in 1865 and re-
minded his superiors that he had predicted it. From Charles-
ton, Henry Pinckney Walker remarked on the economic im-
pact of emancipation and the anxiety caused by the presence of 
large numbers of free blacks and black troops in Charleston. 
He implied that racial attitudes in the nation would have to 
undergo significant alteration before social calm was achieved. 
In Boston, Francis Lousada marvelled at America's ability to 
enhance its industrial and agricultural might while carrying 
on a conflict of such magnitude as its Civil War. What each 
consul saw depended on his vantage point: military advance, 
necessity for social and political change, and economic im-
provement. Still, no matter what they perceived, Archibald, 
Walker, and Lousada acknowledged that the country had de-
veloped into a major power and would never be the same;24 
And although they never said so, the return to regular consul-
ar duties undoubtedly made their workday~ less challenging 
than they had been before war's end. 
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